



BRITISH POLICY IN PALESTINE

BY PAUL L. HANNA

WITH AN INTRODUCTION
BY JOSEPHUS DANIELS



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Introduction

Those were anxious days in the Fall of 1917 when the British War Cabinet issued the Balfour Declaration. The collapse of Russia was imminent, the military situation of the Allies on every front was precarious, and the strength of America had not yet asserted itself. Primarily the Balfour Declaration was a war measure designed to attract to the Allied cause the moral and material resources of the Jewish communities of the world. But the Declaration was far more than such a timely expedient. To the statesmen of Britain and America, who pondered the policy and weighed every word of the brief announcement, the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine was an act of historic justice which the nations owed to a homeless and long-suffering people; and not a few of them were deeply stirred by the prospect of witnessing the fulfillment of a millennial hope and prophetic promise.

The present writer was a member of the cabinet of President Woodrow Wilson when the policy to which the Balfour Declaration gave expression was approved by the President. It so happened that President Wilson asked me to voice his approval in a speech at a great Zionist meeting held in Carnegie Hall. In that address I pointed out, in expressing thanks for the allusion by the Chairman, Judge Julian W. Mack, to the part I, as Secretary of the Navy, had played in dispatching food to Palestine, that chief credit for my acts should be rightly extended "to that defender of the rights of the smaller nationalities to lead their own lives and develop, unhindered, their own culture, to that man who has put the seal of American approval on the Zionist movement, to the world-leader and President—Woodrow Wilson." Voicing my own sentiments, I took occasion to "testify to my great pleasure that President Wilson has finally uttered the word that you have been waiting so long, so eagerly to hear, the word which by your sacrifices, by your devotion to your history and traditions, by your staunchness to the cause of humanity, by your loyalty to the cause of America and its associates in this war, you have so well deserved to hear."

Twenty-five years have passed since the Balfour Declaration was issued, and the present study by Dr. Paul L. Hanna provides a timely and unbiased review of the progress that has been made in

the accomplishment of its purpose and of the obstacles that have been encountered. The progress is represented by the growth of the Jewish population of Palestine from 50,000 to 550,000; by scores of agricultural settlements that have transformed rocky or marshy wastes into flourishing gardens; by cities and suburbs teeming with industry and commerce; by the eradication of disease and the introduction of scientific methods; by a modern school system, a splendid university and other institutions of education and culture. The physical obstacles, as in the case of other pioneering enterprises, have of course been formidable, but the obstacle that has loomed largest and the one to which this work devotes considerable attention has been the opposition of the Arabs.

The question of the effect which the influx of Jewish immigrants and the progress of Jewish enterprise might have upon the Arabs was not ignored in the deliberations that preceded the publication of the Balfour Declaration. That question was carefully weighed, as the wording of the Declaration itself goes to prove. None of the parties to the arrangement, including the Arabs themselves, can complain that they were not consulted. In the case of the Arabs the evidence is contained in a letter dated March 3, 1919, which the Emir Feisal, later King of Iraq, addressed to Felix Frankfurter, who was a member of the American Jewish delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris. In that letter the accredited Arab spokesman declared: "The Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with deepest sympathy on the Zionist Movement. Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday by the Zionist Organization to the Peace Conference and we regard them as moderate and proper. We will do our best in so far as we are concerned to help their attainment; we will offer the Jews a hearty welcome home."

The achievements of the Arabs at the Peace Conference, it should be noted, far surpassed those of the Jews. After centuries of subjection to Turkish rule, the Arab countries of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and, somewhat later, Transjordan, were established as national states under Arab rule. Towards this consummation an important contribution was made by America. It was President Wilson's insistence on the principle of self-determination that swept aside secret treaties and arrangements that would have prevented the application of that principle to the Arabs. America desired to see justice done to the Arabs; moreover, American desired equally to see justice done to the Jews. This desire did not terminate with the publication of the Balfour Declaration and its incorporation into the text of the Palestine Mandate. In September 1922, President Warren G. Harding affixed his signature to a joint resolution which had been adopted without a dissenting vote in both Houses of Con-

gress and which read as follows: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected."

Further, by reason of the fact that the United States had elected not to become a member of the League of Nations, a special Convention was concluded between Great Britain and America on the subject of Palestine. Included in this document, which is known as the American-British Palestine Mandate Convention of December 3, 1924, is the full text of the Palestine Mandate, the preamble of which contains the following: that "the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on the 2nd November, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

The inclusion of the Mandate and its preamble in the Convention was suggested by Lord Curzon, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, himself. In a note of October 2, 1922, to United States Ambassador Harvey, he declared that the British Government was "anxious . . . that the convention should contain a specific allusion to the policy of establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, having regard to the interest taken in this policy in the United States and the warm support which it has received in that country, of which the recent resolutions of both houses of Congress have afforded striking evidence."

The interest of America in the progress of the Jewish National Home continued unabated. It found expression not only in the utterances of all the Presidents who succeeded Woodrow Wilson, but in those of other leaders of American thought and action and in the organs of American public opinion. A significant manifestation of this interest appears in a statement to which sixty-eight members of the United States Senate have recently subscribed. Quoting the joint resolution adopted by the Senate and House of Representatives in 1922, the statement asserts that "it has thus become the declared policy of the United States to favor the restoration of Pales-

tine as a National Home for the Jewish people.” The statement continues as follows:

“The unprecedented work of rehabilitation of the Holy Land and the restoration of a people has proceeded uninterruptedly and is continuing even now despite war conditions. The refugee problem has become aggravated with the years. Of late, the United States has been admitting numbers of refugees although it has assumed no obligation in that direction. Obviously, however, the limited numbers which are being admitted here cannot begin to cope with the problem.

“On the other hand, Palestine has been recognized and set apart by Great Britain with the approval of the United States and other nations, as a haven for the Jewish people, and refugees are streaming to its shores despite restrictive measures recently enforced by the Administration of that country. The tragic plight of refugees fleeing from persecution and finding no home, a situation brought so dramatically to the attention of the world by the sinking of refugee ships with their human cargo, must compel our attention and strengthen our resolve to extend every possible encouragement to the movement for the restoration of the Jews in Palestine, as a great humanitarian effort and in accordance with the spirit of Biblical prophecy.”

The course of world events in the past quarter century, and particularly since the spirit of aggression and violence was allowed to gain sway in many lands, has influenced Britain to modify her Palestine policy. The new policy announced by the White Paper issued in 1939 by the government of Neville Chamberlain, with its drastic restrictions of the right of Jews to migrate into Palestine and of their right to purchase land there—two rights that are essential to the development of their national home—cannot be interpreted otherwise than as an abrogation of the Balfour Declaration. It was so interpreted by Winston Churchill who, in a Parliamentary debate on the White Paper which took place on May 23, 1939, declared: “As one intimately and responsibly concerned in the earlier stages of that policy, I could not stand by and see solemn engagements into which Britain has entered before the world set aside for reasons of administrative convenience or—and it will be a vain hope—for the sake of a quiet life.”

A study of the circumstances surrounding the genesis of the White Paper of 1939 leaves little room for doubt that the sinister forces that had been unleashed in Berlin, Tokyo and Rome were directly or indirectly accountable for it. The change of policy it embodies was adopted by Britain under a species of duress. Indeed, the point for Americans to bear steadily in mind is that Palestine was not made a British possession at the end of the last war

and has never become one—that it was to be administered as an international trust with a well defined object in view. That object was solemnly approved by all the members of the League of Nations and by our own country; and the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League, set up to supervise the execution of the trust, repeatedly criticized the whittling down of the Mandate on successive occasions and finally refused its assent to the repudiation implicit in the White Paper.

So far as our own position is concerned, the record is perfectly clear. Under Woodrow Wilson we were moral co-sponsors of the Jewish National Home. Through Wilson we fought the secret treaties and helped the Arabs along the road toward freedom and independence in Arab lands on the condition and with the distinct understanding that the Jewish people would also be helped along toward freedom and independence in Palestine. From that time to this the sentiments of the American people and the attitude of the American government have never changed or faltered.

It is apparent, moreover, that the reasons that prompted the original policy are more urgent today than they were twenty-five years ago. The plight of the homeless, desperate and terrorized Jews of Europe is immeasurably more tragic. It now includes all of them without regard to class or station. From the walled ghettos of the continent, from the forests where they seek escape from their tormentors they lift up their eyes and see no other land of refuge but Palestine. In the opinion of Field-Marshal Jan Christian Smuts, that great soldier and statesman who played an important role in the adoption of the Balfour Declaration, the case in behalf of that document has become overwhelmingly stronger: "The case has become one not merely of promises and international law, but for the conscience of mankind. We dare not fold our hands without insulting the human spirit itself."

Not only has the situation changed in Europe. It has changed in Palestine also. The Jewish National Home has emerged from the realm of theory to the realm of fact. The Jews have demonstrated their ability to pioneer their way through to national rehabilitation, and Palestine has demonstrated her capacity to sustain their efforts. The Jewish community of Palestine, the majority of which consists of refugees from Nazi persecution and terror, constitutes a National Home in miniature. It is more urgent than ever that that National Home should be permitted to grow and develop and fulfill its promise.

Thus the problem of the Jewish National Home is not limited to the immediate political alignments in Palestine. The problem is co-extensive with Jewish homelessness and with the obligation that rests on the nations to find a solution for it. Sir Norman Angell

has given convincing expression to this obligation. "The peace and welfare of civilization demand that this ancient sore be healed," Sir Norman has said. "It is not a question of the politics of Palestine, but of the politics of civilization."

The vast extent of the area dominated by the Arabs in relation to tiny Palestine has been emphasized by Arthur James Balfour himself. In an address he delivered in London in 1920, Lord Balfour said:

"I hope they (the Arabs) will remember it is we who have established the independent Arab sovereignty of the Hedjaz. I hope they will remember that it is we who desire in Mesopotamia to prepare the way for the future of a self-governing, autonomous Arab State; and I hope that, remembering all that, they will not begrudge that small notch—for it is no more geographically, whatever it may be historically—that small notch in what are now Arab territories, being given to the people who for all these hundreds of years have been separated from it, but surely have a title to develop on their own lines in the land of their forefathers, which ought to appeal to the sympathy of the Arab people as it, I am convinced, appeals to the great mass of my own Christian fellow-countrymen."

"Small notch" though Palestine be in the vast Arab territories, the special position of the Jewish National Home should not be ignored in any plan for the further political integration of the Near East through an Arab Confederation or other form of union. Nothing will be gained and a great deal in terms of peace and stability will be lost by subjecting the Jewish National Home to the domination of forces that may prove hostile to it. In this respect Christian Lebanon is in the same situation as the Jewish National Home. Both are non-Moslem, and their cultural orientation is as much toward the west as toward the east. The world order for which we are striving will not tolerate a policy of riding roughshod over small neighbors and unprotected minorities.

With the defeat and downfall of the Axis, for which America and all of the United Nations now fight and toil, a new and determined effort will be made to reconstruct the world on a basis of justice and lasting peace. Among those who will come forward and plead for a dignified place in the family of nations will be the Arabs, for there is no doubt that their aspirations have not yet been fully satisfied even in the countries in which Arab states have been established. Without venturing upon the hazards of prophecy, one may nevertheless say that the extent to which the postwar claims of the Arabs will be met will depend largely upon their readiness to be just and fair to other peoples who have equal claims upon the justice and humanity of the civilized world. "He who demands equity must practice equity."

All should remember now and later that the same hand which conferred freedom upon the Arabs throughout the Near East, also opened the gates of Palestine to the Jews. Justice, like security, is indivisible.

As for America, there is every reason to believe that, as at the end of the previous war, we shall again uphold the just claims of the Arabs. But, as in the previous case, America will also insist on justice for the Jews. It should be possible to harmonize the reasonable aspirations of both claimants. There is a vast area available for further national progress by the Arabs, at the same time as the Jews are given full opportunity to develop their National Home in Palestine.

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CHAPTER ONE

The Background

PALESTINE, the land of peace—holy alike to Moslems, Hebrews and Christians—became a scene of unending strife in the period between the First World War and the outbreak of the new conflict in September, 1939. Jew contended with Arab, Arab strove against Jew, and both came to look with resentment upon the British administration which ruled them under a mandate of the League of Nations. The one asked for a place in the ancient land of his fathers; the other demanded the independence of a country predominantly Arabic in culture. Between stood the English government, groping for a means of compromise. Bound to foster the creation of a Jewish national home by the Balfour Declaration and the mandate, but influenced against coercion of the Arabs by considerations of expediency, democratic ideals of self-determination and vague but embarrassing pledges, the British government sought in vain to conciliate the two. Unwilling to repudiate the Balfour Declaration, Britain was equally reluctant to enforce it fully in the face of Arab opposition. The measures it did adopt aroused the antagonism of Jews and Arabs, and the effect of these measures merely increased and intensified the friction between the two rival nationalities. The position of Britain in the strategically important eastern Mediterranean was thus weakened in the face of a developing Italian threat and of a more distant but more serious German menace to the British Empire and its lines of communication.

An explanation of the Palestine situation must be sought in the interplay of the three forces involved—Arab nationalism, Zionism and British imperialism. The Arab nationalists demanded political independence for those areas of the Near East which had been for centuries inhabited by Arabic-speaking peoples, so that a virile and well-integrated society might revive the glories of medieval Arab culture. The Zionists desired to create in Palestine, the ancient homeland of Israel, a completely autonomous community large enough to allow the development of a healthy economic, political and cultural life upon a distinctly Hebrew pattern. Imperial policy forbade that any great power other than England should acquire

a dominant position upon the eastern flank of the Suez Canal or at the Haifa gateway of the overland routes to the Persian Gulf; it also required that the government controlling Palestine should be amenable to British influence. These three interests, developed over a long period of time, came into contact and frequently into conflict against a background of the geographic realities of the Holy Land.

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

Geographically, Palestine is an integral part of the Levantine coastal region which stretches from the Taurus range to the Sinai peninsula and from the Mediterranean shore to the Syrian desert.¹ This area is marked by a narrow maritime plain backed by a chain of mountains and highlands, beyond which the country slopes away to the desert. Two of the three principal rivers rise not far apart between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges. The Orontes flows north to the vicinity of Antioch and the Litani south to the extremity of the Lebanons before breaking through the mountain barriers to the Mediterranean. The third river—the Jordan—rises on the slopes of Mount Hermon and, dropping from a height of 1,000 feet above sea level to 1,200 feet below, flows southward into the Dead Sea.

The region south of the Lebanons, to which the names of Palestine and southern Syria were somewhat loosely applied prior to the First World War, is marked by a great variety of physical conditions. The coast is unindented except at the Bay of Acre which provides Haifa with the country's most satisfactory harbor. The mountains reach the Mediterranean in the north at the Ladder of Tyre and Mount Carmel, but along the rest of the coast there extends a plain which gradually widens toward the south until it merges into the Negeb, the semi-arid land of southern Palestine. Extending inland from the coast between the Galilean and Samaritan highlands, the great Vale of Esdraelon stretches its fertile length across Palestine to the Jordan valley. This plain offers the best route into the interior and makes Haifa a commercial outlet for Trans-Jordan, the Damascus region and Iraq. Esdraelon is well watered, capable of irrigation, and suited to grain-growing and mixed farming, while the coastal region has been found particularly suited to citrus culture. The soil of the Negeb, which extends across Palestine south of Hebron from the sea to the Wadi el 'Araba, is not infertile, but the scarcity of rainfall and the unlikelihood of irrigation have caused it to be abandoned almost entirely to a scanty Bedawin population.

The highlands of Palestine consist from north to south of the hills of Galilee, the uplands of Samaria, and the limestone plateau of Judea. In most of this region agriculture is possible, though in

the Judean hills, denuded of trees and badly eroded, farming offers considerable difficulties and scant returns.

A great depression, occupied by the valley of the Jordan and the Wadi el 'Araba, separates Trans-Jordan from western Palestine. In it lie Lake Huleh, surrounded by marshes which have rendered useless a large area of potentially rich agricultural land; the inland sea of Galilee; and the Dead Sea, which contains the country's principal store of mineral wealth in potash and valuable salts. Trans-Jordan lies on a plateau which, rising sharply from the Jordan valley, slopes away gently to the Syrian desert. In the north it is punctuated by the heights of the Jebel ed Druz. To the south it merges into the Arabian desert and reaches the Red Sea on the Gulf of 'Aqaba. East of the Hejaz Railway, which follows the old pilgrim track from Damascus to Ma'an and then on southward to Medina, the land is desert, but to the west it is fertile and the rainfall, though somewhat uncertain, is adequate for agriculture.

Prior to the middle of the nineteenth century Turkish administration in Syria and Palestine was ill organized and precarious. Administrative reforms in 1864 and 1887, however, resulted in the introduction and consolidation of a new provincial system. In the north was established the Vilayet of Aleppo; south along the coast, that of Beirut; and east, beyond the mountains and the Jordan, that of Syria or Damascus. The Vilayet of Beirut consisted from north to south of the sanjags of Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Acre and Balqa or Nablus. Between the sanjags of Tripoli and Beirut lay the independent Sanjaq of the Lebanon, which after 1864 enjoyed a special status and was dependent directly upon Constantinople and not upon the Vali of Beirut. South of the Sanjaq of Balqa and reaching to the Egyptian frontier lay the independent Sanjaq of Jerusalem which after 1887 enjoyed a status somewhat similar to that of the Lebanon. The Vilayet of Syria was divided from north to south into the sanjags of Hama, Damascus, Hauran and Ma'an.²

In the post-war settlement, Cis-Jordan and Trans-Jordan, though both under British mandate, were given separate administrations. The name Palestine is now limited to the former, which emerged from this partition severely restricted in size. It stretches along the Mediterranean Sea between the Lebanon and Egypt for an average length of 160 miles. Its extreme width is less than 70 miles and its total area is only about 10,100 square miles, of which 261 are water. Palestine is thus roughly comparable in size to Belgium or Wales.³ Its northern frontier begins on the coast at the Ladder of Tyre and runs east to the Jordan valley with a salient projecting to the north between the states of the Lebanon and Syria to include part of the upper reaches of the Jordan. The eastern border with Syria follows the left bank of the Jordan and the

shores of Lake Huleh and the Sea of Galilee. The boundary between Trans-Jordan and Palestine is formed by the Jordan, the Dead Sea and the Wadi el 'Araba. In the south the frontier with Egypt runs from the head of the Gulf of 'Aqaba to the Mediterranean Sea at Rafa.

The present country of Trans-Jordan comprises some 34,740 square miles east of the Jordan. In the north its frontier runs just south of the Samakh-Der'a railway line from the vicinity of the Sea of Galilee east to the Hejaz Railway, then, skirting the southern edge of the Jebel ed Druz, eastward across the desert to the Iraqi frontier. In the south it starts at the head of the Gulf of 'Aqaba and runs eastward into the desert. To the southeast in the Wadi Sirhan the territory of Sa'udi Arabia juts into the heart of the country but leaves a corridor between Nejd and Syria as a link between Trans-Jordan and Iraq.

The population of southern Syria in the period before the First World War is somewhat difficult to ascertain. It is probable, however, that it numbered about 700,000 persons,⁴ of whom some 80,000 were Jews.⁵ The majority of the population consisted of an Arabic-speaking people, divided unevenly between the Moslem and Christian faiths. Racially, they were the product of the intermingling of Arabs with the descendants of Phoenicians, Canaanites and Hebrews. Though some recognized authorities refused to call them Arabs,⁶ they were culturally and linguistically akin to the peoples of Arabia and Iraq. The mass of the Moslems were fellahin, peasant farmers, many of whom were tenants on the estates of great Arab landholders, frequently absentees living in the cities of Syria or in Europe. These agriculturalists were illiterate, improvident and heavily burdened by debt. The effendi class formed a small group of wealthy landowners and officials, well-educated but frequently venal, self-seeking and unconcerned with the welfare of the common people. In Cis-Jordan the Bedawin population, limited chiefly to the Negeb, was small. In Trans-Jordan, however, probably more than half the people were nomadic or semi-nomadic. The Christian Arabs, who were divided among the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and various other orthodox and uniate churches, formed slightly less than ten per cent of the population and were chiefly town-dwellers. As they were generally better educated than their Moslem neighbors, they occupied a majority of the professional positions.

The Jews of pre-war Palestine represented the Ashkenazic, Sephardic and Oriental branches of their scattered and homeless cultural community. Gathered together, chiefly in the cities of Jerusalem, Tiberias, Hebron and Safad, were the intensely religious orthodox Jews who were dependent for their livelihood upon the charity of their brethren throughout the world. Since many of

them had come to Palestine merely to die and be buried in the Holy Land, they were indifferent to mundane affairs and regarded as sacrilegious any attempts at a Hebrew return to Palestine by means other than an intervention of God. However, there were other Jews settled on the land, either as agricultural laborers or as landowners and planters, who were actively concerned with the problems of this world. Among them were some who burned with zeal to create in the ancient homeland of Israel a haven for their persecuted fellows and a national center where Jewish culture might again flower as in the days of David and Solomon.

In the years following the peace of 1918 the population of Trans-Jordan changed but slightly. On the other hand that of Palestine grew immensely both through Jewish immigration and even more through natural increase on the part of the Arabs.⁷ In June, 1940, the population of Palestine was officially estimated at 1,521,005 persons, of whom 453,286 were Jews.⁸ While the organization of Arab society remained largely unaltered, the Jewish community underwent a transformation. Thousands of persons intent on creating a balanced life invaded the fields of agriculture, industry, commerce, the professions and the arts. Though the pious orthodox Jews continued to reside in their holy cities, a modern secular life grew up around them.

ARAB NATIONALISM

Arab nationalism, one of the forces which has molded the recent history of Palestine, had its birth in a Syrian literary renaissance in the middle of the nineteenth century.⁹ This movement was fostered by American and French missionary effort and found its early leaders chiefly among Arab Christians. Later, Moslems and Druzes were drawn into the work of restoring the purity of medieval Arabic and reviving the glories of Saracenic civilization. A common center of interest was thus created for Arab intellectuals and a sense of unity developed. Before long the attention of the leaders of this cultural revival was turned to politics; soon there arose demands for Arab independence. Though the movement made little impression on the desert tribes, it spread from Syria to Egypt and Iraq and manifested itself abroad in the work of Najib 'Azuri, who in 1904 founded *La Ligue de la Patrie Arabe* in Paris with the declared object of freeing Syria and Iraq from Turkish rule.

The Arab nationalists welcomed the Young Turk revolution of 1908, strong in the belief that a more liberal regime would be favorable to their movement. They were soon to discover, however, that the new rulers were quite as much opposed to Arab nationalism as their predecessors. The policies of centralization and Turkification which were ultimately adopted destroyed all hope for cooperation

between Turkish and Arab nationalism. Driven underground, the latter movement eventually assumed a revolutionary character with the result that, at the outbreak of war in 1914, there were two powerful secret societies—*al-Fatat*, a civilian organization with headquarters in Damascus, and *al-'Ahd*, an association of officers in the Turkish army. Determined to escape from the Ottoman yoke, the leaders of these groups were anxious not to fall under other foreign domination.¹⁰

In the early months of the war the Syrian and Iraqi leaders found it difficult to choose the policy to pursue. They finally decided to attempt a general insurrection in alliance with the Grand Sharif of Mecca who was motivated both by ambitions to free the Hejaz from the Turks and by sympathy with the Arab nationalist movement which he aspired to lead. But before plans for the rising and negotiations with the British for their support could be completed, the Turkish authorities had detected the scheme and taken steps to thwart it. Convinced that Arab aims were rendering a policy of conciliation futile, Ahmed Jemal, Commander of the Turkish Fourth Army and Military Governor of Syria, began a campaign of repression which effectively prevented any insurrection by the Syrians. The revolt was, therefore, confined to the Hejaz from which an Arab army moved north on the right flank of the British forces operating in Palestine. When this army penetrated into their areas, the tribes of eastern Syria joined the movement, with the fellahin and townspeople welcoming the British and Arabs as deliverers. A general rising against the Turks, however, did not occur.

When the war ended, the Arabs found that their desire to set up independent states in the areas wrested from the Ottoman Empire was in conflict with British and French plans for the control of these regions. Though in the Arabian peninsula they succeeded in securing recognition for the independence of the Hejaz, Nejd, Asir and the Yemen, they failed elsewhere. In Palestine and Iraq British mandates were proclaimed, while Syria and the Lebanon became French mandates.

Embittered by frustration, the nationalist leaders embarked on a campaign of agitation and revolt to achieve freedom from foreign domination. They made important headway. Eventually the mandate for Iraq was revoked and in 1932 that country, though still allied to Great Britain, entered the League of Nations as an independent state. In Egypt, likewise, the nationalists won a notable victory in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, with Egypt entering the league a year later. In 1936, Syria and the Lebanon concluded treaties with their mandatory which promised them independence. The non-ratification of these agreements and French unwillingness

to carry them into effect provided a new cause for Syrian unrest, but the very fact of their existence encouraged all Arab patriots. In the Holy Land, where Zionism added a complicating factor, the nationalists found their most difficult task, and anti-Jewish or anti-British violence frequently flared up. If Palestine could be freed of the mandate and set up as an independent state, united with Trans-Jordan and possibly with Syria, the goal of Arab independence would be virtually achieved. The stage would then be set for an attempt to secure unity through the federation of the various Arab states of the Near East.

ZIONISM

Jewish interest in a return to Palestine had its roots in the distant past. Modern Zionism, however, is a product of the nineteenth century, which saw the Jews of western Europe emancipated from their medieval disabilities and accepted into full citizenship in their respective countries.¹¹ For a time assimilation became the theme there, many spokesmen emphasizing the religious aspect of Judaism and speaking of Englishmen or Frenchmen or Germans of Judaic faith. In eastern Europe the situation was less favorable to the growth of liberalism, but even there evidence existed that assimilation might be attempted. The growth of nationalism in Europe, however, isolated the Jews and at the same time revived and intensified their own national consciousness. The pogroms and hostile legislation in Russia in the 1880s convinced the eastern Jews of the hopelessness of racial amalgamation and turned the efforts of their intellectuals to the rehabilitation of Hebrew culture and its adaptation to the modern world. The idea took shape that the salvation of the Jews lay not in renunciation but in the fullest development of their own rich culture.

The centuries-old longing for Palestine inevitably mingled with this new nationalism. Jews began to feel that their purpose could be achieved only if they possessed a land of their own, where, free of all foreign trammels, they could proceed to rebuild a Jewish civilization—and Palestine, quite naturally, was the homeland of which they dreamed. Though it was obvious that not all the Jews of the world could be crowded into that small country, it was hoped that all who wished to go and all who were persecuted would have a chance to find a new life there. A spiritual center for world Jewry might thus be created. Accordingly, during the 1880s, the Lovers of Zion were organized in Russia and the first serious efforts at colonization in Palestine were begun. In the succeeding decades the movement spread and the colonists increased in numbers, but as success depended largely upon the financial support of one man, Baron Edmond de Rothschild of Paris, the fate of the venture appeared highly uncertain.

At this time the Dreyfus affair in France awakened Theodor Herzl, a young Jewish journalist of Vienna, to the plight of his people. When his famous book, *Der Judenstaat*, appeared in 1896, Herzl knew little of the cultural heritage of his race or of the work being done in Palestine. Impressed by the failure of assimilation, he wanted above all to develop a political refuge for the Jews; its location was not a primary consideration and to the peculiar claim of Palestine he was indifferent. Under his influence the Zionist Organization came into existence in 1897 at the Basel Congress. This meeting brought together many of the leaders of world Jewry and resulted in the formulation of the Zionist program, which stated:

The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:

1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.
2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.
3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.
4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining Government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.¹²

The Zionist Organization brought together nationalist Jews of all points of view. Herzl himself led the "political" Zionists who emphasized the need of political guarantees for the Jewish home in Palestine and sought, in the first instance, a charter from the Ottoman government authorizing a colonizing company to settle and control the Holy Land. Opposed to this group stood the "cultural" Zionists led by Asher Ginsberg, better known by his pen-name of *Ahad Ha'am*. To the members of this faction the basic function of Palestine was to form a spiritual center of world Jewry—a goal in which political self-government appeared unnecessary. The settlement of a considerable body of Jews in Palestine and the creation of a Hebrew cultural community seemed to them sufficient. Between these groups stood the "practical" Zionists, less concerned with theory than with material results, who urged settlement of as many Jews as possible in Palestine under existing circumstances in connection with a continued effort to secure legal assurances for their security, increase and self-government.

Herzl's efforts to obtain a charter from Turkey were fruitless and his attempt to gain support for a Jewish home from the powers brought little response except from Great Britain. In 1902 and 1903 a plan for colonization in the Sinai peninsula received the tentative support of the London government. This approval was conditioned, however, upon cooperation of the Egyptian authorities which was not forthcoming. The British then suggested that

land in East Africa, in what is now known as Kenya but was then regarded as part of Uganda, might be available. When Herzl presented this proposal to the Sixth Zionist Congress in 1903, it aroused bitter protest from those Jews, chiefly from eastern Europe, who insisted that only in Palestine could their homeland be established; opposition of a different nature came from Lord Delamere, the great Kenya landowner, who voiced the objections of the British settlers. It was evident that both the Zionist leadership and the British government would encounter difficulties in carrying out the African plan. But before the meeting of the next congress, which was to render a final decision, Herzl died and the matter ended with a polite refusal by the Zionists of Great Britain's offer.¹³

With the death of Herzl the "practical" faction secured control of the Zionist Organization. The Russian revolution of 1905 helped to stimulate a new influx of eastern European Jews into Palestine and the work of colonization went slowly on despite the more or less active opposition of the Turkish government. The socialist movement gained considerable strength among the colonists and had some effect upon the policies of the Zionist Organization. As the creation of a new social order in the Jewish community of Palestine began to assume importance, an apparently paradoxical fusion of Jewish nationalism and socialism took place.¹⁴ When the war broke out in 1914 the activities of the Zionists centered in England and the United States. Their work was climaxed by the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in November, 1917, after which they directed their efforts toward a victory of the Allies and international recognition of a Jewish national home under the guidance and protection of Great Britain.

Following the war the Zionist Organization, for the greater part of the period under the direction of Dr. Chaim Weizmann, guided the movement for the upbuilding of Palestine and endeavored to cooperate with the British government. However, relations were often severely strained when the policy of London was regarded by the Zionists as opposed to the interests of world Jewry and of the Palestine community. The development of anti-Semitism in central and eastern Europe in the period after the war served to emphasize the value of Palestine as a haven of refuge for the persecuted, and Zionism gained the support of the vast majority of Jews throughout the world.

The aims of Zionism are necessarily somewhat opportunistic and not all its adherents subscribe to precisely the same formulation of their purposes. Nevertheless, it is reasonably evident that they want freedom of immigration into an area in Palestine sufficiently large so that they may create in it a balanced and self-sustaining Jewish community over which no foreign authority will have power

to dominate and in which the Jews may create a distinctive Hebrew civilization. This aim does not, it is true, necessarily involve a Jewish state, but in the light of currently accepted political theories which link national sovereignty with the control of territory, a demand for statehood is almost inevitable once a majority is attained in the region. The sincerity of Zionists who argue that they do not desire a state but want only communal autonomy and parity with the Arabs in the territorial government of Palestine need not be questioned, but it may be doubted whether such a limited program would satisfy a possible Jewish majority in the future.

The World Zionist Organization stands today as the head of a bewildering multiplicity of groups. It is composed of territorial federations organized on national lines and of international "separate unions" constructed upon the basis of ideological differences. The Orthodox Party, the Labor Party and the Jewish State Party form separate unions, while the territorial organizations are divided into two groups, the Confederation of General Zionists and the Union of General Zionists which differ in their attitude towards capitalism. A Congress, composed of members elected by all persons who have paid the Zionist shekel, meets every two years. In the alternate years the so-called Annual Conference, a less widely representative body, assembles. The Congress elects a General Council (Actions Committee) which usually meets every six months. A still smaller body, the Executive (Inner Actions Committee), carries on the daily work of the organization. Headquarters are maintained in both Jerusalem and London.

Until 1929 the Zionist Organization maintained a Palestine Executive for activity in the Holy Land. In that year, Zionist and non-Zionist Jews joined forces to create the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which consists of a Council, an Administrative Committee and an Executive. The Council, composed equally of Zionists and non-Zionists, assembles biennially in conjunction with the meetings of the Zionist Congress. The Administrative Committee and the Executive of the Jewish Agency correspond roughly to the General Council and the Executive of the Zionist Organization. This Jewish Agency took over the functions of the former Palestine Executive.

In 1935 a Union of Zionist Revisionists withdrew from the parent body and set itself up as the New Zionist Organization. Headed by Vladimir Jabotinsky, it demanded the inclusion of Trans-Jordan in the Jewish national home and envisaged the rapid creation of a Hebrew majority and the establishment of a Jewish state.

BRITISH INTERESTS IN PALESTINE

British concern with Palestine has been in modern times a phase of the general English politico-economic policy in the Near East.¹⁵

In the sixteenth century British commercial activity in the Levant assumed considerable proportions, but, with the opening of the sea route around Africa, the relative importance of the eastern Mediterranean declined. In the eighteenth century, however, British traders approached the Near East from India and established themselves in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea areas. At the end of the century, projects for opening communications with India through Egypt were bruited in England and France. Indeed, between 1775 and 1780 the overland route through Egypt from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea was employed by the British until Turkish opposition resulted in its closure.¹⁶ The occupation of Egypt and Syria by Napoleon in 1798-1799 made the British government sharply aware of the danger of a strong foreign power occupying the land routes to the East. In the course of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, therefore, it came to oppose the control or development of either the Sinai or the Euphrates route by any alien power and definitely undertook the support of the Ottoman Empire at vital strategic points over which it did not then desire to assume political control.

The development of steamships, which made navigation of the treacherous Red Sea possible at all seasons, resulted about 1836 in the establishment by British capital of mail and passenger service to India by way of Egypt. Not until 1869, however, with the opening of the French-built Suez Canal, did the Sinai route replace the course around the Cape of Good Hope as the chief artery to the East. Great Britain had opposed the building of the Suez Canal, but after 1875, when the Disraeli government purchased a large block of stock in the canal company, British commercial and imperial interests became dominant in its administration.

The alternative overland route to India through Syria and Mesopotamia was not entirely neglected. Between 1835 and 1837 Francis R. Chesney made a survey for the British government of the possibilities of steam navigation on the Euphrates River and of the creation of a land-and-water route from the northern coast of Syria to the head of the Persian Gulf. With the grant of a Turkish concession in 1856-1857, a project for a Euphrates valley railway seemed on the point of success.¹⁷ Though both schemes failed to materialize, interest in an alternative route survived. The opposition of Great Britain to the German Berlin-to-Baghdad railway and London's insistence, after the war, on the inclusion of Mosul in Iraq grew to a considerable extent out of the determination to control any Persian Gulf route to the East. But British activity in the Near East did not restrict itself to seeking control over lines of communication, although that never ceased to be its major purpose. Throughout the nineteenth century commerce with the

Ottoman Empire, a non-industrial and practically free-trade state, was a powerful force in shaping policy in support of Turkey,¹⁸ and British consular agents were spread throughout the Ottoman Empire, including Palestine.

Until well toward the end of the nineteenth century Britain refrained from assuming any direct political control in the Near East. A partial abandonment of this policy resulted in the occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and of Egypt in 1882. The growth of British interests and the decay of Ottoman power led to a more forward policy and, when in the twentieth century British influence in Turkey declined, the desire to preserve that empire weakened. Treaties were concluded among the great powers shortly before the outbreak of war in 1914, dividing most of Turkey-in-Asia into zones of influence and apparently anticipating the ultimate dissolution of the Ottoman state. In these agreements Great Britain sought to make secure its sphere of influence at the head of the Persian Gulf.¹⁹ Ensconced at Sinai and Basra, England, though uneasy over the growth of German power in Turkey, was in a position to feel that both the Suez and Persian Gulf routes were protected and that its vital interests in the Near East were relatively secure.

Palestine itself attracted considerable attention in Great Britain during the Turkish-Egyptian crisis of 1839-1841 in which Mehemet Ali was forced by the great powers to relinquish his hold over Syria. At that time a variety of schemes for the return of the Jews to Palestine flourished in England. As the government was taking a leading part in the restoration of Turkish power in Syria, it was suggested that Palmerston sponsor an international guarantee for Jewish settlement in the Holy Land.²⁰ Plans for a Jewish restoration with British guarantee or support reappeared from time to time throughout the rest of the nineteenth century. But the government manifested little desire to extend its political sway over the Holy Land. It is true that in 1906 the Turkish government was forced to recognize Egyptian ownership of the Sinai peninsula north to the Rafa-'Aqaba line, but this served to divert rather than attract British attention, for the desert lying between Syria and Egypt was considered an adequate protection for the Suez Canal. In December, 1912, Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, assured the French ambassador that his government recognized French economic interests in Syria and had no political aspirations in that region.²¹

The First World War resulted in a new and more active policy for Great Britain in the Near East. The speedy dissolution of the Ottoman Empire appeared inevitable and the Allied Powers hastened to assure themselves of favorable positions in case of a victory.

Great Britain sought to increase the safety of the routes to the East by enlarging its sphere at the head of the Persian Gulf and by laying claim to the port of Haifa. With regard to Palestine, Turkish attacks on Egypt demonstrated so clearly that the Sinai desert offered insufficient safeguard to the security of the Suez Canal that many became convinced that British control of the Judean highlands was essential. Thus, in securing the mandate for Palestine, Great Britain was not unmindful of the land's strategic importance.

Under the mandate, Palestine became an important junction-point in the system of imperial communications. Motor routes from Baghdad terminated at Haifa and Jaffa. The railway connecting Europe and Africa passed through the length of the country. A project was formed for direct rail communication between Haifa and Iraq and the possibility of a canal between the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea at 'Aqaba received some attention. The civilian airport at Lydda and a seaplane base on the Sea of Galilee constituted links in both British and foreign air services between Europe and the East. A pipeline from the Mosul area brought the petroleum of Iraq to the harbor at Haifa, a modern port through which passed a substantial share of the commerce of the Near East.²² The threat of Italy to British domination of the Mediterranean—a menace which was considered dangerous enough to render the great naval base at Malta untenable in wartime—gave to Palestine an added significance. With Cyprus largely undeveloped and Alexandria situated in a nominally independent though allied nation, Haifa held possibilities of becoming a valuable naval base for the eastern Mediterranean.²³ Palestine and the Suez Canal zone became the focal point of British interests in the Levant. The course of the present war, in which Germany and Italy are seeking to drive the British from the Mediterranean Sea, has served to emphasize the importance for the British Empire of control over Palestine.

Wartime Commitments

THE policy of the British government in Palestine during the years following the First World War had its immediate origin in events which occurred during that struggle. The war resulted in the military occupation of Palestine and in its ultimate control by Great Britain. It gave rise also to negotiations with the Arabs, the Allies and the Zionists, and to varied commitments which molded, even while they complicated and confused, English policy for the future.

The Levant became a theater of war in the conflict of 1914-1918 through the intervention of the Ottoman Empire on the side of the Central Powers.¹ Before the end of August, 1914, there was evidence of Turkish military activity in Syria, directed apparently against the Suez Canal. On September 23rd the commander of the British force in Egypt announced that the border had been crossed near Rafa by armed Bedawin, and on October 26th a large Arab band was reported to have watered twenty miles within the Egyptian frontier. Following the attack on Odessa by the Turkish fleet, British, Russian and French diplomatic relations with the Porte were broken off, and on November 4th and 5th the Allied Powers declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

In December, 1914, despite advocacy of an attack on Turkish lines of communication at Alexandretta by the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, the British cabinet decided upon a passive defense of the Suez Canal.² Forces were therefore withdrawn from the Sinai desert, and the advance of a Turkish army, then being prepared for an attack on Egypt, was not opposed. By the end of January, 1915, the Turks had reached the canal and on the night of February 2nd made an unsuccessful effort to cross it on pontoons. During the following day their attack was continued, but under cover of darkness they finally withdrew.

In 1915 military activity in the East centered around the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign and the launching of the Saloniki adventure. In November, however, the project for an attack on Alexandretta was raised again at a military conference at Mudros. Kitchener was favorable, but the British General Staff, wedded to the

theory of concentration on the decisive theater of warfare, objected. The plan received its death-blow from the Paris government which pointed out that public opinion would require the employment of French soldiers in a recognized sphere of French economic and political interest. Since no such troops were available, the scheme as a whole had to be abandoned. It was decided, however, that a new line of defense should be set up in the desert some distance east of the Suez Canal to obviate the danger of a second and possibly more successful Turkish attack resulting in serious damage to that lifeline of empire.³ Early in 1916, Sir Archibald Murray assumed command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and in the spring of 1916 British troops were advanced into the Sinai desert to create the new defense line for the canal. In July the Turks, urged on by the Germans who wished to keep as many British soldiers as possible occupied in Egypt, launched a new attack, but were defeated at Romani on August 4, 1916. This battle marked the turning point of the Palestine campaign. The offensive passed out of the hands of the Turks and was never regained.

David Lloyd George, who became Prime Minister in December, 1916, favored a military policy aiming at the rapid expulsion of the Turks from Palestine as a means of forcing the Ottoman Empire to sue for peace and so shortening the war. Although the General Staff wanted to meet Lloyd George's wishes it was opposed to military "side-shows." As a result, Murray was asked to advance, but was not promised support for a large-scale invasion.⁴ On December 21, 1916, the British occupied El Arish and on January 9, 1917, Rafa was taken. Within a few days, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff telegraphed Murray that extensive activities would have to be deferred until autumn because reinforcements from Egypt were required in France. Despite this discouraging information, the British commander made two unsuccessful attempts in March and April to break through the Turkish defenses at Gaza.

Sir Edmund Allenby, who replaced Murray in June, 1917, as commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, was informed in August of that year that it was important for him to strike hard at the Turks in the coming autumn and winter, since a victory in Palestine would be of great value in restoring Allied morale.⁵ In October, 1917, therefore, he launched a new attack. After a feint against Gaza, his forces captured Beersheba on October 31st and the British army advanced up the maritime plain of Palestine. By the middle of November the Turkish forces had been pushed back to a line running from Jaffa to Lydda and then south in the hills to the vicinity of Hebron. The British then moved against Jeru-

salem, which the Turks evacuated on the night of December 8th. By the end of the year the enemy had been pushed north in the coastal plain beyond reach of Jaffa.

In 1918 Lloyd George advocated a further advance to clear the Turks from Syria, or at least from all of Palestine. Though the British War Office was still opposed to excessive commitments in the East, the military advisers of the Supreme War Council on January 21, 1918, recommended a strong offensive against Turkey.⁶ Under an elaborate plan approved by the British government, Allenby was to be reinforced and then, after clearing the Jordan valley and cutting the Hejaz Railway in Trans-Jordan, was to advance northward along the Syrian coast. The great German offensives on the Western Front in the spring of 1918, however, rendered this plan impracticable. Instead of receiving reinforcements, Allenby had to send troops to France and a total reorganization of his forces became necessary.

When in September, 1918, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was finally ready for a new advance, Allenby allowed it to be thought that he would launch an attack in the Jordan valley. Instead he caught the Turks off their guard by a movement up the coastal plain. On September 19th the offensive began and in the succeeding days the Turkish forces west of the Jordan were destroyed or scattered. Meanwhile the British and their Arab allies cooperated in clearing Trans-Jordan of the enemy. On September 26th Allenby ordered the advance to continue and sent his cavalry against Damascus, which surrendered on October 1st. A week later British troops, moving up the coast, occupied Beirut. Following the capture of Homs and Hama, an Arab attack on Aleppo resulted in Turkish withdrawal and on October 26th the British occupied that city also.

Long before Aleppo was captured, it was evident that the Turks would soon withdraw from the war. Vice-Admiral Sir Somerset Arthur Gough-Calthorpe was therefore sent to Mudros with authority to sign an armistice. There, on October 30, 1918, Turkish agents agreed to what amounted almost to an unconditional surrender. The Armistice of Mudros provided for the capitulation of all garrisons in the Hejaz, Asir, the Yemen, Syria and Mesopotamia, and for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cilicia.⁷

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARABS

The British military occupation did not of itself decide the future status of Palestine. Diplomatic negotiations had, long before 1918, served to involve Great Britain in a series of promises with regard to the Holy Land which, in the years that followed, preju-

diced every attempt at a Palestinian settlement. Some of these commitments were made to the Arabs.

Prior to the war, the British Foreign Office was prepared to recognize Syria, presumably including Palestine, as a French sphere of influence.⁸ Lord Kitchener, however, who was then the British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, had long regarded with favor the idea of an independent state in Arabia and Syria.⁹ He viewed with suspicion the growth of German influence in Turkey and felt that in the event of a crisis Great Britain should support an Arab independence movement to strengthen its position at the eastern approach to the Suez Canal.

Arab nationalists, fearful of French ambitions for the annexation of Syria, tended to regard Great Britain as their most valuable and least dangerous potential ally. In February, 1914, 'Abdullah, the second son of the Grand Sharif of Mecca, who was passing through Cairo on his way to Constantinople, called on Kitchener. He informed him that friction between the Turkish authorities and his father was growing and endeavored to draw the British Agent out as to his country's probable attitude in case of an Arab revolt in the Hejaz. Kitchener was, of course, obliged to reply that Great Britain could not support an insurrection against a friendly power.¹⁰ In a subsequent interview with Ronald Storrs, Oriental Secretary to the British Agency, 'Abdullah was more explicit. He went so far as to inquire whether Kitchener would assist the Grand Sharif in obtaining machine guns. Storrs, however, was as discouraging as Kitchener had been.¹¹

The British Foreign Office had to consider the possible effect of an Arab revolt upon the international situation. It was unwilling to precipitate an insurrection which might conceivably result in the complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire and a scramble of the great powers for its partition. Furthermore, the Foreign Office had to take into consideration the fact that a struggle over the Caliphate between Turkey and an independent Arab state in control of the Moslem holy cities and headed by a descendant of the Prophet might have serious repercussions among the Moslem inhabitants of the British Empire.¹² As a result, 'Abdullah was not led to hope for British assistance when, at the end of April, 1914, he again called on Storrs.¹³ Kitchener had instructed his Oriental Secretary to say that the Arabs of the Hejaz should expect no encouragement from Great Britain whose only interest in Arabia was the safety of Indian pilgrims.¹⁴

At the outbreak of the war, Lord Kitchener, who was in England on leave, was appointed Secretary of State for War, but a successor as British Agent in Egypt was not selected for some time. When it appeared that Turkey would join the Central Powers,

Storrs, recalling his conversations with 'Abdullah, wrote to his chief suggesting that steps be taken at Mecca to secure an alliance with the Hejazis in case of Ottoman aggression. Their support of the British would weaken the effect of the proclamation of a Holy War by the Sultan-Caliph, provide a strategically located ally in case of an attack on the Suez Canal, and prevent the Red Sea coast from being used for German submarine bases and wireless stations. Kitchener, who had foreseen that support of the Arabs might be useful in the crisis which seemed almost at hand, instructed Storrs to send a messenger to 'Abdullah to learn whether, in case of war with Turkey, Husain would support his sovereign or the British. In October, Storrs' messenger reached Mecca and obtained an interview with the Grand Sharif who said to him, "Stretch forth to us a helping hand and we shall never at all help these oppressors. On the contrary, we shall help those who do good."¹⁵ Husain also dispatched a letter over 'Abdullah's signature expressing his willingness to reach an agreement with Great Britain but protesting his inability to take any immediate action. Upon receipt of this letter, Kitchener telegraphed to the British Agency a reply to be sent to 'Abdullah in which he said: "If Arab nation assist England in this war, England will guarantee that no intervention takes place in Arabia and will give Arabs every assistance against external foreign aggression."¹⁶ Husain accepted this message and its reference to the "Arab nation" as an invitation to extend his projected revolt to all the Arabs under the Turkish yoke.¹⁷ He therefore replied through 'Abdullah in a fashion which practically bound him to a British alliance but asked for time to prepare his plans and muster his forces.

The British Foreign Office, under the influence of Lord Kitchener and its officials in Egypt, became converted to the cause of Arab freedom. An independent state in the Arabian peninsula might take the place of Turkey as the most influential Moslem country and the guardian of the holy cities. It was, of course, expected that, in return for British support, the new state would regard Great Britain as its protector and would in some measure replace Turkey as a friendly buffer state in the Near East. As evidence, therefore, of its good intentions to the Arabs, the British government allowed it to be made public in November, 1914, that it had no intention of undertaking any military or naval operations in Arabia "except for the protection of Arab interests against Turkish or other aggression, or in support of attempts by Arabs to free themselves from Turkish rule."¹⁸ In April, 1915, the government authorized the Sudan Governor-General, who was closely in touch with affairs in the Hejaz, to let it be known that Great Britain would make it an essential condition of peace that the Arabian

peninsula and the Islamic holy cities should remain in the hands of an independent Moslem state.¹⁹ In June a proclamation to this effect was published in Egypt, and printed leaflets bearing the same information were distributed both there and in the Sudan and dropped from airplanes over the Hejaz.²⁰

It was not until July, 1915, that negotiations with Husain were renewed. Meanwhile a protectorate had been established in Egypt and Sir Henry McMahon had succeeded Kitchener as chief British representative with the title of High Commissioner. Both he and Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor-General of the Sudan and later McMahon's successor as High Commissioner, were favorable to an alliance with the Arabs. In Mecca, Husain was choosing his path carefully. He refrained from endorsing the Sultan's call for a Holy War, but did not openly break with his sovereign. At the same time he entered into relations with the Arab nationalist societies of Syria, which in May, 1915, presented to Faisal, the third son of the Sharif, a program with the request that Husain inquire whether it was acceptable to the British government as a basis for Anglo-Arab cooperation. The nationalist leaders swore to accept Husain as the spokesman of the Arab cause and promised that if their terms were met they would raise a revolt in Syria in conjunction with the projected insurrection in the Hejaz. The so-called Damascus Protocol demanded:

The recognition by Great Britain of the independence of the Arab countries lying within the following frontiers:

North: The line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37° N. and thence along the line Birejik-Urfa-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat (Ibn 'Umar)-Amadia to the Persian frontier;

East: The Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf;

South: The Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden, whose status was to be maintained);

West: The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin.

The abolition of all exceptional privileges granted to foreigners under the Capitulations.

The conclusion of a defensive alliance between Great Britain and the future independent Arab state.

The grant of economic preference to Great Britain.²¹

Direct negotiations between the British and Husain were renewed about the middle of July, 1915. At that time the Sharif wrote McMahon setting forth the determination of the Arab nation to free itself from the Turks and asking for support. He requested that Britain agree to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries within the limits laid down by the Damascus Protocol and to approve the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate, and suggested a treaty of mutual assistance between Great Britain and the projected Arab state. In demanding a reply within thirty days, he declared that, if no answer were forthcoming, he would consider himself freed from his earlier pledges.²²

On August 30th, McMahon replied that his government was happy to confirm the promise which Kitchener had made in 1914 and that it approved an Arab Caliphate. With regard to the matter of frontiers, he simply said that "it would appear to be premature to consume our time in discussing such details."²³ The British government was evidently unready to commit itself to the support of Husain's vast and ill-defined scheme for an Arab state which would have embraced all of the Arabian peninsula, in many parts of which the Grand Sharif was unpopular; Syria, in which the effendis regarded the tribal Hejazis as barbarians; Mesopotamia, where a Shia religious majority might be expected to repudiate Sunni leadership; and parts of southern Anatolia where Arabic was not even the language of the majority of the population. Yet the immediate military situation and England's hopes for the future of the Arab state prompted the Foreign Office to accept Husain's terms so far as they were compatible with French interests in Syria. Within what limits the claims of France might be restricted was still unknown, and in such circumstances the laying down of strict frontiers for the territory which in the interest of France must be excluded from the Arab state was obviously impossible.

The Grand Sharif responded on September 9, 1915, with a letter in which he charged McMahon with evasiveness and asked for a definite decision on the question of boundaries. Before a reply was dispatched to this letter, McMahon and his advisers had been approached by Muhammad al-Faruqi, a member of the Arab secret society, *al-'Ahd*. He was not an accredited agent of the nationalists of Syria and Iraq,²⁴ but from him the British learned much concerning the views of the Syrian leaders and their relations with the Grand Sharif. When queried concerning Husain's territorial demands, he said that the Arabs would fight for the districts of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus, but expressed the opinion that they would accept a general reservation of the areas in which Great Britain was not free to act without detriment to the interests of allied powers.²⁵

It was in the light of al-Faruqi's information, and in the hope that French claims could be limited to the Syrian coast, that McMahon was authorized to dispatch his message of October 24, 1915. This key letter in the series of communications which he exchanged with the Grand Sharif promised British support to Arab independence within the limits proposed by Husain, subject to the exclusion of the Syrian coast and saving the interests of France. The important passage stated:

The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:—

(1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the *Shaykh's* *Wahab*.

(2) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability.

(3) When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.

(4) On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

(5) With regard to the *vilayets* of Bagdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special administrative arrangements in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke, which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.²⁶

In his reply, dated November 5, 1915, Husain agreed to the exclusion of Mersina and Adana but insisted that the entire vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut were inhabited by Arabs. He agreed to a temporary British administration of southern Mesopotamia and to respect all English agreements with Arab shaikhs in that region. He asked, however, for assurances that the Allies would not make peace before the Arabs had secured their independence. On December 14, 1915, McMahon responded. He assured Husain that the British government would not conclude a peace which failed to free the Arab peoples from Turkish domination, but said that the recognition of existing treaties was being taken to apply not merely to southern Mesopotamia but to the entire region of the projected Arab state. "With regard to the *vilayets* of Aleppo and Beirut," he added, "the Government of Great Britain have fully understood and taken careful note of your observations, but, as the interests of our ally, France, are involved in them both, the question will require careful consideration and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course."²⁷

Husain's response to this was contained in a letter of January 1, 1916, in which he stated that he would not at that time press the question of the Syrian coast in view of the Anglo-French alliance, but he emphasized that "at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day)

for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts . . . it is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions."²⁸

The British government was not content to allow Husain to consider that it assented to a merely temporary renunciation of Arab claims to the Syrian coast. On January 25, 1916, in the course of his reply, McMahon warned Husain against expecting that Britain would be more compliant later. He said :

It is, as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be permitted to interfere in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of this war to a victorious conclusion. Moreover, when victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of Englishmen and Frenchmen who have died side by side fighting for the cause of right and liberty.²⁹

This letter brought the preliminary negotiations to a close. Two more notes were exchanged, but they dealt entirely with plans for the revolt and not with matters of policy.

That the future of Palestine did not occupy a prominent position in the minds of either the British or the Arab negotiators seems evident from the fact that neither Palestine nor the Sanjaq of Jerusalem was mentioned by name in the Husain-McMahon correspondence. Over the question of whether Palestine was excluded from the Arab area or not, gallons of ink have been spilled. The British government maintains that it was; the Arabs maintain that it was not. That it was the intention of the British to place Palestine in the Syrian coastal region excluded from the promise of Arab independence seems undeniable in view of the declarations of many persons closely engaged in the negotiations.³⁰ That they succeeded in doing so by the terms of the correspondence, however, is open to serious question.

The first difficulty in interpreting McMahon's pledge to the Arabs arises over the meaning of the word "district" in the sense in which it was used in the correspondence. The Arabic word employed was *wilaya*, a term related to the Turkish *vilayet* but not necessarily signifying the administrative district of that name. There was a Vilayet of Aleppo and the Vilayet of Syria was on occasion referred to as the Vilayet of Damascus. That McMahon meant to say all territory west of the vilayets of Aleppo and Damascus was to be excluded, however, it is impossible to believe (though such an interpretation would effectively exclude Palestine from the Arab area), both because there was no land west of the Vilayet of Aleppo which extended to the coast and because of the mention of Homs and Hama as "districts" on an equality with Damascus and Aleppo. Neither can the High Commissioner have wished to exclude the area west of the sanjaqs of Damascus, Hama

and Aleppo, for the Sanjaq of Aleppo also reached the coast, and there was no Sanjaq of Homs. One is forced to believe that the term "district" was being employed simply in a vague sense, meaning vicinity. If one draws a line through Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, and excludes the area to the west, one finds that the coastal area, roughly speaking, from Sidon to Alexandretta, has been eliminated. Such a line does not exclude the former sanjaqs of Beirut, Acre, Balqa and Jerusalem. Thus the British negotiations failed to specifically exclude Palestine.

McMahon did not content himself with excluding a specific area. Apparently desirous to safeguard his government in case French claims had to be conceded in an area greater than that within which Britain hoped they might be restricted, he declared that the British promises, even within the area conceded to the Arabs, applied only to "those regions . . . wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France."³¹ That France was then and for long afterward desirous of annexing Palestine is open to no question.³² Much has been made of the fact that in his letter of December 14, 1915, McMahon said that the interests of France "are involved in them both"—i.e., in the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut. This is sometimes taken to mean that *only* in those two vilayets did France have interests which Britain intended to observe. Such an interpretation, which has for its purpose the exclusion of the independent Sanjaq of Jerusalem from the terms of McMahon's reservation as being outside of the Vilayet of Beirut, seems strained in the extreme. The words of McMahon were in reply to Husain's protest over the specific exclusion of areas in the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut west of the Damascus-Aleppo line and carried no implication that France might not have interests elsewhere as well as in the vilayets mentioned.

It has been argued by proponents of the Arab case that, even if Palestine was excluded from the area of Arab independence by virtue of the general reference to French interests, this reservation lost its validity when, following the war, France gave up its claims to Palestine by agreeing to a British mandate. Lord Maugham, the Lord High Chancellor of England, endeavored to demolish this contention on the ground that the pledge to support Arab independence was given only for areas in which England was free to act on October 24, 1915, and that any subsequent developments enlarging that area were irrelevant.³³ Even more significant, perhaps, is the fact that French interests in Palestine were surrendered to England with the definite understanding that it was to become a mandated territory in which a Jewish national home was to be established according to the terms of the Balfour Declaration.

Were it not for the fact that the Palestine Arabs have to a great

extent based their case for independence upon a legalistic argument grounded upon the theory that the Husain-McMahon letters included Palestine in the area of Arab independence, the interpretation of the correspondence would have little more than academic interest in view of greatly changed circumstances in the Near East. The facts seem clear, however. The British government intended to exclude the coastal region of Palestine from the area in which an unconditional promise of support to Arab independence was given. The Husain-McMahon correspondence did, in fact, exclude areas in which in October, 1915, France claimed special interests. Palestine was such an area. Nevertheless, later activities and declarations of the British, when taken in conjunction with the admitted vagueness of the McMahon reservation, gave the Arabs grounds to hope that Palestine might be included in the area of Arab independence.

The projected rising in Syria never materialized because of the repressive measures of Ahmed Jemal. News of the execution of Syrian nationalist leaders and the imminent approach of a Turkish force, accompanied by a German military mission on its way to the Yemen, impelled Husain to act alone and in June, 1916, the Arab revolt began with the proclamation of the independence of the Hejaz and the overpowering of the Turkish garrison in Mecca. The Arab forces did not succeed in taking Medina until the end of the war, but an army under Amir Faisal moved north and on July 5, 1917, an Arab force captured 'Aqaba. Following this exploit, Faisal's army was attached to Allenby's forces and, operating east of the Jordan, cooperated in the Palestine campaign.³⁴

Under the hectic conditions of warfare, the British authorities in the East were not too scrupulous to maintain the limits which McMahon had placed upon the pledge of support for Arab independence. In endeavoring to arouse the inhabitants of Palestine against the Turks and to encourage recruiting for Faisal's army, messages were widely spread through the country summoning the Arabs to fight for their independence, and statements were made which gave the impression that Palestine was to be part of an independent Arab nation.³⁵ When, after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot agreement, which assigned the Syrian coast to France and forecast an international administration for Palestine, became known to the Arabs through German and Turkish sources, the British government deprecated the efforts of the enemy to sow dissension between the Allies and the Arabs and reaffirmed the vague McMahon promises.³⁶

After the publication of the Balfour Declaration, which promised support for a Jewish national home in Palestine, Commander D. G. Hogarth was sent to Jidda in January, 1918, to interview King Husain of the Hejaz and was authorized to inform him that

the Allies favored Arab unity. Hogarth assured Husain that in Palestine the Allies "are determined that no people shall be subject to another" but declared, with regard to the Jewish aspiration to return to the Holy Land, that "His Majesty's Government are determined that in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realisation of this ideal."³⁷ Hogarth made it plain that the British government regarded Palestine as one of the areas of French interest mentioned by McMahon in 1915, but at the same time he spoke of the political freedom of the Arabs in that area. Husain was as reluctant as ever to accept the final exclusion of the Syrian coast from the sphere of Arab independence and, while he told Hogarth that he would welcome Jews to all Arab lands, he gave him to understand that he would not accept an independent Jewish state in Palestine. Hogarth, however, as he himself said, had not been "instructed to warn him that such a State was contemplated by Great Britain."³⁸

In June, 1918, the High Commissioner in Egypt was authorized to inform seven Arab leaders resident in Cairo that the British government recognized the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs in areas which were independent before the war or which were emancipated from Turkish control by the actions of the Arabs themselves; that, in the parts of the Ottoman Empire occupied by the Allied forces, it desired the future regime to be based on the principle of the consent of the governed; and that it was its wish that the inhabitants of areas still under Turkish control should receive their independence.³⁹ This public declaration of British policy was so general in its terms that it might be taken as a promise to support aspirations for independence throughout the Ottoman Empire, and it was so interpreted by the Arabs. On the other hand, the Balfour Declaration was already a matter of public record and the "Declaration to the Seven" merely spoke of government with the consent of the governed in connection with the occupied area. Nevertheless, this statement of policy, more than any other action of the British government, tended to nullify the restrictions placed upon Arab independence by the McMahon letters and to involve it in an apparent conflict of promises. At the end of the war, the Arabs had undoubtedly some reason to feel that Great Britain was pledged to support Arab self-government in the Holy Land.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ALLIES

From the moment of Turkey's entry into the First World War, the future of the Ottoman Empire became a subject for discussion among Allied statesmen and diplomats, and Russia early pressed

England and France for a settlement of the question of the Straits. On March 12, 1915, the British government consented to Russian annexation of Constantinople and control of the Straits if an Allied victory was secured, the aspirations of England and France were realized, and Russia would agree to British supervision of the former neutral zone in Persia and to the establishment of an independent Moslem power in Arabia with control over the Moslem holy cities.⁴⁰

France was slower to act. On March 8th the French ambassador, Maurice Paléologue, notified the Russian Foreign Office of the compliant attitude of his government toward Russian aspirations but suggested postponement of their consideration until the meeting of the peace conference.⁴¹ When France, however, was pressed for a definite reply to match the British response, Paléologue notified Russia that France desired to annex Syria, including Alexandretta and Cilicia; on the following day, March 15th, he explained that the term Syria was intended to include Palestine.⁴² Although on March 16th the Tsar, in private conversation with Paléologue, consented to French annexation of Cilicia, Syria and Palestine,⁴³ no final settlement with regard to the Holy Land was immediately forthcoming.

On March 20th, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Sazonov, instructed the Tsar's ambassador in London to thank the British Foreign Minister for agreeing to Russian annexation of Constantinople and to inform him that he was prepared to accept the British proposals with regard to Persia and an independent Moslem state in Arabia.⁴⁴ On April 10th France finally gave Sazonov definite assurances of agreement to Russian annexation of Constantinople, provided Anglo-French interests were satisfied.⁴⁵ This diplomatic exchange constitutes what became known as the Constantinople Agreement. Its terms, however, were made dependent by France upon a settlement of the whole problem of the future of Turkey-in-Asia and negotiations were continued throughout the early years of the war in an effort to satisfy the demands of the various Allied countries.

When Italy entered the war its demands for a share in the Turkish spoils had to be met. In the secret Treaty of London, which was signed on April 26, 1915, by British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey and the French, Russian and Italian ambassadors, it was recognized that Italy had special interests in southern Anatolia. In the event of a partition of Turkey-in-Asia, this area was to be annexed; and if France or Great Britain occupied any territory of the Ottoman Empire during the war, Italy was to have the right to occupy the region of Adalia. By the same treaty, the Rome government associated itself with the Anglo-Franco-Russian under-

standing that Arabia and the Moslem holy places were to remain under the authority of an independent Moslem power.⁴⁶

Great Britain would have preferred to postpone further negotiations about partition of the Ottoman Empire,⁴⁷ for discussions of the future of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, which involved questions of the Christian holy places and Anglo-French ambitions in the Levant, tended to strain inter-Allied relations. France, on the other hand, was determined to secure Syria in return for agreement to Russian annexation of Constantinople, and it appeared that an Anglo-Franco-Russian understanding with regard to Turkey-in-Asia must be reached. The British government, therefore, appointed a committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, to inquire into the matter of British interests in the Ottoman Empire and to consider the question of partition.⁴⁸

It was necessary to review the whole problem in the light of Turkey's probable disappearance as an unambitious guardian for the land routes to the East and of France's apparently imminent rule in Syria. The Turkish military attack on the Suez Canal had demonstrated clearly the danger of an unfriendly power in Palestine. Any strong foreign state might at some future time occupy such a position, and it thus became Britain's desire to see that none gained complete dominance in Palestine. The de Bunsen Committee presented a report in June, 1915, in which it rejected suggestions that Palestine should be either annexed or included in a British sphere of influence. But it opposed the French claim and declared, "Palestine must be recognized as a country whose destiny must be the subject of special negotiations, in which both belligerents and neutrals are alike interested."⁴⁹ This theory became the basis of Britain's policy regarding Palestine, for those in authority in London were slow to conclude that British control offered the most satisfactory solution to the problem of that country's future.⁵⁰ The government was prepared to prevent French occupation of Palestine but was not ready to work wholeheartedly for annexation or sole control.

On October 21, 1915, as a prelude to Anglo-French conversations over the future of Turkey-in-Asia, Sir Edward Grey consulted the French ambassador, Paul Cambon. He told him of the Husain-McMahon negotiations and asked that the French government appoint a representative to confer with the British regarding frontiers in Syria. On November 23, 1915, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Permanent Under-Secretary in the British Foreign Office, met Charles François Georges-Picot, the agent selected by France, and explained to him that the Arabs demanded possession of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus in return for an agreement to assist the Allies. On December 21st, Georges-Picot informed Nicolson that the French

government was prepared to agree to Arab control of those cities, provided their administration was conducted under French influence.⁵¹ Late in the year Sir Mark Sykes was authorized by the British government to arrange with Georges-Picot an agreement on the future of Asiatic Turkey.⁵² In their conversations in London, Sykes unfolded the British plan to create an Arab state and Georges-Picot pressed the French claim to Cilicia and Syria.⁵³ In the course of time the negotiations resulted in the creation of an agreement reasonably acceptable to both England and France.

It was decided in February, 1916, that Georges-Picot and Sykes should go to Petrograd to present their tentative agreement to the Russian Foreign Office and arrange for a definitive solution of the Turkish problem.⁵⁴ In March, the English and French emissaries arrived in Russia and submitted their draft agreement to Sazonov. It divided Syria and Iraq into five zones, which were denominated respectively as Blue (Cilicia and the Syrian coast north of the Ladder of Tyre), Red (the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad), Brown (Palestine west of the Jordan), A (the interior of Syria and Mosul) and B (Trans-Jordan and a strip of territory extending eastward between the Red zone and Zone A to the Persian frontier).

In zones A and B, France and Great Britain agreed to recognize and support an independent Arab state or confederation of Arab states. Zone A was to become a sphere of French influence, and there France was to have priority in enterprises and loans and the sole right to supply advisers or officials to the Arab state or states. Zone B was to be a similar sphere for Great Britain. In the Blue and Red zones, France and Britain, respectively, were to have the right to establish such direct or indirect control as they thought wise in agreement with the Arab state or confederation. In the Brown zone, an international administration was to be established, the form of which was to be decided after consultation with Russia and in agreement with the other Allies and the Sharif of Mecca. The ports of Haifa and Acre were to be accorded to Great Britain; while Alexandretta was to be a free port for British trade, and Haifa for French.

Great Britain was assured control of a projected Haifa-Persian Gulf railway, and both powers agreed not to acquire territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula.⁵⁵ Negotiations on the basis of this draft project resulted in an exchange of notes dated April 26, 1916, between Paléologue and Sazonov, by which Russia accepted the Sykes-Picot settlement in return for French agreement to Russian annexation of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Trebizond and other areas to the north and west of the Blue and A zones.⁵⁶ British agreement to the Russian plan was secured at London in the following months.⁵⁷

While negotiations with Russia on the basis of the draft Sykes-Picot agreement were proceeding, it became evident that France was not reconciled to the loss of Palestine, for on March 26th Paléologue wrote to Sazonov to express thanks for an oral promise that Russia would not object if British consent was obtained to its inclusion in French Syria, provided the Christian holy places were safeguarded.⁵⁸ Despite this evidence of French dissatisfaction, the agreement, in a form differing only slightly from that presented to the Russian Foreign Office in March, was made effective through an exchange of letters between Grey and Paul Cambon. On May 9th, Cambon sent a copy of the agreement to Grey and requested British approval of its terms. On May 15th, there took place an exchange of letters in which Grey requested and Cambon granted assurances that pre-war concessions in the French area would be recognized. Thereupon the British government accepted the Sykes-Picot settlement with the definite understanding, expressed in a letter of May 16th from Grey to Cambon, that the cities of Homs, Hama, Damascus and Aleppo were to be assigned to the Arabs.⁵⁹

As soon as Italy learned of the conclusion of the Anglo-Franco-Russian agreement, its Foreign Office began to demand that the secret Treaty of London be revised to give Italy a larger share in the Turkish spoils. The matter was discussed in January, 1917, between A. J. Balfour, the new British Foreign Secretary, and the diplomatic representatives of France, Russia and Italy.⁶⁰ At an Allied conference at St. Jean de Maurienne in Savoy in April, 1917, in which Russia was not represented, a tentative understanding was reached by which, subject to the agreement of Russia, Italian demands in Anatolia were satisfied.⁶¹ In the summer another inter-Allied conference was held in London and there, on August 8, 1917, a final text for the Italian agreement was drafted. Italy accepted the Sykes-Picot understanding, and two new zones were created in Anatolia—Green (southern Anatolia from Smyrna east to the Blue zone) and C (the area north of Smyrna)—in which Italian rights similar to those of France and England in the Blue, Red, A and B zones were recognized. Italy was to have a voice in determining the international regime of the Brown zone and was, like Britain and France, not to seek any territory in the Arabian peninsula. This agreement was embodied in an exchange of notes between the British and French Foreign Secretaries and the Italian ambassadors in London and Paris on August 18, 21 and 22, 1917.⁶² The agreement was specifically stated to be subject to the approval of Russia. That approval was never forthcoming, for the Provisional Government was pledged to a policy of no annexations and the Bolshevik Revolution soon swept even that government away.⁶³

In the negotiations with the Allies, the British government

sought to safeguard its interests by securing international recognition of the special status of Great Britain at the head of the Persian Gulf, by providing for occupation of Haifa and control of a projected railway from that point to Mesopotamia, and by preventing any single power from securing a paramount position in Palestine. Yet the British negotiations concerning the future of the Ottoman Empire were not in conflict with the letter of the McMahon pledge to the Arabs. An effort was made to insist scrupulously upon recognition by the Allies of an independent Moslem state in Arabia; and in the negotiations with France, the formal independence of the Arab countries in the interior of Syria and Mesopotamia was gained. The Blue zone of the Sykes-Picot agreement corresponded to the region specifically excluded from that area in which Arab independence was to receive support. The Red zone was the area in which Britain was to receive special privileges of administration. France reluctantly gave up its claim to full control in the interior of Syria and Palestine and agreed to an international administration of the Holy Land in which not only it and the other Allies but also the Arabs would have a share. Sir Mark Sykes, who was as strong a supporter of Arab nationalism as he later became of Zionism, could congratulate himself that he had won many concessions and had secured French agreement to the terms of the Anglo-Arab understanding.

It is true that the division of the interior of Syria and Mesopotamia into Anglo-French spheres of influence could not be pleasing to Arab nationalists who wished to create a strong independent nation. Further, if the Sykes-Picot agreement were to be merely a prelude to French annexation of the Blue and A zones, and English annexation of the Red and B zones, the frontiers laid down in the agreement were utterly out of reason on every ground of geography and economics. Yet if the agreement could have been carried out faithfully, and if both France and Great Britain had been sincerely interested in the welfare of the Arab state or confederation, the Sykes-Picot agreement might have offered a workable compromise of English, French and Arab interests in the Levant.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ZIONISTS

At first the War of 1914-1918 appeared to be a tragic blow to the Zionists. Their international solidarity was temporarily broken, and their organization was divided by the lines of battle. The Executive in Berlin, in an endeavor to perform its functions, established a bureau in the neutral city of Copenhagen which managed to carry on only limited activity. Between 1913 and 1921 no world

congress was held, though in 1919 and 1920 international conferences assembled.

Before the Copenhagen Bureau was constituted, American Zionists sought to provide a center for activity in the greatest of the neutral countries. At the end of August, 1914, an extraordinary conference, meeting in New York, set up a Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs to act in conjunction with the central Executive. Louis D. Brandeis was chosen chairman of this Provisional Committee, which, by virtue of its energy and available wealth, became an influential element in world Zionism. In 1918 it was instrumental in establishing the Zionist Organization of America, which replaced the two weak federations in the United States and gave American Jews a new solidarity and an even greater voice in the affairs of the international movement.

British Zionism was split between the English Zionist Federation and the Order of Ancient Maccabeans, a separate union of the world organization. Neither body was prepared to offer leadership to the international movement or even to adopt an active policy. Despite this handicap, however, England became the center of Zionist political activities.

Very early in the war, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a Russian chemist on the staff of Manchester University and a vice-president of the English Zionist Federation, began to consider the possibility of interesting the British government in offering support to a Jewish national home in Palestine. Aided by a small group of friends, he undertook to make converts to the cause among both Jews and non-Jews and, before the close of 1914, had approached several government officials. The reception of his advances was not unfavorable, and it was decided to secure the support of the World Zionist Organization. Shortly before the end of 1914, therefore, E. W. Chlenov and Nahum Sokolow, both members of the Zionist Executive, arrived in London to cooperate with the Weizmann group. After a stay of five or six months, Chlenov left England, but Sokolow remained as the representative of world Zionism in the negotiations with the British government.⁶⁴

In launching their campaign, the Zionists endeavored first to obtain the support of the Conjoint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association.⁶⁵ In this attempt they were unsuccessful, for the heads of the Conjoint Committee disapproved of Hebrew nationalism. The effort to secure Jewish support, however, was not halted by this rebuff. Toward the end of 1915, the English Zionist Federation circulated an endorsement of the Basel Program for a national home in Palestine which secured over 77,000 Jewish signatures.⁶⁶

The necessity for creating a stronger organization than then existed in England resulted in January, 1916, in the establishment, by a conference of Jewish leaders in London, of a Zionist Committee for England, headed by an Executive of which Sokolow and Weizmann were members. This action gave new unity and vitality to British Zionism, which launched forth on a career independent of the Copenhagen Bureau but in close contact with the American Provisional Executive. A year later, in January, 1917, the English committee was dissolved, and Sokolow and Weizmann, soon to become president of the English Zionist Federation, were given full authority to speak for British Zionism. In August, 1917, a London Bureau, headed by Sokolow and Weizmann, was set up as an organ of world Zionism.⁶⁷

While their organization was being developed, the leaders were busily endeavoring to secure the support of the British government. Early in the war they received the cooperation of Lord Rothschild and Herbert Samuel.⁶⁸ Weizmann secured an interview with Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and laid the Zionist program before him. Sir Edward Grey, it was learned, was personally favorable to a British declaration in support of the Zionists.⁶⁹ Weizmann also talked with Arthur Balfour, who in 1903 had given his support to the Kenya scheme and in 1906 had been convinced in a conversation with Weizmann that, in the eyes of the Jews themselves, Palestine offered the only satisfactory solution of their problem.⁷⁰ By January, 1916, the Zionists felt that their plan for a Jewish state in Palestine under British protection had the approval of Grey, Lloyd George and Samuel.

In 1916, Dr. Weizmann placed at the disposal of the government a process for extracting acetone from cereals and horse-chestnuts. As the difficulty and expense of securing this substance, used in the manufacture of high explosives, had been one of Lloyd George's major worries as Minister of Munitions, Weizmann's gift of his process to the government naturally brought him into high favor. Lloyd George suggested recommending him for an honor of some sort, but Weizmann, who had been attached to the Admiralty as a chemist, contented himself with utilizing his contacts with Lloyd George and Balfour who, as First Lord of the Admiralty, was his department head, to advance the Zionist cause.⁷¹

In March, 1916, as an attempt to forestall the nationalists and to secure from the British government a statement which might satisfy the interest of the Jewish masses in Palestine without endangering the position of assimilated Jews elsewhere, the Conjoint Committee drafted a declaration which, it was suggested, the Allied governments might issue. This formula declared:

In the event of Palestine coming within the spheres of influence of Great Britain and France at the close of the war, the Governments of those Powers will not fail to take account of the historic interest that country possesses for the Jewish community. The Jewish population will be secured in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, equal political rights with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities for immigration and colonization, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colonies inhabited by them as may be shown to be necessary.⁷²

That Great Britain was seriously considering the question of Palestine with reference to the Jews is evidenced by the fact that Grey undertook to consult the Allies with regard to this proposal. It is clear, too, that the government was prepared to go further than the Conjoint Committee wished, for in referring the matter to Russia, it expressed a desire to find a formula which would attract the support of the Jews and suggested as a means to this end a project which would enable their colonies in Palestine to develop sufficient strength so that they, in conjunction with the Arabs, might take over the administration of the entire territory, Jerusalem and the holy places excepted.⁷³

As early as 1915 the Zionists had begun to draft a program for presentation to the British government.⁷⁴ Toward the end of 1916, however, activity was intensified and the Zionist Committee for England spent several months elaborating a memorandum. By October a draft, "Outline of Programme for a new Administration of Palestine and for a Jewish Resettlement of Palestine in accordance with the Aspirations of the Zionist Movement," was ready for submission to the Foreign Office as a basis for negotiations then in prospect. The scheme did not suggest a Jewish state, but asked that the government or governments under whose suzerainty Palestine came at the end of the war should recognize the desirability and necessity of Jewish resettlement there and should grant a charter to a colonizing company for the development of the country.⁷⁵ The good relations existing between the Zionists and the government at the time this program was submitted is indicated by the fact that in October, 1916, Weizmann and Sokolow were accorded the privilege of sending official Zionist telegrams in code through Foreign Office channels.⁷⁶

Early in 1917, Sir Mark Sykes, who had already communicated informally with prominent Jews on the subject of their aspirations and soon became a convert to Zionism and a firm believer in Jewish-Arab cooperation for the rehabilitation of the Near East, was selected by his government to negotiate with the Zionist leaders. In this work he had the assistance of his former colleague, Georges-Picot.⁷⁷ On February 7, 1917, the first official meeting between the Zionists and the representative of the government took place at the home of Dr. Moses Gaster in London. Besides Sykes and

Dr. Gaster, there were Lord Rothschild, Harry Sacher, Herbert Samuel, Nahum Sokolow and Dr. Weizmann. It was decided that Sokolow should be authorized to continue the discussions with Sykes and Georges-Picot on behalf of the Zionist Organization.⁷⁸

In March, 1917, Sokolow went to the continent to obtain the assent of Britain's allies to the Zionist plan for a national home. In March he was received at the Quai d'Orsay and authorized to inform the American and Russian Zionists that the French government regarded their program with favor. In Rome, an audience with the Pope and interviews with Italian officials assured him of Catholic sympathy and Italian support. Once again in Paris, he was received late in May by the Premier and on June 4, 1917, was given written assurances of French sympathy by the Foreign Minister.⁷⁹ Meanwhile, in March, Weizmann had an interview with Balfour, the new Foreign Secretary, who discussed the "difficulties arising from French and Italian claims in Palestine," and suggested the possibility of an Anglo-French protectorate. Weizmann, however, was opposed to any sort of condominium.⁸⁰ The Zionist leaders had long since decided that British protection alone would offer them the greatest security.

While the Balfour Mission was in the United States in April and May, 1917, the Foreign Secretary met Justice Brandeis several times and discussed the Palestine question with him. Together with other American Zionists who were closely in touch with the negotiations being carried on in England, Brandeis favored the plan for a British protectorate and assured Balfour that President Wilson was sympathetic with Zionist aims.⁸¹

By the spring of 1917 it was evident that the British government was preparing to support Zionism.⁸² On May 20th, at a special conference of the English Zionist Federation, Dr. Weizmann said that the time was not ripe for a Jewish state, but laid down a plan for a protectorate to be held by some great power, such as Britain, which would provide conditions favorable to the fulfillment of Zionist aims. He went on to say, "I am entitled to state in this assembly that His Majesty's Government is ready to support our plans."⁸³ Four days later the London *Times* published an open letter dated May 17, 1917, from the Conjoint Foreign Committee. The letter set forth the willingness of that body to work with the Zionists on the basis of the Committee's declaration of March, 1916, but bitterly denounced the theory that all Jews were part of a homeless nationality for whom a land in Palestine was necessary. It went on to point out that emancipated Jews regarded themselves simply as members of a religious community and that the creation of a distinct nationality in Palestine might stamp all Jews as aliens in their native countries and undermine

their rights as citizens. It further expressed the opinion that a demand for special rights in Palestine would prejudice the struggle for equal rights in other countries.⁸⁴ The storm of protest which met this letter resulted in the dissolution of the Conjoint Committee and demonstrated the Zionist proclivities of the mass of British Jews. At the same time it crystallized a body of anti-Zionist sentiment and united, in opposition to nationalist aspirations, a group of wealthy and influential Jews of whose opinion the government could not be unmindful.

Before the end of June, Lord Rothschild and Dr. Weizmann called on Balfour and suggested that the time for a public pronouncement in favor of Zionism had arrived. The Foreign Secretary thereupon asked them to submit a draft declaration for the consideration of the cabinet.⁸⁵ On July 18th, Lord Rothschild replied to this request by presenting a statement prepared by the British Zionists and approved in France and America. It read:

H.M. Government, after considering the aims of the Zionist Organisation, accepts the principle of recognising Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people, and the right of the Jewish people to build up its National Life in Palestine under a protection to be established at the conclusion of Peace, following upon the successful issue of the war.

H.M. Government regards as essential for the realisation of this principle the grant of internal autonomy to Palestine, freedom of immigration for Jews, and the establishment of a Jewish National Colonising Corporation for the resettlement and economic development of the country.

The conditions and forms of the internal autonomy and a charter for the Jewish National Colonising Corporation should in the view of H.M. Government be elaborated in detail and determined with the representatives of the Zionist Organisation.⁸⁶

When Balfour submitted the project to the War Cabinet, a struggle developed, first over the policy involved and then over the terms of the declaration. Lord Curzon thought Zionism impracticable and opposed official support. The chief attack, however, was delivered by Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India. He was one of the ablest Jews in England but was strongly opposed to Hebrew nationalism and, as the minister responsible for India, was fearful of arousing Moslem hostility. The cabinet ultimately decided in favor of a pro-Zionist pronouncement, but it was necessary to revise the terms of the declaration in an effort to assure the anti-Zionist Jews that their rights of citizenship would not be jeopardized and to insert a safeguard for the rights of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. Furthermore, a statement had to be drafted which would receive the approval of Zionists throughout the world and of the Allied and Associated Powers. It is, therefore, small wonder that an acceptable formula was not forthcoming until November.⁸⁷ The final form of the declaration was in-

corporated in the following letter which Balfour sent on November 2nd to Lord Rothschild:

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

I shall be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.⁸⁸

The Allied Powers soon gave their formal adherence to the principles of the Balfour Declaration. On February 9, 1918, the Paris government issued a communiqué to the press asserting that "there is complete agreement between the French and British Governments in all matters which concern the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine."⁸⁹ Italy announced its approval of the home in a letter to Sokolow, dated May 9, 1918. The lesser Allies followed suit. The United States, which never declared war on Turkey, refrained from a formal endorsement, but President Wilson, who had consented to the terms of the Balfour Declaration before its issue, publicly approved Zionist aims in August, 1918, in a letter to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise and again in March, 1919, in a reply to a Zionist delegation.⁹⁰

The Allied governments espoused Zionism in the expectation that such action would attract the support of Jewish opinion in the struggle with Germany. They especially hoped that the Balfour Declaration and its counterparts would have a favorable reception in the United States where Jewish influence was potent in the formulation of public sentiment. It was thought, too, that a pro-Zionist statement might induce Russian Jews to favor a war policy and to employ their efforts in averting a Communist revolution and capitulation to the Central Powers. Finally, the fear that Germany was contemplating an announcement of sympathy for Zionism⁹¹ spurred the Allies to action. Their support of the national home was thus basically a war measure, dictated by materialistic considerations of self-interest.⁹²

Many and varied causes, in addition to those motivating its allies, impelled the British government to approve Zionist aims. The Biblical heritage of the English people which made the ancient history of the Hebrews more familiar to them than their own background awakened an interest in the Jews and a sympathy for their aspirations. Moreover, the theories of democracy, self-determination, and the rights of small nationalities, which flowered in the Allied countries during the war, induced respect for the Zionists'

effort to recover a lost homeland. To these sentimental factors, material interests were added. Zionist leaders and propagandists never tired of pointing out the coincidence of their aims and British interests in the East.⁹³

In England they saw a possible protector with neither the anti-Jewish heritage of Russia nor the Catholic tradition of France and Italy. As a result, they sought a British protectorate for Palestine and urged the desirability of English control of that region coupled with its settlement by a people bound to Britain by gratitude and self-interest. It was evident, therefore, that an Allied declaration in support of Zionism would strengthen the British position when the time came to establish an administration for the Sykes-Picot Brown zone, and would make it easier to oppose French desires for a paramount position in Palestine. All these elements entered into the British decision, but, in the final analysis, the Balfour Declaration in England, like its counterparts abroad, was issued to win the support of an international community whose wealth and whose influence in every country of the world were deemed valuable to the Allied cause.

The Balfour Declaration was not precise in wording. Indeed, the conditions of compromise under which it was drafted rendered precision impossible. The Zionists themselves hesitated to ask for a Jewish state when they were in a minority and unable to protect themselves. Instead they fell back upon the Basel program and spoke of a national home, a phrase which could mean much or little according to circumstances and the wish of the reader. Anti-Zionist opposition resulted in the declaration referring only to the *creation in Palestine of a Jewish national home* and not to the *re-constitution of Palestine as the Jewish national home*.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the Balfour Declaration, which was received with almost universal approval by the British press, was nearly everywhere accepted as a promise of a Jewish state to be created within some measurable future.

The British public, ill-informed of conditions in Palestine, thought of the Holy Land as a derelict country, thinly populated by a semi-nomadic peasantry. Arab nationalism seemed scarcely a reality, and persons who considered the inhabitants at all assumed that they would welcome the entry of energetic newcomers of similar racial antecedents, who were pledged to the economic rehabilitation of the land. Even so well-informed a public servant as Sir Mark Sykes held in 1917 that Jewish-Arab cooperation was possible and desirable.⁹⁵ Further, the powerful Zionist Organization was energetic in the dissemination of Jewish propaganda, while the Arabs, not yet awake to the importance of European public opinion, had taken scarcely any action to make their

cause comprehensible or attractive to the West. It was, therefore, not surprising that the British public adopted Zionism and interpreted the national home, a term strange to English ears and unknown to international law, as a Jewish state in embryo.⁹⁶ Lloyd George summed up the contemporary interpretation by saying:

The idea was . . . that a Jewish State was not to be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them by the idea of a national home and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth.⁹⁷

The Balfour Declaration did not conflict with the letter of the McMahon promises to Husain, since Palestine was not necessarily included in the area of Arab independence. It did not conflict with the letter of the Sykes-Picot agreement, for there was nothing in its terms to render an international control of Palestine impossible. When that is said, however, the whole story has not been told. The interests which these three British commitments were intended to serve were entirely different. They were opposed. They were irreconcilable. The McMahon promises were addressed to Arab nationalism. They were an expression of sympathy with the ideal of a nation that would embrace in some more or less close political bonds all the Arab peoples of Arabia, Syria and Mesopotamia. The Sykes-Picot agreement was based upon the material interests of imperialism. The Near East was, under its terms, to be exploited in the interests of France and England. The Balfour Declaration was addressed to Hebrew nationalism. It offered British support to the Zionist ideal of a Jewish Palestine, where Arab rights would be recognized, but where the culture of the state would be Hebraic.

When the War of 1914-1918 came to an end, most Arabs felt that they were in a position to claim British support for a united Arab nation, while most Jews felt that Great Britain was pledged to an ultimate Jewish state in Palestine. France was still relying for the safeguard of its rights in Syria upon the Sykes-Picot agreement which the Quai d'Orsay held was morally binding despite Russian repudiation of the secret treaties.

The Peace Settlement

THE end of the First World War left the future of Palestine still undecided. Despite British conquest of the territory and long, involved negotiations among the Allies, the Arabs and the Zionists, the immediate post-war period was one of uncertainty in the Holy Land and of further diplomatic maneuvering abroad. A temporary military administration in the occupied area proved unequal to the task laid upon it. Wartime commitments, Anglo-French rivalry, and the concept of a League of Nations and a mandates system complicated an attempted Palestinian settlement at Paris. Negotiations for an Allied treaty with Turkey were not concluded until 1923. Efforts to draft a mandate encountered one difficulty after another. Indeed, the disposition of Palestine constituted a major obstacle in the process of peace-making.

The country that Allenby occupied in 1917 and 1918 was devastated by years of war and by the activities of a ruthless military regime. Its material resources had been expended recklessly by the Turkish government which expropriated wealth, conscripted manpower and struck at the basis of agricultural economy by such shortsighted measures as the uprooting of bearing olive trees for fuel.¹ To economic dislocation was added administrative chaos when the retreating Turks removed with them both governmental records and local officials.

The rules of war obligated the British army to administer the occupied territory under Turkish law and to introduce no innovations which might prejudice its ultimate disposition. The disappearance of records and personnel and the disastrous plight of economic life, however, made mandatory the immediate creation of some sort of civil government. In order to show the flags of the Allied powers, small detachments of French and Italian troops had operated in conjunction with Allenby's forces, and in April, 1917, an Anglo-French political mission under Sykes and Georges-Picot had been attached to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.² Georges-Picot felt slighted because he was not invited to assist in the creation of an "Anglo-French civil administration,"³ but the plan

adopted for Palestine provided for no form of condominium. A political administration under the control of the British commander-in-chief was established, and Allenby obtained permission to appoint a Chief Administrator of Occupied Territory and military governors for sub-districts.

When, in the autumn of 1918, the territory under Allenby's control had spread into Syria and it became necessary to reorganize the government, an effort was made to satisfy the claims of the Arabs and the French. Shortly after the capture of Damascus, Allenby informed Faisal that arrangements were being made for a provisional Arab administration of the area east of the Jordan. On October 23, 1918, as the result of an Anglo-French agreement, the British commander-in-chief was able to report to the War Office that he had organized the administration of occupied enemy territory into three zones: South (Palestine north to Acre and east to the Jordan) under an English administrator, North (the Syrian coast) under the commander of the French detachment, and East (Trans-Jordan and the interior of Syria) under one of Faisal's officers.⁴ By this arrangement, the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement were recognized in the provisional military administration which, it was expected, would remain under Allenby's general command until peace was concluded with Turkey. British troops supplied most of the garrison for the whole occupied area, and General Headquarters in Egypt exercised supervision over the French and Arab as well as the British administrators.

The confused situation in the Near East, the probability that a considerable delay would occur before a final settlement was reached, and the desire to calm Arab fears of foreign domination and assure the world of Allied solidarity led, on November 7, 1918, to the publication of a joint Anglo-French declaration throughout the Arab areas under military occupation. This document, though it did not refer specifically to Palestine, was broadcast in the Holy Land and was taken by the Arabs, in conjunction with the "Declaration to the Seven," as a pledge of independence. It read:

The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War let loose by the ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.

In order to carry out these intentions France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in the territories the liberation of which they are now engaged in securing, and recognising these as soon as they are actually established.

Far from wishing to impose on the populations of these regions any particular institutions they are only concerned to ensure by their support and by adequate assistance the regular working of Governments and administrations freely chosen by the populations themselves. To secure impartial and equal

justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by inspiring and encouraging local initiative, to favour the diffusion of education, to put an end to dissensions that have too long been taken advantage of by Turkish policy, such is the policy which the two Allied Governments uphold in the liberated territories.⁵

The military administration in Palestine was faced with a difficult task which it was ill-fitted to undertake. Its personnel was hurriedly assembled from the army and the Egyptian civil service, and was given little definite instruction as to policy by either the War Office or the Foreign Office.⁶ Its duty, officially, was to maintain the *status quo* until peace was concluded and it thus became its unpleasant task to oppose almost every group in the community, for all factions hoped that the passing of the Turks would bring their own particular plans to rapid fruition. In practical matters the administration created a measure of order out of almost total chaos. In handling questions of policy, however, it quickly demonstrated its incapacity.

Many officials in Palestine regarded Britain's wartime pledges to both the Zionists and the French as unfortunate, though possibly expedient, commitments which the changed conditions of peacetime might render void. In the United States a British spokesman, interested in recruiting for the Jewish battalions which served with the army in the Holy Land, could say, "Great Britain in taking Palestine from the Turk, did not take it for herself, but for the Jewish people."⁷ In Paris Lloyd George could assure the French that England would not accept a mandate for Syria even if it were offered.⁸ In Palestine, however, where it was evident that the Arabs objected strongly to both Zionist immigration and French control but were willing to accept British assistance and guidance in attaining their aim of a united Syria, some officials cannot have failed to hope that events, if left to themselves, would present the world with a *fait accompli* in which both France and the Zionists would disappear from a Near East where British dominance would be assured.

The government personnel, so far as it came from Egypt, was acquainted with the Arabs and saw in their friendship the true aim of British policy. A few important posts, moreover, were held by anti-Semites. Other officials, neither pro-Arab nor anti-Jew, felt themselves bound by the international obligations of a military occupation to a passive insistence upon the *status quo* and to a policy of conciliation toward the majority of the inhabitants.⁹

The Zionists, however, who were impatient to begin the work of restoration in their ravaged homeland, gained authorization in February, 1918, for the dispatch of an international commission to Palestine.¹⁰ Headed by Dr. Weizmann, this body, which ultimately represented in its composition English, French, Italian and Russian

Jewry, reached the Holy Land on April 20th and soon became a source of annoyance to the authorities, though it was not until after Weizmann's departure in September, 1918, that friction became serious.

Following the arrival and rise to power in the Commission late in 1919 of Menahem Ussishkin, a Russian Zionist of great sincerity and force but decidedly lacking in tact and pliancy, matters went from bad to worse.

The Zionist leaders were first disappointed and then angry and resentful to find that local authorities were less enthusiastic in support of a Jewish restoration than were their chiefs in London. Their zeal led them to expect active assistance, and their sensitivity to possible anti-Semitism caused them to see obstructionist tactics in the passive attitude adopted by the provisional government. The Commission undertook to exert pressure to secure employment for Jews in the public service, recognition of Hebrew as an official language on a par with Arabic, and removal of the restrictions on immigration and the right to purchase land.¹¹

The authorities objected that Jews demanded higher wages than Arabs, but were outraged when the Zionist Commission undertook to pay subsidies to Jewish public servants to enable them to hold low-salaried positions and yet maintain their standard of living. They ridiculed the absurdities inevitably present in a hectic campaign to revive a moribund tongue and protested the expense involved in a third official language. They insisted that the economic condition of the country made immigration undesirable, and that the disappearance of all Turkish registers rendered land transfers impossible.¹² A general feeling of distrust and suspicion thus gradually developed between the Zionists and the Military Administration.

Meanwhile Arab unrest grew. The Anglo-French declaration of November, 1918, and the Wilsonian theory of self-determination had aroused the hopes of the Arab intellectuals, but months passed and British and French control of the occupied areas seemed to become more and more firmly rooted. In the interior, under the Arab administration, propaganda was conducted in the interest of a united Syrian state. In Palestine opposition to Zionism, evident even before the war,¹³ crystallized in the activities of the Moslem-Christian Associations, Arab nationalist societies which sprang up in many towns.¹⁴ As if to intensify the political unrest, the American section of a projected Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey arrived at Jaffa on June 10, 1919. This body, headed by Henry C. King and Charles R. Crane, undertook a survey of public opinion throughout Syria. The result was an outburst of Arab nationalist sentiment. A General Syrian Congress,

which had been assembled at Damascus and claimed to speak for all the Arabs of Syria, Palestine and the Lebanon, adopted on July 2nd, for presentation to the American commission, a program which demanded "complete political independence" for a united Syria including Palestine. The Congress protested against the mandatory status which the peace conference had prescribed for Syria, but expressed itself as willing, if its objection was overruled, to accept American or British assistance and guidance. It declared uncompromisingly:

We oppose the pretensions of Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge their title but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities.¹⁵

Between September and December, 1919, British control of the entire Arab area in Allied occupation came to an end when a provisional Anglo-French agreement for division of responsibilities went into effect. Under this plan English forces were withdrawn from the French and Arab zones, and Allenby's authority over them ceased. This official severance of connections, however, did not divorce events in Occupied Enemy Territory (South) from those taking place outside its borders. Faisal's efforts to reach an agreement with France that would satisfy both French imperialists and Arab nationalists resulted only in a provisional compromise totally unsatisfactory to his followers. Forced at last to adopt the policy of his extremist supporters, he accepted in March, 1920, the crown of Syria and Palestine that was proffered by the General Syrian Congress. This action aroused the enthusiasm of the Palestine Arab leaders and intensified their hatred of the Jews, who appeared to be the chief obstacle to union with Syria and to self-government in Palestine. It was suspected, moreover, that the local British authorities would not look with entire disfavor upon action which would demonstrate decisively the reality of Arab unity and the impossibility of French and Zionist plans.¹⁶ As a result of these conditions, Palestine in the spring of 1920 was a tinderbox.

The Moslem festival of Nebi Musa provided a spark to set off the conflagration which became the first in a long series of Palestine "disturbances." After several thousand pilgrims had arrived in Jerusalem on April 4, 1920, there took place a political demonstration in which a large picture of Faisal was displayed and agitators incited an attack upon the Jews. In the course of the ensuing riots, hoodlums fell upon the Jews with sticks, stones and knives. Instead of assisting the victims, the Arab police either adopted a passive attitude or joined in the rioting. Ultimately British troops were called out, and the disorders were temporarily quelled. To

insure peace, some 300 or 400 Arabs were detained overnight in a mosque, but when, on the following morning, they were released, the disturbances broke out again. On the afternoon of April 5th the authorities finally disarmed the Arab police, proclaimed martial law, and handed over control to an insufficient force of military guards. It was not until the next day that order was completely restored. As a result of the outbreak, five Jews and four Arabs were killed, and 211 Jews and 21 Arabs were wounded.¹⁷

Many Zionists branded the 1920 disturbances as a pogrom and charged the Military Administration, then headed by Sir Louis J. Bols, with complicity.¹⁸ The authorities had approved the formation of the Moslem-Christian Associations and had sanctioned their activities despite the protests of Zionists who pointed out that such an attitude would be interpreted by the Arabs, accustomed to Turkish methods, as official approval of their purposes and as an invitation to anti-Jewish action. Moreover, following the riots, the military authorities arrested and inflicted severe penalties upon leaders of a defense organization which had illegally armed bodies of Jews for self-protection in view of the growing virulence of the anti-Zionist campaign.¹⁹ Vladimir Jabotinsky, a former officer in the British army and the chief of the defense force, was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment for possession of firearms and ammunition at the same time that an exactly similar penalty was meted out to an Arab rioter convicted of rape.²⁰ Some justification of the charges of anti-Zionist activities and prejudice in governmental circles appeared, therefore, to exist.

In the aftermath of the riots, the Arabs submitted to the Military Administration demands for the suppression of the Zionist Commission and the disbandment of the Jewish battalion stationed in the Holy Land. The home government, however, was not induced to alter its policy by this first outbreak of violence in the Arabs' campaign against Zionism. The Foreign Office instructed Allenby that he was not to entertain the Moslem-Christian proposals,²¹ and plans were soon elaborated for replacing the existing regime in Palestine. The administration had shown itself incapable of maintaining order and both unable and unwilling, because of its position in international law and because of its composition, to foster the creation of the Jewish home. British public opinion, therefore, joined the Zionists in urging a thorough reorganization of the Palestine government.²² On April 25, 1920, at San Remo, a mandate for the Holy Land was assigned to Great Britain by the Principal Allied Powers, and shortly thereafter announcement was made that a provisional civil administration would be established. On the last day of June, 1920, Bols surrendered his charge into the hands of the new High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel.

THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

The coming of peace in 1918 found the future of the Near East still unsettled. The French government, acutely conscious that the conquest of Syria had been accomplished almost entirely by British arms and uncertain of the validity of the Sykes-Picot agreement since its repudiation by Russia, was suspicious of English designs and desirous of gaining renewed assurances of its position. It was under these circumstances that on November 30, 1918, Georges Clemenceau, the French Premier, paid a visit to London. Though the British government as a whole had not yet adopted a policy advocating English control of Palestine, Lloyd George had decided that British and Zionist interests could both be best served in that way. In conversations with Clemenceau, therefore, he asked that English control be substituted for the international regime provided by the Sykes-Picot agreement in a Palestine having the Biblical limits from Dan to Beersheba, and that Mosul be added to the sphere of British influence in Mesopotamia.²³ Clemenceau agreed upon three conditions: (1) that France secure a just share in the petroleum resources of Mosul which were controlled by an English company; (2) that Britain support all other French rights as defined by the Sykes-Picot agreement; and (3) that, if some form of trusteeship under a League of Nations were substituted by the Peace Conference for a system of annexations and protectorates, the French area under mandate should include not only the Blue zone but also the A zone, less Mosul.²⁴ On these terms a tentative and unwritten understanding was reached.

In December, 1918, the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet took up the question of Palestine in an effort to draft a definite policy. Lord Curzon, the chairman, noted with anxiety the growing friction between Arabs and Zionists, but stated that Faisal was reportedly prepared to acquiesce in a reasonable "infiltration" of Jews if Great Britain remained in the Holy Land, though he would support the native Arabs strongly if any other power intervened.²⁵ He declared the plan for international control to be dead and dismissed the possibility of France as a trustee state on the ground that its presence in the Holy Land would be acceptable to no other power. He admitted that an American guardianship had received favorable consideration by the cabinet in the past but said that, partially for strategic reasons in connection with the protection of the Suez Canal, he personally was now a convert to British control. Opinion, however, was not unanimous. Lord Robert Cecil feared that France would never accept a British protectorate and, therefore, favored support for the United States.²⁶

On the basis of this discussion, the Foreign Office prepared a

memorandum on policy for the consideration of the War Cabinet. This paper opposed any sort of condominium in Palestine and urged the appointment of a single tutelary power subject to the supervision of a League of Nations. In considering the selection of the trustee it eliminated France and cast doubt upon the willingness of the United States to accept appointment. It suggested that the choice between America and Britain be left open.²⁷ When the cabinet came to discuss the question, Lord Curzon opposed an American trusteeship. He insisted that the inhabitants of Palestine wanted British protection and pointed to Faisal's alleged views on Zionism and to a recent pronouncement of American Jews in favor of British control.²⁸ The cabinet, however, reached no definite decision upon the policy to be adopted at Paris.²⁹

Before the Peace Conference formally opened on January 18, 1919, plans for a League of Nations had received favorable attention in the Allied countries, and a project of the South African statesman, Jan Smuts, for a mandatory system under which the principal Allies would act as trustees for new states to be created out of the territories of the conquered Central Powers had been modified and incorporated in a League proposal drafted by President Wilson. The Allied and Associated Powers, particularly England and the United States, were morally bound by public statements to oppose imperialistic annexations in the Near East. The Allies' reply of January 10, 1917, to Wilson's war aims note announced as their purpose "the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks."³⁰ In a speech before a trade union conference on January 5, 1918, Lloyd George declared, "Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions."³¹ Wilson, in his Fourteen Points address on January 8, 1918, said: "The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."³² None-the-less, the interests of the Allies and their obligations under the secret treaties made complete withdrawal from the East unthinkable to the statesmen at Paris. Under these circumstances the plan for mandates administered under the control of a League of Nations appeared to offer a means of reconciling public pronouncements and secret desires. General acquiescence in the application of this principle to the non-Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire was, therefore, easily procured.

On January 25th the Peace Conference approved the creation of a League of Nations and appointed a committee to draft its constitution. Five days later the Supreme Council³³ discussed a man-

datory regime under which more advanced nations, acting on behalf of the League, should become guardians for the conquered German colonies as well as for the occupied areas in Turkey. Because some of the British dominions desired the direct annexation of such colonies, Lloyd George proposed that, while certain communities formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire might be recognized as provisionally independent, the lands of central Africa would require greater control and those of south Africa and the German Pacific islands could best be administered as integral parts of the territory of the tutelary power. This scheme created three types of mandates, ultimately known as A, B and C, and placed the territories of interest to the dominions in category C under conditions differing only slightly from outright annexation. President Wilson objected to any definitive settlement of the mandates question until the League of Nations was constituted. Lloyd George complained that the British Empire was being forced to maintain more than a million men under arms for the military occupation of the Turkish Empire alone and begged for at least a tentative approval of his plan so that it might become a basis for a revision of Allied commitments. To this Wilson agreed, and a provisional resolution embodying the English plan was adopted.³⁴ The British Prime Minister then suggested that the Supreme Council should proceed at once to the assignment of mandates. Since action in this sense would have tended to render the provisional decision final, Wilson naturally dissented. It was therefore concluded merely to request the Supreme War Council for a report on the equalization of responsibilities in the military occupation of Turkey.³⁵

The committee, then engaged in drawing up a constitution for the League of Nations, adopted the Supreme Council resolution on mandates almost intact. Provision was added for the drafting, either by the Allied and Associated Powers or, failing their action, by the League Council, of instruments defining the duties and powers of the trustee states.³⁶ Though minor alterations in the text were made in the ensuing weeks, no basic changes were introduced, and in the Covenant, adopted on April 28, 1919, by the Peace Conference, the mandates section appeared as Article 22 which read in part as follows:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best

undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. . . .

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.³⁷

It was thus indirectly decided that Palestine should become a mandate, but its guardian power was not officially chosen nor were the terms of the mandatory instrument or the limits of the territory defined.³⁸

Long before the mandates system assumed its final form in the Covenant, the future of Palestine within that system had become a topic for discussion before the Supreme Council. On January 7th, after a visit in England, Amir Faisal, the representative of the Hejaz and the spokesman for the Arab nationalist movement, arrived in Paris, where there had earlier been circulated among the various peace delegations a memorandum in which he frankly foreshadowed a great unitary state but asked, for the present, only for the independence of the various Arab countries, some of which, he conceded, stood in need of foreign assistance. Of the Holy Land, he said :

In Palestine the enormous majority of the people are Arabs. The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood, and there is no conflict of character between the two races. In principles we are absolutely at one. Nevertheless the Arabs cannot risk assuming the responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in this one province, so often involved the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective super-position of a great trustee, so long as a representative local administration commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of the country.³⁹

At the end of January the Hejaz delegation presented an official statement to the Peace Conference. This asked for independence under League of Nations guarantee for the Arabic-speaking peoples from the line Alexandretta-Diyarbakir south to the Indian Ocean, the Hejaz and Aden excepted. The boundaries of the states to be created in this area should, it suggested, be a matter for settlement in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned. No mention of Palestine appeared in this brief and general statement.⁴⁰

On February 6, 1919, Faisal, accompanied by T. E. Lawrence and three members of the Hejaz delegation, appeared before the Supreme Council to present his case. He supported demands for the independence and cohesion of the Arab areas of the Ottoman Empire by reference to their geographic, racial, linguistic, social and economic unity, to the Arabs' part in the war, and to the Allies' promises and public declarations of policy. He recognized that Syria wanted complete independence, but hinted that its desires might be met within a loose confederation. He stood prepared to admit the independence of the Lebanon, but advocated its economic union with the surrounding areas. The Arabs, he said, realized that they needed foreign help, but they were not willing to sacrifice their freedom to obtain it. "Palestine, for its universal character, he left on one side for the mutual consideration of all parties interested. With this exception he asked for the independence of the Arabic areas enumerated in his memorandum." If this principle was admitted, he suggested that the people of the various regions be allowed to indicate to the League of Nations the amount and nature of the foreign assistance they required. If the evidence did not appear conclusive, he favored an international commission of inquiry. When asked by Wilson whether the Arabs would prefer a single mandatory or several, Faisal refused to assume the responsibility of an answer, saying that the people must decide. Queried as to his personal opinion, he admitted that he was opposed to partition.⁴¹

Faisal's attitude toward the Palestine question, though apparently not in harmony with Arab ideas in general, is not difficult to understand. The Amir was well aware of French opposition to Arab nationalism and of Syrian objections to French control, but he had not given up hope of gaining, with the help of the British, a favorable compromise. It was for this reason that he avoided any direct attack upon French aims and showed himself sympathetic to Zionism. In June, 1918, Dr. Weizmann had visited him in his camp near 'Aqaba and assured him that the Zionists were not working for the immediate establishment of a Jewish government in Palestine. In London he had been strongly advised to come to terms with the Zionists. He was finally convinced that the national home policy need hold no serious threat to the existing population and that Jewish-Arab cooperation would be desirable. His wish to assure himself of support in the coming struggle with France naturally predisposed him to compliance with British suggestions.⁴² It was in these circumstances that, early in January, 1919, he joined Weizmann in signing an agreement which presupposed the separation of Palestine from an Arab Syrian state and undertook to establish friendly relations between the two countries. It specifically

provided for the carrying out of the Balfour Declaration, for large-scale immigration of Jews into Palestine, and for the protection of Arab rights, but did not concern itself with the question of political control. Faisal made his agreement to this treaty contingent upon the Arabs' securing their independence in accordance with the terms laid down in a memorandum which he had sent to the British Foreign Office.⁴³

On February 13, 1919, the Supreme Council again turned to the Syrian problem when it heard a statement by Dr. Howard Bliss, president of the American University at Beirut, who strongly urged that an international commission be sent to the Levant at once to ascertain the views of the people with regard to their political future. He was followed by a delegation from *Le Comité Central Syrien* of Paris headed by Chekri Ganem.⁴⁴ This gentleman presented a long and eloquent statement in which he denied that the Syrians are Arabs and pleaded for the independence of a unitary Syria under French protection. He denounced Faisal and his military regime at Damascus and said of the Holy Land:

Palestine is incontestably the Southern portion of our country. The Zionists claim it. We have suffered too much from sufferings resembling theirs, not to throw open wide to them the doors of Palestine. All those who are oppressed in certain retrograde countries are welcome. Let them settle in Palestine, but in an autonomous Palestine, connected with Syria by the sole bond of federation. Will not a Palestine enjoying wide internal autonomy be for them a sufficient guarantee?⁴⁵

Arguments against partition of Syria and bids for Zionist support, it appeared, could be made to serve all interests. If Faisal, the protege of the English, appeared to be advocating unity to expel the French from Syria, then Ganem, the protege of the French, could advocate it to expel the English from Palestine. If Faisal could offer concessions to Zionism, so could Ganem. On February 15th, the French effort to counteract Faisal's declaration was carried further when Clemenceau introduced to the Supreme Council a Lebanese delegation which also asked for a French mandate.⁴⁶

Consideration of Eastern questions had to be taken up at odd moments when the more immediately pressing problems of the German peace permitted. It was thus not until the end of February that the Zionists had an opportunity to appear before the Supreme Council. The Jews, however, had not been idle. At the close of November, 1918, Nahum Sokolow left London for Paris to open a Zionist Bureau for the dissemination of information regarding Jewish nationalist aspirations.⁴⁷ He was later joined by two other members of the pre-war Executive, as well as by Dr. Weizmann, various other prominent European Zionists, and representatives of the American Zionist Organization. Moreover, an English, a French, an Italian and two American Jewish delegations and vari-

ous representatives of the Jews of eastern Europe appeared in the French capital. These groups, primarily interested in obtaining guarantees of Jewish rights outside Palestine, took little part in the negotiations concerning the Holy Land, but *Le Comité des Délégations Juives auprès de la Conférence de la Paix*, which ultimately united most of them, supported the Zionist program for a British mandate and the development of a Jewish homeland.

Long negotiations among the Zionists and some of their English sympathizers resulted in the production at the end of January of a memorandum for presentation to the Peace Conference. Early drafts of this program demanded majority rights for the existing Jewish community in Palestine, but prudence and the protests of British political experts prevailed and the Zionists adopted a platform looking forward to a Jewish commonwealth only when immigration should have swelled their numbers.⁴⁸ The official memorandum provided a series of draft resolutions for consideration and adoption by the conference. Among them were statements recognizing the historic title of the Jews to Palestine and their right to reconstitute a national home there, and creating the Holy Land a League mandate under British control. The memorandum also requested boundaries to include the lower reaches of the Litani River and Mount Hermon and that portion of Trans-Jordan lying to the west of the Hejaz Railway, which itself was to be left in the territory of the projected Arab state. It forecast the ultimate creation of a representative, responsible government under a democratic franchise for all the inhabitants of Palestine without regard to race or faith.⁴⁹

On February 27, 1919, the Supreme Council received a Zionist deputation. Nahum Sokolow distributed copies of the Jewish memorandum and explained that the delegation was authorized to speak for both the Zionist Organization and the Jewish community of Palestine. Weizmann, Menahem Ussishkin and André Spire spoke briefly in support of their program. Before the delegation withdrew, Robert Lansing, the American Secretary of State, asked the exact meaning of the phrase, a Jewish national home. "Did that," he asked, "mean an autonomous Jewish Government?" Weizmann replied that he did not request the immediate creation of a Hebrew administration, but made it clear that he hoped to see a Zionist majority established in Palestine and looked forward to the ultimate creation of a Jewish state. He said:

The Zionist organization did not want an autonomous Jewish Government, but merely to establish in Palestine, under a mandatory Power, an administration, not necessarily Jewish, which would render it possible to send into Palestine 70[000] to 80,000 Jews annually. The Zionist Association would require to have permission at the same time to build Jewish schools, where Hebrew would be taught, and in that way to build up gradually a nationality

which would be as Jewish as the French nation was French and the British nation British. Later on, when the Jews formed the large majority, they would be ripe to establish such a Government as would answer to the state of the development of the country and to their ideals.⁵⁰

The French government was determined that no partial solution of the Turkish mandates question should be agreed upon which did not recognize its claims in Syria. As a result, a final settlement of Palestine's future became dependent upon a successful outcome of the Anglo-French negotiations which were begun in London during Clemenceau's December visit and continued in Paris as a background to the semi-public activities of the Supreme Council. On February 15, 1919, the French government submitted to Great Britain a written proposal embodying its understanding of the Lloyd George-Clemenceau engagement. This was followed by a conversation between Clemenceau, Pichon, Lloyd George and Balfour as a result of which Sir Maurice Hankey presented a counter-proposal suggesting, according to the French, "a great limitation of the territory to come under French influence, both on the east and on the south as regards the Jebel Druse." The French government, however, rejected both this scheme and a later one advanced by the British.⁵¹

Lord Milner, who was in charge of the negotiations, informed Clemenceau that Britain was not trying to remove France from Syria and that its interest "was confined to an extended Mesopotamia, to Palestine, and to a good connection between them." The British plan with regard to Syria was one of compromise. An independent Arab state in the Sykes-Picot A zone was to have an outlet to the sea at Tripoli and to accept a severely limited mandate, while the Lebanon and the rest of the coast (the Blue zone) was to be placed under a regular mandate and assigned to France.⁵² The French, however, regarded with suspicion the Zionist and British efforts to extend the Palestine frontier northward either in the interest of the Jewish home or a "good connection" with Mesopotamia, and saw a violation of the Lloyd George-Clemenceau understanding in the attempt to weaken French control over inner Syria.⁵³ Britain was apparently showing no intention of accepting only a limited mandate for the Sykes-Picot B zone and Mosul, and the French government was somewhat inclined to feel itself unfairly treated.

On March 20th, the disagreement over the Syrian mandate came into the open at a meeting of the British, French, Italian and American heads of state. The French Foreign Minister, Stephen Pichon, announced that his government did not desire to control Palestine but insisted upon receiving a mandate for an otherwise united Syria. Lloyd George countered that the League of Nations could

not be used to abrogate the Husain-McMahon understanding, declared that Britain could not agree to place Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo under direct French influence, and pointed out that the Paris government had specifically agreed to uphold an Arab state in the interior of Syria. At this juncture, President Wilson intervened with the observation that the wishes of the people should be the determining element in the choice of a mandatory and espoused the earlier proposal of Faisal and Dr. Bliss for a commission to investigate public opinion on the choice of a mandatory. Clemenceau acquiesced in principle but urged that the inquiry must not be confined to Syria, while Lloyd George agreed without reservations. It was decided, therefore, that Wilson should draft terms of reference for the proposed investigating body.⁵⁴

As a result of this decision, it was announced on March 23rd that an international commission was to visit Syria and its terms of reference received the approval of Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau.⁵⁵ Serious objections to the commission appeared, however, among the Eastern specialists who felt that the presence of such a body in Syria would be a cause for intrigue and unrest.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the American members of the Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey were quickly appointed and on April 23rd the British list was announced. But the French government soon placed obstructions in the way of the final constitution of the commission and ultimately made it clear that it intended to take no part in an investigation which might very probably result in the exposure of anti-French sentiment in Syria. In view of this attitude, the British government withdrew from participation. President Wilson, on the other hand, insisted upon the execution of the project and at the end of May dispatched Henry C. King and Charles R. Crane to the East.

After spending forty days in Syria and Palestine, the American commissioners reported that the Arab Moslems were practically unanimous in favor of an independent united Syria in receipt of limited foreign assistance, that the Arab Christians urged the necessity of an effective mandate, and that the Jews generally supported the Zionist program and British control of Palestine. The report recommended a single mandate of limited period for a Syria which would include Palestine. This united state, it suggested, should be a constitutional monarchy under the rule of Faisal and should allow for the autonomy of special areas such as the Lebanon. The mandate should be assigned, in accordance with the wishes of the people, to the United States or, as second choice, to Great Britain. Under no circumstances should it be given to France, though if French insistence made a compromise necessary, the Lebanon might be detached and entrusted to its mandatory care.

The American commissioners took an unfavorable view of Zionism on the ground that the majority of the population in Palestine opposed major aspects of the Zionist program. Neither Christians nor Moslems, they thought, could look forward with pleasure to the ultimate creation of a Jewish state in the Holy Land.⁵⁷ On August 28th, the so-called King-Crane report was filed with the American delegation in Paris, though it was not made public. Indeed, its recommendations were not practicable. Neither the United States nor Great Britain would at that time accept a Syrian mandate even if it were offered, and nothing could induce the French government to surrender its claims.

Further discussion of the Turkish mandates at meetings of the Supreme Council during May seemed to have little effect other than to increase Clemenceau's dissatisfaction with the British.⁵⁸ In the months that followed, Anglo-French tension became still more serious. An authoritative article in *L'Asie française* definitely accused Great Britain of breaking faith in its wartime negotiations with the Arabs and of endeavoring to oust France from Syria by supporting the agitation of local extremists.⁵⁹ In view of the furore which this and similar articles awakened in France, Lloyd George found it advisable to insist upon a reorganization of the forces of occupation. He therefore presented to Clemenceau a memorandum dated September 13, 1919, which announced that the evacuation of Syria and Cilicia would begin on November 1st and that British troops would remain in occupation only of "Palestine, defined in accordance with its ancient boundaries from Dan to Beer-Sheba, and Mesopotamia including Mosul." It proclaimed British readiness to discuss the boundary between Syria and Palestine, and suggested that if no agreement were reached, the question might be submitted to the arbitration of a referee selected by President Wilson.⁶⁰ Clemenceau reserved the right to discuss a permanent settlement later, and the Supreme Council decided that the rearrangement of the forces of occupation in Turkey should not prejudice the future.⁶¹ It thus came about that France, as a provisional measure, assumed full control in the Sykes-Picot Blue zone, and that Faisal's government in Damascus took over complete responsibility for garrisoning and administering the Syrian interior and Trans-Jordan.

This agreement did not end Anglo-French bickering. On October 14, 1919, Clemenceau sent Lloyd George a strongly worded telegram protesting British obstructionist activities with regard to French claims in the Levant. Lloyd George replied with a long letter in which he insisted upon the complete fairness of British policy, pointed out that France was pledged to support an Arab

state in the interior of Syria, and recalled that British acceptance of the Sykes-Picot agreement had been conditioned on Arab possession of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. He revealed that Amir Faisal had again come to Europe in hopes of reaching a final settlement, and that Britain had brought pressure to bear upon him to come to an agreement with France.⁶² Shortly thereafter, Faisal went to Paris and, on November 27th, interviewed Clemenceau. Pending a final settlement by the Peace Conference, he agreed, on behalf of the Arab government, to respect the French occupation of the Syrian coastal region and to turn to France for any foreign assistance that might be required. The French Premier undertook not to push garrisons into the interior.⁶³ This unsatisfactory compromise apparently resulted in some lessening of Anglo-French tension.

After the signature of the German treaty on June 28, 1919, and the departure of Wilson from Paris, the Peace Conference lost authority and initiative. Lloyd George appeared in France only occasionally, and the conference was allowed to drift to its death in January, 1920, without a final settlement of questions relating to Turkey. It had been unofficially decided that Palestine was to become a British mandate and that some recognition should be given to Zionist aspirations, but a full year's negotiation had accomplished little more.

THE PEACE WITH TURKEY

The status of Palestine could not be legally determined until peace was concluded with Turkey, of which, under international law, the Holy Land was still a part. At Paris, however, little progress was made on the treaty with the Ottoman Empire. European matters were more pressing and international rivalries in the East surrounded every approach to Turkish affairs with threats to Allied solidarity. A Turkish delegation which appeared before the Supreme Council on June 17, 1919, presented a plea for a settlement on the basis of pre-war conditions, under which the old frontiers of the Ottoman Empire would be largely restored.⁶⁴ This proposal was elaborated in a memorandum of June 23rd, which offered nothing more than autonomy for the Arab areas, including Palestine.⁶⁵

It is difficult to believe that the Turks had any hope that their project would receive approval, but the Allies would have been well-advised to reach some settlement with the imperial government while it was still in a position to negotiate. Instead, Clemenceau delivered a reply from the Peace Conference on June 25th, which, in a scathing public letter, declared that the Turks had never been able to rule subject peoples and utterly rejected their proposals.⁶⁶

It was not until February, 1920, during a conference of the Supreme Council in London that the general outlines of the Turkish treaty were laid down. By that time Millerand had succeeded Clemenceau as Prime Minister of France and the new government was proving itself even more reluctant than the old to surrender any of its claims in the Levant. In reply to a query regarding the arrangements with Faisal made in November by his government, the French delegate to the London Conference, Philippe Berthelot, explained that a tentative accord providing for a Syrian state under French protection had been concluded. He expressed himself, however, as skeptical of Faisal's ability to retain his authority and carry out his undertakings and insisted that, if the Amir failed to observe the agreement, France would regard itself as freed from all obligation to him.⁶⁷ It appeared that the new French government would be pleased rather than sorry if the engagements into which Clemenceau had entered were voided through Arab default.

In the period which elapsed between the Allied meeting at London and mid-April, 1920, the Conference of Ambassadors and the drafting committees were busy with the terms of the Turkish treaty.⁶⁸ Events in Syria had ceased to wait upon the Allied statesmen. On March 8th the General Syrian Congress proclaimed the independence of Syria, including Palestine and the Lebanon, and chose Faisal king. The growing conviction that England, which had already withdrawn its troops, was prepared to abandon them to French control and what appeared to the Arabs to be Faisal's small success in his negotiations with Clemenceau had brought the extremists to power in Damascus. The Amir bowed before them in accepting the proffered crown. Faced by this complete renunciation of the mandates system, France and Great Britain on March 15th repudiated the action of the Syrian Congress and informed Faisal that only the Peace Conference could settle the future of the Arab lands.⁶⁹ These events in Syria, however, and the Nebi Musa riots in Jerusalem called the attention of the world to the unrest in the East and served to impress upon British statesmen the imperative need for a final settlement of Levantine problems.

Following a day of informal meetings, the Supreme Council officially assembled at San Remo on April 19, 1920, for a discussion of the Turkish treaty. It appeared at first that once again European matters would delay a settlement. Lloyd George, however, was able to obtain immediate consideration of the Turkish peace, and on the first day of the conference the Allied prime ministers announced that agreement on major matters had been reached and that an Ottoman delegation would be invited to Paris on May 10th to receive the draft treaty.⁷⁰

A final settlement of the Anglo-French dispute over Syria was

necessarily a part of the San Remo negotiations. It appears that the French delegates, led by Millerand, insisted upon fulfillment of Clemenceau's 1918 demand for a single mandate over the whole country.⁷¹ Arrangements with Faisal were to become a domestic matter for settlement by France alone. In order, therefore, to secure assent to the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia, including Mosul, and to avoid a break at a time when Anglo-French relations in Europe were far from good, the British government acquiesced in a decision against which it had been struggling for nearly eighteen months. Clemenceau's other demand—for a share in the petroleum of Mosul—was also met. Negotiations on this matter proceeded parallel with the territorial discussions at Paris, and in April, 1919, an Anglo-French oil agreement assigned France a twenty-five per cent interest in the Turkish Petroleum Company which held the Mosul concession. Clemenceau refused to ratify this undertaking until France was assured of Syria. The agreement was renewed in December, 1919, but still the Syrian affair blocked ratification. British capitulation to French insistence removed this obstruction, and on April 24, 1920, a third agreement was signed containing the same stipulation and providing that France should facilitate the building of oil pipelines across Syrian territory to the Mediterranean. It received the confirmation of Lloyd George and Millerand on the following day.⁷²

When the clauses of the Turkish treaty dealing with mandates came before the Supreme Council at San Remo for approval, it was proposed that Syria and Mesopotamia should be recognized as provisionally independent states subject to mandatory control. Palestine, however, was to receive special treatment. The British draft of the article on the Holy Land provided for recitation of the Balfour Declaration because, as Lord Curzon, the Foreign Minister, explained, the Jews regarded its appearance in the treaty as of prime importance. Berthelot objected to the inclusion of the British pledge on the ground that, while the French government had agreed to a Jewish national home in Palestine, it had not adopted the form of words of the Balfour Declaration and that it was most unusual to refer to a semi-official document in a treaty. He preferred a French draft which, he felt, would more adequately safeguard the political and traditional rights of the non-Jewish communities.

This text, it appeared, would have allowed the French government to preserve its pre-war rights as guardian of the Roman Catholics and their holy places in Palestine, and both Francesco Nitti, the Italian Premier, and Lloyd George protested. The English Prime Minister flatly stated that his government could not and would not accept the dual mandate which a French protectorate

over the Catholics would involve. Finally, as a compromise, Nitti proposed to insert in the treaty a provision for the appointment by the mandatory of a special commission to study the status and claims of the Palestine religious communities. Millerand ultimately agreed to this and dropped his objection to the British formula respecting the Jewish national home.⁷³ On April 24th, it was therefore announced that the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in the Turkish treaty had been decided upon by the Peace Conference.⁷⁴

On the following day the French delegates suggested that the mandatory powers should be nominated in the treaty. Lord Curzon dissented and noted the analogy of the Versailles treaty, in which the German colonies were simply surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Berthelot agreed to follow the same plan with regard to the Turkish territories but asked that a resolution naming the mandatories be adopted and recorded in the minutes.⁷⁵ Acting upon this request, the conference assigned, in the name of the Principal Allied Powers, the mandates for Syria and the Lebanon to France and those for Mesopotamia and Palestine to Great Britain.

Announcement of the allotment of the A mandates was received with varied emotions by the unofficial delegations gathered in San Remo. Sokolow, Weizmann and Herbert Samuel, who were there in the interest of the Zionists,⁷⁶ hailed the decisions of the conference as a victory. A delegation representing the Arabs, however, issued a statement denouncing the partition of their lands and the imposition of mandates as a breach of faith, and warned that these actions would throw the Arabs into the arms of the anti-European Turkish nationalists under Mustapha Kemal.⁷⁷

On April 26th the San Remo Conference came to a close with adoption of the final clauses of the Turkish treaty. The Ottoman delegation received the text in Paris on May 11th and, despite a bitter protest against its terms, was compelled to sign the treaty on August 10, 1920, at Sèvres. The clauses dealing with the northern Arab regions, upon which it was expected the mandatory instrument for Palestine would be based, distinguished sharply between the Holy Land and the other mandated territories. Syria and Mesopotamia were recognized as provisionally independent states ultimately to become completely free from tutelary control. Palestine, however, was placed under the administration of a mandatory obligated to implement the promises of the Balfour Declaration, and no recognition was accorded to Arab aspirations for independence. Turkey was required not only to relinquish sovereignty over the detached areas but also to accept whatever measures the Allies saw fit to employ in establishing and regulating the mandatory regime.⁷⁸

Arab nationalists bitterly pointed out that the Treaty of Sèvres placed the Holy Land in a unique category and not in the A classification of the Covenant, that it entrusted the administration to a mandatory pledged to carry out a policy abhorrent to the majority of the population, and that it guaranteed the people no voice in the selection of their guardian state.⁷⁹ To these protests Zionists and legalists replied that the Covenant, in defining category A, referred only to "certain communities" of the Ottoman Empire and did not specifically include Palestine in that classification, that there was nothing in the Covenant requiring all mandates to conform to one of the three defined categories, and that, while the consent of the people concerned was made a principal consideration in the choice of the mandatory, it was not the sole criterion of selection.⁸⁰ That the legalists were technically in the right and that there was a certain inconsistency in denouncing the whole mandatory system on one hand and claiming its protection to secure a particular type of mandate on the other did not appear to disturb the Palestine Arabs who continued their attacks upon the Sèvres treaty until it was superseded by that of Lausanne.

Both fears and hopes that the settlement at Sèvres would offer the foundation for a speedy regularization of the Palestine mandate failed to materialize, for that ill-fated treaty was never ratified. Even at the time of the San Remo Conference the Constantinople government had lost virtually all authority in Anatolia, where Mustapha Kemal was establishing the Grand National Assembly in opposition to the European-controlled regime of the Sultan. By February, 1921, it was evident that the imperial government would not ratify the treaty except under compulsion. It was also evident from the successes of the Kemalists and their followers that a forced ratification would be repudiated by the nation. In conferences at London in February and March, 1921, and at Paris in March, 1922, the Allies offered modification of the Sèvres terms in a futile effort to restore order and halt the war which had resulted from Greek attempts to enforce a settlement on the Kemalists. By the autumn of 1922 the Turkish nationalists had defeated the Greeks and were advancing against the Allied forces of occupation in the region of the Straits. War between Britain and the Kemalists, however, was averted by the Armistice of Mudania, signed on October 11, 1922, which granted large concessions to the Turks and foreshadowed a general conference to negotiate a new treaty.⁸¹

When the Lausanne Conference opened on November 20, 1922, a Conservative government had replaced Lloyd George's coalition in London and the nationalists were undisputed masters of Turkey. The Kemalists presented no claim to Asiatic portions of the former empire which they regarded as non-Turkish and, though a long

and bitter quarrel developed over Mosul, the question of Palestine scarcely figured in the negotiations, which were ultimately concluded by the signature of a new treaty on July 24, 1923.⁸² The convention that resulted from the Lausanne negotiations was not a mere revision of the Sèvres treaty, but an entirely new document. Turkey, displeased with the mandates system which threatened to deprive it of Mosul, was not required to recognize its application to former Ottoman territory. Neither the League of Nations Covenant nor the mandates clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres appeared in the Lausanne agreement. In July, 1922, League of Nations approval had been given to the terms of the Syrian and Palestine mandates and it was regarded as sufficient for the Turkish government to make a simple renunciation of sovereignty over all territory outside its frontiers.⁸³ The Balfour Declaration and the distinction between Palestine and other A mandates, therefore, did not receive recognition in an international convention, but had to rely for validity upon League of Nations approval of the mandatory instrument for the Holy Land. Much emphasis has been placed upon this fact by Arab propagandists, but it had no real influence on the course of Palestine history.

It was not until August 6, 1924, that the Treaty of Lausanne entered into force with the deposit in Paris of the necessary ratifications and that the status of Palestine as a League of Nations mandate was fully legalized. Many months before that, however, the League Council, ignoring the technicalities of international law, had declared the Palestine mandate in effect.

THE PALESTINE MANDATE

Even before the exact form of the document defining the powers of the mandatory of Palestine was decided, the Zionists were engaged in elaborating their plans. It was expected that the mandates would be expressed in special conventions, signed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and annexed to the appropriate treaties of peace. At first some influential Zionists hoped that an Anglo-Jewish agreement might supplement the mandatory instrument, but this scheme was ultimately abandoned and the Hebrew leaders concentrated their endeavors upon obtaining recognition of the idea "that history and memory give a people a right to self-determination; and that the Jew, who represents the oldest nationality in the world, should be assisted to revive his national life in his home, even though the existing inhabitants of the land may oppose his coming."⁸⁴

The Zionist statement to the Peace Conference contained the basic principles of a mandatory instrument in the resolutions sub-

mitted for consideration by the Supreme Council. These suggestions were elaborated in a draft convention circulated in March, 1919, by the Paris Zionist Bureau. This projected treaty would have established the Holy Land as a British mandate in which there would have been recognized "the historic title of the Jewish People to Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute Palestine as their national Home: and there to establish the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth." It would, moreover, have required the mandatory to promote Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land, to recognize Hebrew as an official language, to entrust education to Jewish agencies, to promote local self-government, to adopt measures that would lead to public ownership or control of natural resources, public works and land, and to agree, when it and the League of Nations deemed Palestine ready for self-rule, to representative and responsible government in whatever form the people desired.⁸⁵ Most of the ideas of this early Zionist project appeared in the final form of the Palestine mandate, though many of them were modified by frequent revisions.

On June 28, 1919, the Supreme Council appointed an international committee which, under the chairmanship of Lord Milner, undertook the drafting of mandatory instruments. This committee succeeded in producing B and C mandates but encountered difficulties, aggravated by the absence of a treaty with Turkey, in the effort to formulate an acceptable instrument for the A category. Colonel House, the American member, submitted a draft which provided for an organic law conformable to the wishes of the population and for representative and responsible government so far as it might prove consonant with efficient administration.⁸⁶ France, however, objected strenuously to the idea of a general A mandate, insisting that each territory offered a separate problem, and Lord Milner was of the opinion that further consideration of the A mandates should be postponed until after the Turkish treaty was completed.⁸⁷ Moreover, such an instrument as House proposed could not possibly have satisfied the Zionists, providing as it did for immediate self-government without special safeguards for the Jews. The mandates committee, therefore, concluded its work without making any recommendations upon the future status of the Turkish territories.

It was not long after the League of Nations came into being with the ratification of the Covenant on January 10, 1920, that the Council undertook to regularize the mandates system. On July 10th, the Council, sitting in London, noted that it could not act upon mandates until the Allied Supreme Council had fulfilled its obligation by notifying the League of their assignment.⁸⁸ On August 4th and 5th, at San Sebastian, it concluded that it was the

intention of Article 22 of the Covenant that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should draft the mandatory instruments which the Council should examine and, if assured of their conformity with the Covenant, should confirm. It therefore requested the Principal Allied Powers to name the countries chosen as mandatories, to define territories and frontiers, and to communicate the terms of the mandates to the League.⁸⁹ When in October the Council, meeting in Brussels, received notification from the French government that negotiations between the Allied Powers were still proceeding, it formally adopted a report recommending a speedy decision on mandates.⁹⁰

With the League of Nations expressing displeasure over the delay in producing mandatory instruments, the work of drafting the A mandates was pushed during 1920. Both the Zionists and the French, however, had interests which complicated the preparation of the Palestine document. The Zionists naturally sought to enforce their desires upon the British government, but the growing unrest of the Palestine Arabs, the activities of pro-Arab and pro-Moslem groups in England, and possibly also Lord Curzon's lack of faith in Zionism recommended caution to the Foreign Office, which in June, 1920, produced a draft mandate of a character disappointing to the Zionists. It did not speak of the Jewish right to Palestine nor of the historical connection of the Hebrews with the Holy Land. The phrase, "a Jewish commonwealth," so dear to the Zionists, was not used and the creation of the national home did not appear to receive sufficient prominence as the principal purpose of the mandate.⁹¹

The Zionists, however, rallied their forces. The International Conference which met in London in July, 1920, gave renewed strength to the movement by electing Dr. Weizmann president of the world organization and voting the establishment of the Palestine Foundation Fund for the development of the national home. Parliamentary groups favorable to the aims of Zionism endorsed plans for a mandate more in harmony with Jewish wishes, and American opinion was marshalled behind the effort to secure a revision of the official draft.⁹² The influences brought to bear upon the government proved sufficiently strong to gain the insertion in the preamble of the mandate, conveyed to the League of Nations in December, 1920, of a statement that the recitation of the Balfour Declaration in the Treaty of Sèvres had given recognition "to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their National Home in that country." The necessity of creating a Jewish home reappeared as the primary purpose of the mandate, clearly differentiating it from the A category where the establishment of national

self-government for the existing inhabitants was the principal ostensible aim. The Zionists, however, did not succeed in securing a reference to the ultimate creation of a Jewish commonwealth. The Foreign Office would go no further than a statement that the mandatory would be "responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home." This draft abrogated capitulatory arrangements in Palestine and provided that the Holy Places Commission, to be created in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, should entrust the care of the sacred sites to suitable bodies representing adherents of the religions concerned.⁹³

Negotiations with France over the question of the northern frontier had also to be carried on. The Sykes-Picot line dividing the Brown and Blue zones ran southeast from the coast above the Bay of Acre across the Sea of Galilee to Irbid in Trans-Jordan, leaving Galilee and the upper Jordan valley under French control. The northern limit of Occupied Enemy Territory (South) ran from the Ladder of Tyre to the Jordan above Lake Huleh, but even this provisional line cut Palestine off from the waters of the Litani, the sources of the Jordan, and Mount Hermon. The Zionists, therefore, pressed the British government for a frontier which would include in Palestine the lower reaches of the Litani, the entire course of the Jordan, the western slopes of Mount Hermon, part of the plateau south of Damascus, and the lower valley of the Yarmuk River.⁹⁴ Control of the Yarmuk valley would provide Britain with the logical route for a Haifa-Mesopotamia railway or pipeline, and this fact lent support to at least part of the Zionist demands. France, however, showed extreme reluctance to surrender the Sykes-Picot line.

Following Lloyd George's offer in September, 1919, to abide by the arbitration of President Wilson, the matter of the frontier lay in abeyance until the Millerand government came to power in Paris. Negotiations were then resumed, and Philippe Berthelot was ultimately induced to promise that he would recommend to his government the inclusion in Palestine of the Jordan valley north to Dan. Since this technically fulfilled Clemenceau's 1918 promise to Lloyd George of a Palestine stretching from Dan to Beersheba, the Prime Minister had perforce to express himself as satisfied.⁹⁵ The French government, however, endeavored to restrict this concession within the narrowest possible limits. British efforts to obtain more favorable terms largely failed, and on December 23, 1920, an Anglo-French convention was signed which laid down in general the frontiers between Syria and Mesopotamia and Palestine. The line between Syria and Palestine was to run from the Euphrates

westward below the Jebel ed Druz to a point on the Hejaz Railway south of Nasib, thence to Samakh at the Sea of Galilee along a line south of the Yarmuk valley Der'a-Haifa railway, thence across the Sea of Galilee and up the eastern bank of the Jordan to Banias (Dan), thence west to Metullah, south along the Jordan-Litani watershed, and west to the sea at the Ladder of Tyre. A commission was to be established to trace this line on the spot. France promised consideration for Palestinian interest in the water resources of the Jordan and the Yarmuk and pledged itself to permit readjustment of the Yarmuk valley frontier to allow the construction of another railway or pipeline in the valley to the south of the existing railroad and entirely within British-mandated territory.⁹⁶ The minor concessions which the British gained in this treaty were slightly extended by the work of the frontier commission whose report was approved by an Anglo-French exchange of notes on March 7, 1923. The frontier was by this agreement moved east of the Sea of Galilee so that its waters and the Samakh-Al-Hamma sector of the Der'a-Haifa railway fell entirely within Palestine. This section of the railway, however, was extra-territorialized and left in the possession of France.⁹⁷

A compromise having been reached with the Zionists, and settlement of the frontier with France being in sight, Great Britain was in a position to present the draft mandate for Palestine to the League of Nations Council in December, 1920. At that time the Council also received the draft instruments for the C mandates and for Syria and Mesopotamia. Non-ratification of the Sèvres treaty prevented action on the A mandates, but the C instruments were confirmed by the Council on December 17th.⁹⁸

Despite the absence of a treaty with Turkey, the Council, in order to regularize the situation in the Arab lands, might have given provisional approval to the A mandates in February or March, 1921, had it not been for two unforeseen difficulties. First, the British representative requested deferment of action pending a visit to the East of Winston Churchill, who was assuming control of the mandated territories, then being transferred from the Foreign to the Colonial Office. Second, the United States protested the assignment of mandates without its assent and even asked that confirmation of those in the C category be reconsidered. In view of these developments the Council decided to postpone action on the A and B groups and to invite the United States to send a representative to the next Council meeting.⁹⁹

At the session in June and July, 1921, no American representative appeared and the Council requested the Principal Allied Powers to seek a solution of the impasse through bilateral consultations with the United States. At the succeeding session in

the autumn of 1921 this plea to the Allies was repeated, but the Council, despairing of a rapid settlement, decided on October 2nd to send a letter to the trustees of A and B territories requesting them to act in the spirit of the unconfirmed mandates.¹⁰⁰

In a series of diplomatic notes, beginning soon after the assignment of the A mandates at San Remo, the United States had been protesting to the British Foreign Office that it could not be excluded from equality of rights in mandated territories because of its non-ratification of the Covenant and that it must be consulted in the disposition of the former Ottoman possessions despite the fact that it had never declared war on Turkey. Lord Curzon was at first unwilling to concede either point but, following the American protest to the League of Nations in February, 1921, he showed a more conciliatory attitude, for the British government desired to ask the Council to approve the Palestine mandate despite non-ratification of the treaty with Turkey. The Anglo-American negotiations, however, encountered difficulties and dragged on until the meeting of the Lausanne Conference when they were suspended for many months. Resumed in November, 1923, they ultimately resulted in a treaty, signed on December 3, 1924, and ratified exactly one year later, which recited the Palestine mandate and provided for United States acceptance of its terms, for American participation in all rights and benefits extended to members of the League of Nations, and for American assent to any changes in the mandate which might affect these rights.¹⁰¹

Agreement of the United States to League of Nations approval of the Palestine mandate did not, however, prove conclusive in procuring a settlement. The Roman Catholic Church became doubtful of the wisdom of its support of Zionism and fearful that its rights might not be protected under the proposed mandate. Its objections were brought into the open by the efforts of the British government to secure assent to its draft instrument. In January, 1922, the Foreign Office informed the League of Nations Council that it stood ready to appoint the Holy Places Commission and suggested that the Council take action upon the selection of a chairman.¹⁰² In May it requested that the Palestine mandate be placed upon the agenda for approval, tentative consent to which had recently been secured from the United States. The Italian representative protested that his government, not expecting confirmation of the mandate until a Turkish treaty had come into effect, had not yet presented certain observations regarding safeguards for its rights, and the French representative intimated that he could not agree to approval of the Palestine mandate before that of Syria received consideration. A week later the British delegate, protesting the delay, secured consent for a special session of the

Council in mid-July to deal with the A mandates.¹⁰³ On May 15th, however, Cardinal Gasparri, the Papal Secretary of State, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the League, in which he raised the question of the compatibility of the Jewish national home with the interests of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine and criticized the arrangements made for the protection of religious rights.¹⁰⁴ On July 1, 1922, the British government replied by submitting to the League a new draft of Article 14 of the mandate, which would have left to the Holy Places Commission considerably greater discretion and made its decisions dependent upon League approval.¹⁰⁵ This gesture, the accompanying assurances, and a subsequent further revision of Article 14 proved sufficient to keep the Vatican from further overt objection to the confirmation of the mandate.

At the July meeting of the League Council, withdrawal of America's protests, following recognition of its rights by the various mandatories, permitted approval of the B mandates. Assent to the A instruments, however, met a new obstruction. France insisted upon simultaneous approval for the Syrian and Palestinian mandates, and Italy, which had received assurances regarding its rights from England but had not yet approached France on this matter, would not agree to a consideration of the French mandate. Furthermore, both Italy and France found the new draft of Article 14 of the Palestine mandate unsatisfactory. Determined British efforts prevented another postponement, and it was finally decided that a new Article 14 should simply provide for a Holy Places Commission whose method of appointment, composition and functions should be subject to the approval of the League Council¹⁰⁶ and that the Council should give its assent to both the Palestinian and Syrian mandates which would then automatically enter into force upon the conclusion of the Italo-French negotiations over Syria. On July 24, 1922, this decision was formally adopted and a Palestine mandate, from the preamble of which all reference to the Treaty of Sèvres had vanished, received League of Nations approval.¹⁰⁷

More than a year later, on September 28, 1923, when a conclusion still had not been reached in the negotiations over Syria, Lord Robert Cecil requested the League Council to reopen the question and pass a resolution permitting the Palestine mandate to enter into force with the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne. The Italian and French representatives thereupon promised an immediate announcement of agreement, and on the following day, when this announcement was made, the Council declared the Palestinian and Syrian mandates in effect as of September 29, 1923.¹⁰⁸

In its preamble, the Palestine mandate recited the Balfour Declaration and gave recognition to the historical connection of

the Jews with Palestine and to their right to reconstitute their national home in that country. The body of the instrument did not, as in a simple A mandate, provide for a provisionally independent state, but gave to the mandatory, acting through the medium of a Palestine government, "full powers of legislation and administration" and required that the country be placed under such conditions as would secure the establishment of a Hebrew national home. It provided that the mandatory must recognize a Jewish agency to advise and cooperate with the Palestine administration in such economic, social and other matters as might affect the establishment of the national home and the interests of the Jewish population. The mandatory was authorized to arrange with this agency, in whose place the Zionist Organization was empowered to act, for the construction or operation of public works, services or utilities and for the development of natural resources so far as the administration did not desire to undertake those activities. The mandate, moreover, made it obligatory upon Great Britain to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement on the land. Under the terms of the mandate, a Palestinian nationality was recognized and the acquisition of citizenship by Jews was to be facilitated. The right of each community in Palestine to maintain its own schools was guaranteed, and the administration was pledged to acknowledge as legal days of rest the holy days of the various religions of the country. Hebrew was recognized as an official language.¹⁰⁹

This document was framed in the Jewish interest, and the imperative obligations placed upon the mandatory were in favor of the Zionists. It is significant that the word "Arab" did not once appear, and that the native Palestinians were referred to throughout as non-Jews. In the course of time it was claimed that the mandate placed upon Great Britain an equal obligation to the Arabs and to the Zionists. The article which made the mandatory responsible for creating a situation in Palestine calculated to achieve the establishment of the national home also required the fostering of conditions favorable for the development of self-governing institutions and the enforcement of safeguards for the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants, irrespective of race and religion. The mandate provided for the encouragement of local autonomy. The requirement to facilitate Jewish immigration was hedged about by the double modification that this should be done under "suitable conditions," and that the rights of the non-Hebrew population should not be "prejudiced." It required, however, a transposition of the terminology of the mandate by the transfer of secondary and subordinate clauses into primary positions to give a real duality to the instrument. The plain sense of

the document was inescapable. It sought to foster the establishment of a Jewish national home, while safeguarding, so far as might be compatible with that purpose, the rights and well-being of the non-Jewish population.

The primary purpose of the mandate was clear, but it contained no definition of that elusive and elastic term, "the national home." It was, therefore, left open for the mandatory to declare at some time in the future that the special obligations of the mandatory instrument had been discharged. On the assumption that its promises to the Jews had been fulfilled, the mandatory might then undertake the establishment of an independent state in Palestine as if the Holy Land had been placed under a simple A mandate, unconditioned by the Balfour pledge.

The Mandatory Regime

LONG before the Palestine mandate officially went into force, the impossibility of fulfilling the wishes of both Arabs and Zionists became evident. Despite the institution of the new Civil Administration, Arab riots occurred at Jaffa in 1921 and unrest spread throughout the land. Withdrawal of Trans-Jordan from the territory affected by the Balfour Declaration in no way weakened the objections of the Moslems and Christians to the creation of a Jewish home and to the withholding of independence from Palestine. A definition of policy became imperative. The British government, however, was in a difficult position. A solemn pledge to foster the creation of a Jewish national home existed in conjunction with less definite promises implying a grant of self-government for the Palestine Arabs. There was general recognition that civilization owed the Jews a home where their persecuted brethren might find refuge and where a Hebrew society might be developed, but there was also acknowledgment of the Arab case for self-determination. Finally, the government, although not wishing to lose the friendship of international Jewry and its sympathizers, was disinclined to frame a policy abhorrent to the Arab and Moslem worlds. The cabinet, therefore, refused to adopt either a pro-Zionist policy, contemplating the early creation of a Jewish state, or a pro-Arab policy, involving a recognition of Palestinian independence and abrogation of the Balfour Declaration. Instead, it sought to reconcile Arab opinion to the creation of a modified Jewish home. This plan of compromise, accepted without enthusiasm by the Zionists and rejected by the Arabs, was enunciated in the Churchill White Paper which disclaimed any intention of promoting a Jewish state in Palestine and interpreted the national home on lines of cultural autonomy. The purpose of the mandatory apparently became the creation of a binational but unitary state.

THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

Not long after the assignment of the mandate in April, 1920, the British government announced its intention of establishing a civil administration in Palestine. During the closing days of

the military regime, Herbert Samuel had been sent to the Holy Land as adviser on governmental and financial questions¹ and had become convinced that the political status of the country would have to be settled speedily if serious trouble was to be avoided.² His report, delivered to Lloyd George during the San Remo Conference,³ was, in the light of the recent Palestine riots, quickly acted upon, and Samuel himself was appointed High Commissioner to institute a civil government.

This nomination to the chief post in Palestine received a mixed reception. The Zionists in general, who saw in Samuel both a Jew and one of the earliest and most prominent supporters of the British pro-Zionist policy, were jubilant.⁴ The Palestine Arabs, who had received official notification of the existence of the Balfour Declaration only a month before,⁵ distrusted the appointment, seeing in it a first step toward the creation of a Jewish state. Opinion in England was, as a whole, favorable. It is true that so influential a periodical as the Conservative *Spectator* bitterly assailed Lloyd George for his failure to appoint a Christian who could have reassured the Arabs of British impartiality⁶ and that Lord Sydenham, who was to become one of the leading champions of the Palestine Arabs, criticized the selection in the House of Lords.⁷ The fact that these attacks came from political enemies of the Lloyd George government suggested that they were caused, partially at least, by partisan feeling.

Samuel, who assumed direction of Palestine affairs on July 1, 1920, did not realize the strength of Arab nationalism and was confident that the economic prosperity which the Jews could bring would speedily convert the Arabs to acquiescence in a moderate Zionist program. His plans contemplated no expropriation of land or infringement of existing rights, but envisaged Jewish-Arab co-operation, functioning under the benign influence of democratic liberalism. A home for the Jews was not to exclude a home for the Arabs. Hebrew and Arab culture were to develop side by side while the mandatory gradually introduced self-governing institutions through which representatives of both peoples, elected upon democratic principles, would join in governing the country in the common interest.⁸

To indicate the sincerity of his intention that popular government would be provided once the mandate went into force, Samuel, soon after his arrival in Palestine, established an Advisory Council composed of eleven British officials and ten persons selected by the High Commissioner as representatives of the Moslem, Christian and Jewish communities. This body, though all ordinances were presented to it for discussion, had no power either to enact or veto legislation and was regarded by the Arabs as a mockery of the self-

government which they held was promised them even under the unsatisfactory mandates article of the Covenant.⁹

Unfortunately for Samuel's plans, the Arab leaders wanted and believed they had been assured immediate freedom and self-government and did not desire to share their land with a foreign people or culture. Dr. Weizmann's statement at the Peace Conference was being spread about in a garbled form, attributing to him a desire to make Palestine as Jewish as England was English, and Israel Zangwill was insisting that the Arabs should be required to surrender Palestine to the Jews and retire to the surrounding territories.¹⁰ Furthermore, young Jewish immigrants, chiefly from central and eastern Europe, soon began to arrive in Palestine with strange customs and, as one observer pointed out, with "an air of glad proprietorship," touching to the sympathetic beholder, but intensely aggravating to the Arab effendis whose own proprietorship had so long gone unchallenged.¹¹ Distressed and alarmed, the Arab leaders still hoped that a sufficient show of displeasure might result in the abandonment alike of the Balfour Declaration and the unconfirmed mandate. Unless they could be convinced that these hopes were in vain, any program based upon Arab-Jewish cooperation was doomed to failure.

The measures which Samuel instituted in Palestine in order to conciliate the Arabs were not calculated to carry conviction of the absolute determination of Great Britain to enforce the Zionist program. His natural desire to show impartiality, to protect Arab interests, and to suppress the more extreme evidences of Zionism appeared to the Arabs as portents of a possible reversal of policy. E. T. Richmond, an avowed anti-Zionist, was retained in the administration and given control of the Political Department of the Secretariat, a post which made him practically director of Arab policy.¹² Haj Amin al-Husaini, a prominent member of one of Palestine's two leading political families, a man who had been sentenced to two years' imprisonment for illegal activities in connection with the Nebi Musa riots in 1920, was appointed Mufti of Jerusalem, the position of chief Moslem dignitary in the capital, and was later raised to even greater eminence.¹³ A large block of land in the vicinity of Beisan, technically government property which the Jews hoped might become available for settlement, was sold on easy terms to Arabs under circumstances which led to considerable speculation.¹⁴ When many of the Jews came to feel, as they shortly did, that the administration was not primarily interested in the promotion of the national home, the Arabs were naturally encouraged to hope for a victory over the Zionists.

In the early autumn of 1920, following the enactment of an ordinance which empowered the High Commissioner to control entry

into the Holy Land,¹⁵ the country was opened to immigration. Regulations were issued allowing entry of persons of independent means, those of religious occupation, dependents of residents of Palestine, and colonists introduced by the Zionist Organization. This last category was subject to government limitations in harmony with the High Commissioner's announced policy that immigration must be proportioned to the employment and housing accommodations available in the country,¹⁶ and an annual quota of 16,500 immigrants was assigned to the Zionist Organization upon the condition that it guarantee their maintenance for at least a year after their arrival.¹⁷

In the period between September, 1920, and April, 1921, about 10,000 immigrants reached Palestine, nearly all Jews.¹⁸ This proved disappointing to enthusiasts, but the Zionist Commission, hampered by lack of funds, found it impossible to undertake an economic regeneration of Palestine such as would have been necessary to assure a livelihood for greater numbers. The actual immigration, however, was sufficient to give color to the Arabs' protests that an alien horde was preparing to engulf them and to revive the campaign against British policy. In the spring of 1921 an Arab nationalist body presented a hostile resolution to the visiting Colonial Secretary, the spurious anti-Jewish Protocols of Zion were published in the Arab press, and agitators began their work among the masses.

The festivals of Nebi Musa and Easter, 1921, passed quietly but an explosion was not long delayed. On May Day, an authorized Jewish labor demonstration and an illegal Communist parade clashed in the streets of the Jewish town of Tel Aviv, adjoining Jaffa. The Communists, a small and unpopular group, were easily dispersed, but the excitement engendered by the disturbance fanned the flames of racial antagonism in Jaffa and soon a mob was attacking and murdering Jews with the active or passive assistance of the predominantly Arab police. Before military reinforcements arrived from Lydda, rioters had stormed the Zionist Commission's Immigration Center and massacred thirteen persons. Order was restored in the late afternoon of May 1st by the use of British troops. On the evening of the following day, Samuel authorized the proclamation of martial law. The rioting was followed, however, by a period of unrest and by a boycott which, though commenced by the Arabs against the Jews, soon became mutual.

The disorders were not restricted to Jaffa and Tel Aviv. False rumors of Jewish attacks upon Arabs were circulated, and on May 3rd Hebrew colonies at Kafr Saba and Ain Hai were looted. On May 5th the important village of Petah Tiqva was attacked by several thousand armed Arabs in semi-military formation and was saved from destruction only by the accidental presence in the vicin-

ity of two squadrons of Indian cavalry. On May 6th Arabs besieged Hadera and attempted an attack on Rehovot.¹⁹

The commission of inquiry, which Samuel appointed under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Sir Thomas W. Haycraft to investigate the disturbances, reported that the immediate cause of the Jaffa riots was the Jewish Communist demonstration but placed the underlying blame upon Arab anti-Zionist sentiment. This hostility had been fostered, it found, by the popular theories that Great Britain was favoring the Jews over the Arabs, that the Zionist Commission had been accorded too much authority, that there was a disproportionate number of Jews in the public service, that the country was being flooded with aliens whose superior commercial ability rendered them dangerous to Arab enterprise, that Jewish labor was displacing Arab workers, that the immigrants displayed arrogance and contempt for accepted social ideas, and that the Jews were introducing Bolshevism. Though the commission denounced the Arabs as the aggressors and sharply reprehended the actions of the Jaffa police, it showed itself inclined to criticize the Jews. It suggested that the Zionist Commission might have done more to foster good relations and commented unfavorably on early attempts to subsidize Jewish public servants and on the pressure exerted on Jews to employ only their co-religionists. It referred to statements regarding the speedy creation of a Jewish majority and quoted the head of the Political Department of the Zionist Commission as saying that there could be only one national home in Palestine. The commission summed up its findings as follows: "The fundamental cause of the Jaffa riots and the subsequent acts of violence was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents."²⁰

The Zionists resented the inquiry commission's rejection of their contention that anti-Jewish sentiment had been artificially created by the wiles of effendis, fearful of losing their political preferment because of the establishment of an efficient government and of being deprived of their privileged economic position as the result of a social revolution arising from the introduction of Western ideas. They were even more outraged by what they regarded as concessions to a policy of violence. It seemed bad enough that the administration had failed to protect the Jews from attack. It was worse that it temporarily conceded Arab demands for a cessation of immigration. The military authorities at Jaffa halted the landing of Jews, and on May 14th Samuel announced the complete suspension of immigration pending revision of the existing legislation.²¹ On June 3, 1921, he declared that immigration must be limited by the

economic absorptive capacity of the country, and sought to reassure an assembly of Arab notables that their interests would not be prejudiced in favor of the Jews.²²

When in July the ban on immigration was removed, more rigid regulations had been issued under the Immigration Ordinance. Categories for professional men and laborers were set up and that of immigrants introduced by the Zionist Organization disappeared. Only persons having a definite prospect of work might enter in the labor classification for which quarterly quotas²³ were to be laid down by the government.

In practice the new regulations, while giving the administration a more frequent check upon immigration, did not work any more serious a hardship on the Jews than had Samuel's earlier legislation. Labor certificates were assigned first to employers, then to private applicants with assured prospects of work, and finally the unexpended certificates were given to the Zionist Organization which was permitted to request the entry of persons for whom it estimated that work might be found and for whom it stood ready to promise a year's maintenance.²⁴ The Zionists, however, regarded the new regulations as an unjust restriction upon their right to enter their homeland and as a measure elicited by Arab murders of innocent men and women.

Though disappointed that Arab intransigence proved more difficult to overcome than he had expected, Samuel was not convinced of the impossibility of converting moderate Arabs to support of the mandate, acceptance of a non-aggressive national home, and participation in the government. Believing in the possibility of Jewish-Arab cooperation, he judged that the Jaffa riots merely demonstrated the need of a greater effort to remove the aggravating features of the Zionist program. He steadfastly refused to admit that nothing less than renunciation of the Balfour Declaration would pacify the Arabs or to see that concessions, short of such a complete reversal of policy, merely strengthened them in their belief that ultimate and complete victory would be theirs. He therefore pressed the government to hasten the establishment of a constitutional regime and to publish an official interpretation of the Balfour Declaration.

TRANS-JORDAN

Before British policy with regard to Palestine was fully formulated, Trans-Jordan was divorced from the territory of the Jewish national home. Until the frontiers of the Eastern mandates were laid down and the fate of Faisal's Arab state in inner Syria was decided, the future of the land east of the Jordan remained uncertain. McMahon had promised independence to the eastern part and

possibly to all of Trans-Jordan, and by the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement the whole region was assigned to the British zone of influence. In the period of military occupation the region was entrusted to the Arab administration as part of Occupied Enemy Territory (East) and, when the British evacuation of Syria took place, it was left to the Arabs. British claims to exercise supervision over Trans-Jordan were not surrendered, and it is certain that the English government would have endeavored to safeguard its interest in a corridor to Mesopotamia even had Faisal's state survived.

Before the end of 1920, the Arab administration at Damascus had been swept away. In the anti-mandate agitation and in the Arab attacks on French military positions near the Lebanese border, France found an excuse for breaking Clemenceau's agreement with Faisal and, on July 14, 1920, sent an ultimatum to Damascus demanding acknowledgment of the mandate and agreement to French occupation of Aleppo, Homs and Hama. Faisal finally acceded to this demand but not in time to prevent the fall of his capital and his enforced flight. French troops thereupon established the mandatory regime throughout that part of Occupied Enemy Territory (East) which had been included in the Sykes-Picot A zone but did not attempt to occupy the area of British influence.²⁵

As a result of the collapse of the Arab administration, Trans-Jordan was left in a state of anarchy dangerous to the surrounding areas. Uncertain of the future and unwilling to undertake a military occupation of the territory, the British government authorized Samuel to establish local governments east of the Jordan. On August 20, 1920, therefore, the High Commissioner went to Es Salt to meet an assembly of local notables to whom he announced that it was not then the intention of his government to incorporate Trans-Jordan in Palestine. He suggested, instead, that they organize representative councils for the administration of the territory.²⁶ When this proposal and a promise to supply British advisers met with approval, a definite agreement embodying these terms was concluded with the Arabs.²⁷ In an endeavor to carry out the scheme, five British officials were dispatched to Trans-Jordan, but the success of the experiment was not very great.

In December, 1920, the Anglo-French frontier convention placed Trans-Jordan south of the Yarmuk and the Jebel ed Druz within the British mandate for Palestine and, in plans drafted in London following the transfer of mandatory affairs to the Colonial Office in February, 1921, it was decided to "include Transjordan in Palestine, to make it indistinguishable from Palestine, and to open it to Jewish immigration."²⁸ This decision might have been explained

upon the theory that Trans-Jordan, or the fertile western part of it, had not been included in the McMahon promise to the Arabs, and it no doubt would have been so justified if it had been carried into effect, but it was evidently dictated, not by any abstract interpretation of a vague promise, but by material considerations. The Arabs of Trans-Jordan were not demonstrating any ability to establish a stable government, and continued anarchy to the south of Damascus might lead to French intervention across Britain's corridor to Mesopotamia. Naturally, it appeared to a harassed Colonial Office that this fragment of a vanished Arab state could most logically be administered as an integral part of Palestine.

A Colonial Office conference at which the London decisions were to be discussed by the Secretary of State and the local administrators was scheduled for Cairo in March. Before it met, events in Trans-Jordan had forced an alteration of British policy. In November, 1920, Faisal's brother, Amir 'Abdullah, had arrived at Ma'an with the announced intention of restoring Arab government at Damascus. This threat to French authority appeared at first unworthy of serious consideration, but on March 2, 1921, the Amir advanced to Amman and there established his headquarters.²⁹ The Cairo conference decided, therefore, not to proceed with any decisions relative to Trans-Jordan, but to open negotiations with the Arab leader. There appeared to be only three alternatives: to dispatch a British force to crush the Amir and preserve order, to establish a native state under 'Abdullah himself in return for a promise of his good behavior toward France, or to run the risk of a French occupation should the Arabs attack Syria. The British cabinet, then being badgered by public outcry over expenses in the Near East, was absolutely opposed to any extension of British garrisons and operations, yet the risk of French action could not be assumed. The result was that an attempt to secure a "British Abdulla" had to be made.³⁰

Following the close of the Cairo conference, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill visited Jerusalem and invited 'Abdullah to confer with him. The outcome of their conversations was an informal undertaking by which, in return for promises that 'Abdullah would not attack Syria and would rule with the advice of the Palestine High Commissioner, Great Britain entrusted to him the administration of Trans-Jordan for a six-month period. On April 18th, Samuel paid a formal visit to Amman and explained the new arrangement to the shaikhs and other leaders, and in July Parliament voted 180,000 pounds as a grant-in-aid for the new government.³¹

In the months which followed, the temporary agreement with 'Abdullah drifted into permanency. It provided an easy and relatively cheap means of preserving peace and British supremacy be-

yond the Jordan and was in harmony with the policy of concessions to Arab sentiment then being pursued in Palestine. Arab insistence upon observation of the McMahon promises, moreover, ultimately led the British government to concede that all of Trans-Jordan had been included in the area of Arab independence.³² As a result of this interpretation and of the decision to maintain 'Abdullah's authority, it became necessary to arrange for the withdrawal from application to Trans-Jordan of the provisions for the creation of the Jewish national home. This was accomplished by the insertion in a revised draft mandate published in August, 1921, of a new article which empowered the mandatory "to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions [of the territories east of the Jordan], and to make such provisions for the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions."³³

This article, as finally adopted by the League of Nations in July, 1922, carried a provision requiring the consent of the League Council for the application of its terms and, in fulfillment of this stipulation, Lord Balfour presented to the Council on September 16, 1922, a memorandum proposing that the territory east of the Wadi el 'Araba, the Dead Sea, the Jordan and the Yarmuk should be freed from application of the Jewish national home clauses of the Palestine mandate. To this the Council gave its assent.³⁴

Despite the protests of many Zionists that the national home had been partitioned, the British government adhered to its policy and insisted that McMahon had assigned Trans-Jordan to the Arab sphere. Following a visit of 'Abdullah to London in the autumn of 1922, it was officially announced in Amman in April, 1923, that: "Subject to the approval of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government will recognize the existence of an independent Government in Trans-Jordan under the rule of His Highness the Amir Abdulla, provided that such Government is constitutional and places His Britannic Majesty's Government in a position to fulfil its international obligations in respect of the territory by means of an agreement to be concluded between the two Governments."³⁵

'Abdullah's administration in Trans-Jordan proved at first neither efficient nor popular, and, indeed, throughout its existence it has been dependent upon British subsidies.³⁶ In the course of time, the Amir won the support of his subjects and, by adroit diplomacy, succeeded also in keeping on good terms with the British. His state has had, therefore, a generally peaceful existence, though it remains economically and socially undeveloped. In 1925 'Aqaba and Ma'an, whose status had remained undefined between the governments of 'Abdullah and his father in the Hejaz, were definitely attached to Trans-Jordan, thus assuring Great Britain control of a

strategic port on the Red Sea.³⁷ On February 20, 1928, the negotiations for a treaty to regularize the position of Trans-Jordan were finally completed with the signature in Jerusalem of an agreement by which 'Abdullah recognized the British mandate and undertook to enact such laws as might be necessary to enable the mandatory to discharge its obligations. He promised further to accept the advice of a British Resident representing the Palestine High Commissioner in matters relating to foreign affairs and finances and to the mandatory's interests in Trans-Jordan where Great Britain was specifically granted the right to maintain armed forces. In return for these concessions, "the existence of an independent Government in Trans-Jordan" was recognized.³⁸

Following the signature of this treaty, an organic law was enacted by the local government and elections were called for a legislative council. Despite popular discontent with the constitution, which did not provide for responsible government, the elections were concluded in February, 1929, and the Legislative Council met on April 2nd for its first session.³⁹ In this way Trans-Jordan was separated from Palestine. As a semi-independent state, its poverty and general backwardness provided material for Zionist criticism of the policy which divorced it from the national home, while its freedom from Jewish immigrants supplied a model for Palestinian Arab emulation.

THE CHURCHILL WHITE PAPER

It was not alone the Jaffa riots and Samuel's pressure which finally convinced the British government that a formulation of Palestine policy was necessary. There was a sustained public outcry and an animated press campaign against commitments and expenditures in the Near East which, though directed chiefly against Mesopotamia, did not entirely avoid criticism of the assumption and administration of the Palestine mandate.⁴⁰ Moreover, supporters of the Arabs and of the Jews were equally insistent in demanding a statement of the government's intentions. The former protested against any action prejudicial to the Arabs in the interest of a people whose centuries' long absence from their homeland was held to have extinguished their rights.⁴¹ The latter argued that mere physical possession, without contributions either to the land itself or to world culture, should not confer upon the Arabs a right to bar the virile and productive Hebrews from an opportunity to make a distinctive contribution to world civilization.⁴² Persons of this opinion bitterly attacked Samuel's policy of conciliation and demanded strict fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration.⁴³

The first step in meeting the general criticism of the Eastern mandates was taken in February, 1921, when the inefficient system

of divided responsibility between the Foreign, India, and War offices was replaced by unified control under the Colonial Office to which the energetic Winston Churchill was transferred with authority to cut expenses, reduce garrisons and arrange for the establishment of stable governments.⁴⁴ The new Colonial Secretary gathered around him a group of Eastern experts who drafted plans for the immediate creation of a provisionally independent government in Mesopotamia. This action, though opposed by certain Anglo-Indian imperialists, was strictly in accord with the principles of the League Covenant and the abortive Treaty of Sèvres. A similar scheme could not be applied to Palestine where the Arabs would obviously have employed a grant of self-government to invalidate the Balfour Declaration. It seemed necessary, therefore, to draft plans for a British administration similar to the existing civil government but containing provision for the gradual introduction of an elective element into the legislature with the expectation that Arabs and Jews might ultimately be induced to cooperate in the government of their joint country.⁴⁵ The decisions of the Colonial Office were discussed and in general adopted at the conference of Eastern administrators held in March, 1921, in Cairo.

It was not long before it was evident that the existing regime in Palestine would not receive even passive acquiescence from the Arab leaders. As long as Faisal's government survived at Damascus, they hoped for union with Syria. Following its collapse, they commenced a struggle to obtain from their enforced mandatory recognition of an independent Palestine. In December, 1920, the nationalists, working generally through the Moslem-Christian Associations, assembled at Haifa for the Third Palestine Arab Congress.⁴⁶ This body passed resolutions demanding the right of self-determination and requesting that Great Britain establish a national government responsible to a council elected "by the Arabic speaking people who were living in Palestine at the outbreak of the Great War,"¹ and appointed an Executive Committee to represent the Arabs of Palestine in securing acceptance of these demands.⁴⁷

After an unsuccessful attempt to lay its grievances before Churchill while he was in Cairo, the Arab Executive Committee was finally able at the end of March, 1921, to present a memorandum to him in Jerusalem. This document demanded recognition of the Arab Congress as spokesman for the people of Palestine, denounced the Balfour Declaration as contrary to McMahon's pledges, and protested the terms of the recently published draft mandate which, it said, placed Palestine in the C category. It specifically requested renunciation of the Jewish home, creation of a government responsible to an elected parliament, and cessation of Jewish immigration.⁴⁸ To these demands Churchill gave little encourage-

ment, declaring that he was not able and did not desire to repudiate the Balfour Declaration or to halt immigration. Though he said that there was no intention of creating a Jewish government to dominate the Arabs, the delegation received scant comfort from a statement that: "Step by step we shall develop representative institutions, leading to full self-government, but our children's children will have passed away before that is completed."⁴⁹

The Jaffa riots, coming as they did only a little more than a month after Churchill's departure from Palestine, served to emphasize the Arab demands. On May 25th, moreover, the Fourth Palestine Arab Congress met in Jerusalem to reaffirm its fixed objection to British policy, and in July the Arabs sent a delegation to Europe under the chairmanship of Musa Kazem al-Husaini to protest against the mandate and seek support for independence. This body arrived in England in August, but proceeded almost immediately to the continent where the chairman gained an interview with the Pope and the delegation protested to the League of Nations that no plebiscite had been taken to determine the people's choice of their mandatory and that the draft mandate did not conform to the A category of Article 22 of the Covenant.⁵⁰ Upon returning to England the delegates issued a pamphlet the nature of which was revealed by its title, *The Holy Land: The Moslem-Christian Case against Zionist Aggression*,⁵¹ and began a propaganda campaign which received support from a mixed group of Conservative opponents of the coalition, anti-Semites, and sincere Arab sympathizers. At the same time it entered into lengthy negotiations with the Colonial Office in an effort to deflect British policy from its Zionist orientation.

The government, urged to public action in advance of the confirmation of the mandate by the unrest in Palestine, had permitted Samuel to announce on June 3, 1921, that it was considering a constitution which would provide for a partially elected legislative council.⁵² By August the legal advisers of the crown had drafted an order-in-council embodying a projected organic law which, as published in February, 1922, provided for an administration composed of a British High Commissioner, an official Executive Council, and a partially elective Legislative Council. Under this constitution no ordinances repugnant to the mandate might be enacted and the High Commissioner retained complete veto power. The legislature, of which ten members would form a quorum, was to consist of the High Commissioner, ten officials, twelve elected members, one person nominated by the Associated Chambers of Commerce, and two persons nominated by the High Commissioner.⁵³

The Arab delegation, which was permitted to study and comment upon this document, declared flatly that unless the government re-

nounced the Balfour Declaration, stopped all alien immigration, and promised Palestine full self-government, it was futile to consider the precise terms of a constitution. It went on, nevertheless, to point out that the High Commissioner, with a casting vote in the Legislative Council, would control fourteen out of a possible twenty-seven votes, and that the provision for ten members forming a quorum would allow business to be transacted without the presence of a single elected member.⁵⁴ In its reply to these observations, the Colonial Office declared that it could not discuss the future of Palestine upon any basis other than the Balfour Declaration and observed that the creation of a parliamentary government would, in the existing state of Arab opinion, preclude the fulfillment of the Balfour pledge to the Jewish people. In an effort, however, to meet specific objections, it suggested that a means might be found to give the people a voice in the control of immigration and expressed its willingness to consider changes in the composition of the Legislative Council.⁵⁵ To this attempt at conciliation the Arabs replied only that they considered the Balfour Declaration voided by the previous McMahon promises and by the terms of Article 22 of the Covenant, that they did not recognize the unratified mandate against which they were actively protesting, and that "no object could be gained in discussing details when the foundation on which these details are built is subject to disagreement."⁵⁶ A definite promise that a committee of elected members of the Legislative Council would be set up as an advisory body on immigration failed to shake their determination to maintain an attitude of non-cooperation in the formulation of Palestine policy.

In May, 1922, Sir Herbert Samuel visited England to impress upon the Colonial Office the imperative need of an immediate official interpretation of the Balfour Declaration which would set Arab fears at rest and enable moderates to accept the mandate and to assist the government in drafting and applying a constitution. His recommendations were accepted, and a statement of policy was carefully drafted for issuance over Churchill's signature.⁵⁷ A copy was submitted to the Arab delegation on May 30th and was discussed with its members by Samuel on June 1st. With a slight alteration made necessary by Arab evidence that McMahon could not have referred in his letters to the Vilayet of Damascus, it was presented two days later to the Zionist Organization with a request for assurances that it was acceptable to the Jews. These were forthcoming on June 19th⁵⁸ and, despite its rejection by the Arab delegation which insisted that the policy therein outlined would not bring about cooperation but "division and tension between Arabs and Zionists increasing day by day and resulting in general retrogres-

sion,"⁵⁹ the Churchill White Paper was published on July 1st together with the correspondence between the Colonial Office and the Arabs and Zionists.

The statement of policy, issued as an interpretation of the mandate before its approval by the League of Nations, and accepted by the Zionists who were fearful of losing British support which might help their purposes, declared that Cis-Jordan had not been included in the area to which McMahon promised independence and reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration. It denied that the government intended to create a predominantly Jewish state. It upheld the aims of cultural Zionism, but refuted the theory that the Palestine Zionist Executive⁶⁰ should have any part in the administration of the country. It assured the Jews of their right to enter Palestine, but circumscribed this by the principle of economic absorptive capacity. In brief, it foreshadowed the creation of Samuel's ideal of a duo-cultural state in the Holy Land. It read in part:

Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become "as Jewish as England is English." His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated . . . the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the [Balfour] Declaration . . . do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine* When it is asked what is meant by the development of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a center in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection.⁶¹

The Churchill White Paper failed of its desired effect upon the Arabs, but its publication was useful in defeating a Parliamentary attack upon the government's policy. On June 21st, Lord Islington had raised a debate on Palestine in the upper house. In the face of Lord Balfour's maiden speech in that chamber, he gained support from pro-Arabs, anti-Semites, and members disgruntled by the government's refusal to submit the various mandatory instruments to Parliament before their approval by the League of Nations, and obtained the passage by a vote of 60 to 29 of a resolution which declared the Palestine mandate unacceptable on the ground that it violated the McMahon promise as well as the Anglo-French Declaration of November, 1918, and that it was contrary to the wishes of the

inhabitants.⁶² Such a defeat, though not in itself serious, was humiliating to the Lloyd George coalition whose weakness and lack of cohesion caused it to fear any attack. Potentially more serious was the announced intention of the Conservative, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, to bring before the House of Commons a demand for Parliamentary examination of the mandate and investigation of the Rutenberg concessions.⁶³ Prevented from taking action until after the issuance of the White Paper, Joynson-Hicks was unable on July 4th to duplicate Lord Islington's success. Churchill announced that the government stood upon the policy enunciated in the White Paper and would regard the vote as one of confidence and, in the face of this declaration, Joynson-Hicks could muster only 35 votes for his motion.⁶⁴ Many members of Parliament who had been inclined to sympathize with the Arabs when they thought them endangered by extreme political Zionism regarded the White Paper as a satisfactory explanation of the government's intention to safeguard their rights, and thought the Arab delegation unreasonable in refusing its assurances and the offer of a Legislative Council.

The cabinet, encouraged by its Parliamentary victory and by the generally favorable reception of the Churchill White Paper, proceeded with its program of appeasement. No sooner was the mandate approved by the League of Nations than, on August 10th, the Palestine Order-in-Council was enacted. In conformity with the promises to the Arab delegation, the Legislative Council was reduced in size by the withdrawal of the three non-official appointive members, and provision was made for an advisory committee on immigration.⁶⁵ To accompany this constitution the Palestine Legislative Council Election Order was enacted, providing for indirect elections conducted on the basis of separate representation for the various religious communities and for facilities permitting residents to choose Palestine citizenship and so receive the right of suffrage.⁶⁶ In the face of resolutions of the Fifth Palestine Arab Congress rejecting this constitution and refusing participation in the Legislative Council elections, Samuel promulgated the orders-in-council on September 1, 1922, and began preparations for the holding of elections early in the following year.⁶⁷

When in October, 1922, the Lloyd George coalition was replaced by a Conservative cabinet under Andrew Bonar Law, the Arabs hoped that the Zionist policy might yet be reversed, for their strongest support in Parliament had come from die-hard Conservatives ready to attack the government on any favorable issue. Their delegation, therefore, hastened back to England to urge its case upon the new government. Once more, however, it was doomed to

disappointment. Many of its former supporters were now cool, and the government was content to adhere to the Churchill White Paper and to support Samuel in his policy of mild conciliation. In January, 1923, the Duke of Devonshire, then Colonial Secretary, publicly informed the delegates that no further change of policy was contemplated,⁶⁸ and by mid-March the delegation had returned to Jerusalem where it was greeted by an Arab general strike called in celebration of a successful boycott of the Legislative Council elections.⁶⁹

Early in 1923, proclamations designating February 20th to 28th as the period for primary elections and outlining the election procedure were issued in Palestine. The apathy of the Arab peasantry and an active boycott conducted by the Arab Executive Committee resulted in such wholesale refusals to vote that only 68 out of the 663 Moslem and 14 out of the 59 Christian secondary electors were chosen. An order extending to March 7th the time for completing the primary elections resulted in the choice of only 107 Moslems and 19 Christians. Full complements of 79 Jewish and 8 Druze electors could not hide the fact that the attempt to secure Arab cooperation on the basis of restricted popular representation had failed.⁷⁰

The government might have continued with the elections and set up the new organs of government without Arab participation, but its purpose in introducing the elective element would thus have been defeated. It therefore enacted a new order-in-council enabling the High Commissioner to govern Palestine with the help of an Advisory Council until such time as the Legislative Council was created.⁷¹ On May 29th, Samuel announced the suspension of the Legislative Council clauses of the constitution and the revival of the nominated Advisory Council with an unofficial membership of eight Moslems, two Christians and two Jews.⁷² The Arabs, jubilant over their defeat of the Legislative Council scheme, were encouraged to hope that firmness in their policy of non-cooperation might yet result in greater concessions. Pressure was therefore exerted upon the persons chosen to the Advisory Council to secure their resignations, and on June 12th the Moslem and Christian members refused their appointments. Efforts to induce them to reconsider failed, despite assurances that acceptance would not be taken as approval of the constitution. In August, six of the ten Arab nominees were induced to give a conditional promise to serve, but the influence of organized extremists proved too great and the government ultimately gave up the attempt to create the council.⁷³

Meanwhile a Sixth Palestine Arab Congress met in Jaffa in June; Sir Herbert Samuel returned to London to discuss Palestine

affairs with a cabinet committee appointed by the new government; and a third Arab delegation followed him, heralded by a statement from the newly elected chairman of the Arab Executive Committee that England must establish a "national constitutional independent Government."⁷⁴ The result of the ensuing discussions in London was a new effort to pacify the Arabs. The cabinet decided that the government, now under the leadership of Stanley Baldwin, should continue to accept the Churchill White Paper as the basis of its policy but that, in view of Arab protests against the unfair advantages accruing to the Zionists from the recognition of an agency representative of world Jewry, it would undertake the establishment of an Arab Agency, which would occupy a position "exactly analogous" to that accorded the Jewish Agency and would be consulted with regard to immigration. In an effort to avoid a second Legislative Council fiasco, however, the cabinet took the position that this organization would be created only as part of a settlement to which both Jews and Arabs would agree. Samuel thereupon returned to Palestine to consult the Arabs while Devonshire approached the Zionist leaders in London.⁷⁵

On October 11, 1923, the High Commissioner announced the new plan to a body of Arab leaders, with the warning that the Conservative government was not going to depart from the policy of its predecessors. It must be admitted that any agency composed of Palestinian Arabs nominated by the High Commissioner could not have been in any real sense "exactly analogous" to the world-wide Zionist Organization which was then serving as the Jewish Agency. But the Arabs were in no mood for compromise even if the concession offered had been greater than it was. They had induced the government to accelerate its plans for the establishment of representative institutions, had secured in the Churchill Paper an official denouncement of efforts to create a Jewish state, and had obtained an offer of an Arab Agency, all through non-cooperation. Adhering to this apparently successful policy they therefore unanimously rejected the government's proposal.⁷⁶

On November 9, 1923, the British Colonial Office, convinced at last that no concession short of self-rule and a renunciation of the Balfour Declaration would at that time induce the Arab leaders to participate in the government, telegraphed to Samuel, announcing its intention to carry out the obligations of the mandate and authorizing him to terminate the negotiations with the Arabs and to administer the land with the help of an advisory council.⁷⁷ In December, therefore, Samuel appointed a council composed entirely of British officials and prepared to carry on the government without popular participation.⁷⁸

In its formulation of policy in 1922 and 1923 the British government clearly revealed the same reluctance to take a definite decision that marked its entire handling of the Palestine question. Unwilling to admit that Arab and Jewish nationalisms were incompatible, it tried both to reduce the Zionist program and to induce the Arabs to accept less than complete mastery in the Holy Land. Fearful of breaking its openly pledged word to the Zionists and thereby incurring the enmity of world Jewry, but equally afraid of losing the friendship of the Arab peoples of the Near East and of displeasing the Moslem world, the British government struggled to harmonize two irreconcilable interests.

The 1929 Disturbances

THE six years which followed the decision to administer Palestine without local participation in the government formed a period of relative peace in the Holy Land. But it was the calm before a storm. Arab dissatisfaction with even the modified Jewish national home of the Churchill Paper made itself manifest in serious riots in 1929. A new statement of policy became necessary and the Labor government of Ramsay MacDonald issued a document which offered further concessions to the Arabs. The Passfield White Paper not only reiterated the cultural nature of the national home but provided for its curtailment in size through the imposition of more stringent immigration restrictions and limitations upon the right of land purchase. Though Zionist outcry, public displeasure, and political pressure induced the government to explain away these latter provisions, the basic policy of the mandatory remained one of compromise.

In Palestine the British administration, acting under the authority of the mandate, gradually established itself upon the Crown Colony model. Ultimate responsibility lay in the hands of the High Commissioner who was assisted by Executive and Advisory councils, composed of British officials. The lower ranks of the civil service were drawn from the various peoples of the country. Though the Jews frequently protested against insufficient representation in the public services, because in minor posts their demands for wages higher than those acceptable to Arabs made their employment difficult, under the constant pressure of the Zionist Organization their community received in general its share of government positions. The Christian Arabs were proportionately more strongly represented than their Moslem fellows, but their generally higher level of education made such a condition inevitable.¹

In local government the administrative districts were headed by English officers who received their instructions from and were responsible solely to the High Commissioner. The Turkish municipalities were permitted to retain their rights of self-government, and elective Local Councils were established in selected non-municipalities.

pal areas, both Jewish and Arab,² but in the interests of efficiency, the powers of minor self-governing units were severely restricted.

The experiment of a Jewish High Commissioner was not repeated. By 1925, when the term of Sir Herbert Samuel came to an end, the idea had become prevalent that the mandatory's duty was to act as an impartial referee between Jews and Arabs and not to assume an active part in the creation of the Jewish national home.³ As a result, Baron Plumer, a well-known soldier with five years of colonial experience as Governor of Malta, was appointed to Palestine for a three-year term. Plumer fulfilled the part of a non-partisan moderator to perfection and won the respect of both Jews and Arabs, but his uneventful term of office did little toward solving the basic problems arising from Arab-Jewish habitation of a single homeland. His successor, Sir John Robert Chancellor, another military man, who had served the Colonial Office in the West Indies and Africa, was less fortunate and saw the period of peace terminate in the 1929 disturbances.

Under Samuel, Plumer and Chancellor, the administration proceeded with the creation of a self-supporting governmental machine. Public services, non-existent or only slightly developed under the Turks, were established or enlarged within limits laid down by the resources of the Holy Land. A Jewish educational system, directed by the Zionist Organization, was already in existence and, according to the terms of the mandate, remained under its supervision. Government grants, however, though generally smaller than the Jews regarded as equitable, were made from year to year to the Hebrew schools.⁴ Moreover, a public system of education for the Arabs was developed, although lack of funds prevented its extension in rural areas to embrace more than a fraction of the school-age population. A public health service was established which, seconded by Zionist efforts, largely eradicated malaria, one of the chief menaces to health in the Holy Land. Attempts were made to improve methods of farming and to introduce better seed and livestock. Efforts to organize an efficient police force resulted in the training of a body of men who proved themselves capable of preserving order in times of peace when no questions of racial or political antagonism arose to cause dissension within their ranks and to weaken their loyalty to the government.

More and more the administration of Palestine was required to assume responsibility for public security as the British garrison was systematically reduced under pressure of demands for economy. In July, 1921, it consisted of 5,000 combatant troops,⁵ but by the middle of 1925 there remained only one regiment of cavalry, one squadron of airplanes, and one company of armored cars in both

Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and control of the garrison had been transferred to the Air Ministry in emulation of the plan working satisfactorily in Iraq.⁶ Lord Plumer, shortly after his arrival, approved a further reduction of British forces by which the *gendarmerie* was disbanded and the army garrison removed. The former, recruited after the Jaffa riots in 1921 partially from the "Black and Tans" employed in Ireland, was in some measure replaced by the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force which, though stationed across the Jordan, was available for service in Palestine,⁷ but the loss of the army units was not made good. Great Britain left Palestine to the protection of the Royal Air Force with headquarters at Amman in Trans-Jordan.

Following the British occupation of Palestine there developed alongside of the mandatory regime a Jewish community organization having many of the attributes of an autonomous government.⁸ Ultimately, to meet the demands of the growing Jewish population for official recognition of their voluntary institutions, a general ordinance was enacted in 1926 under which the government was empowered to issue regulations for the organization of religious communities.⁹ At the end of 1927 the administration sanctioned an elaborate Jewish organization consisting of an Elected Assembly, a General Council and a Rabbinical Council, and gave it authority to levy taxes upon and legislate for all Palestinian Jews who did not declare their desire for exclusion from the official community.¹⁰ A group of orthodox, anti-Zionist Jews bitterly opposed this enactment and sought separate recognition as a community within the terms of the ordinance of 1926,¹¹ but the government was unwilling to multiply the number of autonomous communities, while the Zionists fought resolutely for the unity of Palestinian Jewry and for the singleness of the embryo government of the national home.

Though in name the Jewish governmental organization was that of a religious community, in fact it was that of a non-territorial, semi-autonomous state, and for such a position the Arabs showed no desire to apply. In the face of Zionism, every effort was being made to reduce the gulf between Moslem and Christian, and the leaders wanted no self-government which would be based upon religious lines and which would tacitly recognize Arab community life as something apart from that of the territorial state of Palestine. Nevertheless, although no organizations capable of exercising quasi-governmental functions over the non-Jews were established, the religious courts of the various Christian sects and the Druzes were recognized and the Moslem courts and the administration of Pious Bequests were afforded a privileged position under the control of a Supreme Moslem Council.¹²

During the period of political peace, severe fluctuations marked the economic life of Palestine where agriculture remained the basic pursuit despite stimulation of commercial and industrial activity through Jewish initiative. Though the post-war depression circumscribed the work of the Zionist Organization for the development of Jewish colonies and enterprises, it did not make itself seriously felt in the internal economy of the Holy Land until 1923. Even then its effect was comparatively slight, and the following year saw a revival which inaugurated a period of general prosperity. In 1926 the British Parliament guaranteed a Palestine loan of 4,500,000 pounds to pay debts and advances owing to the mandatory and to develop the port of Haifa. In the following year a bond issue was successfully floated, despite the fact that the country had descended into a second and more serious depression.¹³ In 1926 poor rainfall and a sharp decline in trade and commercial enterprise brought distress to all classes. The next year a severe earthquake caused considerable property damage in the mandated territory, and in 1928 an invasion of locusts added to the unfavorable economic outlook. The closing months of that year, however, saw a decided improvement in the situation, and 1929 gave promise of rapid recovery.

Immigration was in part governed by and in part responsible for the economic situation in Palestine. Largely Jewish, it was responsive also to economic fluctuations abroad. The arrival of Jewish colonists, which was resumed several months after the May riots in 1921, remained below 8,000 persons a year until 1924 when improving conditions both abroad and in Palestine permitted an influx of 12,856 settlers. In the following year the arrival of 33,801 Jews coincided with the first signs of impending depression, and by the end of that year Jewish unemployment was growing.¹⁴

At the end of 1926 the administration, which placed part of the blame for the depression upon excessive immigration, enacted a new ordinance under which regulations were issued redefining the categories of immigrants. The first category, A, included persons in possession of 500 pounds capital who intended to engage in a profession, in commerce, or in agriculture; those with 250 pounds capital who were skilled in a trade or craft; those having an annual income of 60 pounds; orphans assured of support; persons in religious occupations; and students. The second category, B, covered persons who would fall in the first-named group of the A category if possessed of the requisite capital. The third category, C, related to individuals with definite prospects of employment, and the fourth, D, dealt with dependents of residents or immigrants. No numerical limits were placed upon categories other

than C, for which, as in the case of the old labor classification, semi-annual quotas were to be established by the government, but admission to categories B and D could be regulated in a restrictive sense.¹⁵ The administration had already been according to the Zionist Organization fewer labor certificates than it requested, but in the period between October, 1925, and March, 1926, it granted only 7,500 out of 16,500, and during the six months between April and September, 1927, when the depression had reduced the Zionist demands, only 500 out of 1,500. Following this last labor quota, no certificates were either asked or granted until the fall of 1928, when 600 were assigned to the Palestine Zionist Executive for the ensuing period.¹⁶

In 1926, total Jewish immigration fell to 13,081. More significant than this marked decline, however, was the rise in emigration. Inability to establish themselves forced 6,952 Jews who had arrived since 1920 to leave the Holy Land. In 1927 the situation was even more serious and, while Hebrew immigrants numbered only 2,713, their departing fellows totaled 5,071. The following year brought slightly improved conditions and, though total emigration exceeded immigration by thirty-six persons, Jewish arrivals outnumbered departures by ten. The final year of internal peace brought 5,249 Jews to Palestine and saw only 1,746 leave. Better economic conditions were reflected in the development of a new wave of immigration.¹⁷

About one-fourth of all the Jewish newcomers settled upon the land, where they turned to citrus culture and diversified farming.¹⁸ Considerable areas of actually or potentially fertile land were bought by various Jewish individuals and philanthropic organizations. An ordinance of September, 1920, required governmental consent to land transfers and provided that the vendor must retain an area sufficient for his maintenance and that tenants must be assured of adequate land elsewhere in case of eviction.¹⁹ Arab protests against such stringent restrictions upon their right of sale resulted in 1921 in the passage of an amending ordinance which removed the requirement concerning the vendor.²⁰ Time demonstrated that this legislation was not effective in preventing tenant evictions and, though the Zionists were generally more than fair in their treatment of displaced Arabs whose landlords had sold their estates at large profits, certain areas formerly Arab became predominantly Jewish. A largely agricultural Arab population, growing through natural increase and not trained for intensive farming, watched this process with misgivings which agitators could work upon and transform into a new manifestation of hostility against Jewish colonization.

The population, which in 1922 stood at 757,182 persons of

whom 83,794 or slightly more than 11 per cent were Jews,²¹ was officially estimated in June, 1929, at 919,064, of whom 154,330 or slightly less than 16.8 per cent were Jews.²² A Jewish increase of 70,536 between 1922 and 1929 was thus matched by a non-Jewish increase of 91,346, only a minor part of which was caused by immigration. The figures belied charges that the Jews were driving Arabs from their country, but the proportional increase in the Hebrew community was sufficient to provide Arab leaders with a further argument against Jewish immigration.

THE PALESTINE DISORDERS

During the period of peace which preceded the outbreak of disorder in 1929, the organized Arab nationalist movement in Palestine appeared to be disintegrating. When, following the war, Zionist immigration failed immediately to reach alarming proportions, apathy settled upon the peasant masses. Later, as government followed government in London without any change of policy, faith in the politicians' program of non-cooperation was shaken. Personal and factional dissension made meetings of the Arab Executive Committee, controlled by the Husaini family, occasions for wrangling and recrimination.²³ As early as 1923 a short-lived National Party was organized in opposition to the Executive,²⁴ and in 1927 a Liberal Party was established to foster a policy of cooperation with the mandatory.²⁵

The Arab differences, so far as they were not purely factional, were based upon questions of method rather than upon objectives. The members of the National and Liberal parties were quite as much opposed to the Jewish national home as were the leaders of the Executive, but they held that acceptance of British offers followed by agitation for further concessions was more expedient than rejection of anything less than complete capitulation to their desires. Consequently, in an endeavor to restore its waning prestige, the Arab Executive virtually confessed an error in tactics and sought to recreate a united front through the summoning of a Seventh Arab Congress. In June, 1928, this, the last of the Arab congresses, met at Jerusalem and elected a new Executive Committee. The Husainis were successful in retaining the presidency for Musa Kazem but recognition was accorded also to the claims of the rival Nashashibis and other less important factions.²⁶ The policy which the new alignment was prepared to follow was revealed in a telegram, dispatched to the League of Nations in the name of the congress, which asked for democratic parliamentary government.²⁷ Chief place in the new program was given to a

demand for the self-governing status of an A mandate. If this could be secured, abolition of the Jewish national home and abrogation of the mandatory regime might be attained gradually and by constitutional means.

It was in furtherance of this new policy that the Arab Executive presented Lord Plumer with an elaborate memorandum asking for restitution of the political rights enjoyed by Palestinians under the Turks and for the establishment of a parliament.²⁸ Upon the arrival in December, 1928, of Sir John Chancellor, the Executive sought to secure the support of the new High Commissioner for governmental institutions in which the people might participate and, in the following month, Chancellor promised to consider the revival of a representative legislative assembly and to discuss the matter with the Colonial Office. Shortly before he went on leave in June, 1929, he allowed the press to announce his intention of consulting the home government regarding the suspended Legislative Council.²⁹

Before the revised tactics of the Arabs bore fruit, the extremists found in religious antagonism a fresh weapon against the Jewish home policy and a new means of applying direct action for the abrogation of the mandate. A source of Hebrew-Moslem friction was at hand in the Jewish Wailing Wall, a fragment of the Hebrew temple which had been incorporated in the outer wall of the Haram esh Sharif. Within the Haram stands the Dome of the Rock, the third holiest shrine of Islam, and surrounding the Wailing Wall lies Moslem religious property of an inalienable nature though not of a sacred character. To this spot for centuries orthodox Jews had come to pray and to bewail the vanished glories of Israel.

To scattered religious enthusiasts, ignorant of Moslem sentiment for the Dome of the Rock, the Balfour Declaration foretold a restoration of the temple. To the Zionist Organization, dependent in a considerable measure upon orthodox support, it brought a hope that the land around the Wailing Wall might be secured as a Jewish national shrine.³⁰ The Moslems, however, refused to part with their property and the Jews were forced to depend upon their traditional right of access to the Wall, along the foot of which ran a narrow passage where on holy days Hebrew services were conducted.

On the Day of Atonement, September 24, 1928, an incident occurred at the Wall which supplied both Jews and Arabs with material for a religious controversy. On the evening of the preceding day the Jews erected a portable screen to separate the men from the women. When the Moslem authorities protested this alleged violation of customary practice and Islamic property

rights, the administration, endeavoring in the absence of the Holy Places Commission³¹ to maintain the *status quo*, ordered a minor Jewish religious official to remove it. Because this had not been done by the following morning, a British police officer removed the screen during the Jewish service and precipitated an unseemly fracas when some of the worshipers attempted to stop him. The passions of Jews throughout the world became inflamed over the indignity offered their co-religionists, while the Zionist Organization and the Jewish community in Palestine, already agitated over British refusals to apply more active measures for the creation of the national home, sprang to the support of the orthodox Jews.³²

The Moslem leaders hastened to institute a counter-campaign. On October 8th, the Mufti presented a memorandum to the administration in which he stated that the Arabs believed the Jews intended to take possession of the Haram esh Sharif. The legend that Mohammed's steed, Buraq, had once been stabled in the Haram wall, though at a distance from the Wailing center, was employed to give a sacred character to the whole wall and a General Moslem Conference was assembled to protest any extension of Jewish rights. Moreover, as if to emphasize their proprietorship, the Moslems began the construction of new masonry atop the Haram wall and stationed a muezzin near the assembly place of the Jews.

The Colonial Office judged it necessary on November 19, 1928, to issue a White Paper in which it stated its intention to maintain the Jews' established right of access to the pavement in front of the Wailing Wall and their right to employ there the appurtenances of worship which they had been allowed to take to the Wall under the Turkish regime. The government, however, held that it would be inconsistent with its duty as mandatory to compel the Moslems to accord any additional privileges to the Jews and suggested that a settlement might be reached by the Palestine Zionist Executive and the Supreme Moslem Council.³³ This statement of policy unfortunately did not actually define Jewish rights and, in the absence of any Arab-Jewish compromise, the Palestine administration was forced to request evidence in substantiation of conflicting claims. The Arabs submitted documentary proofs that restrictions had been enforced at the Wall from time to time, but the Jews, who held that their rights were traditional and required no documentary proof, delayed. Not until late in May, 1929, did the Zionist Executive present the Jewish case.

Meanwhile, though the General Council of the Jewish community in November issued an open letter denying any wish to encroach upon the Moslem holy places, feeling on both sides rose higher and higher. As a result of Jewish protests, the right of

the Moslems to add new stonework to the Haram wall was referred to London, but the Arabs proceeded to expand their building activities and, by opening a new door, converted the Wailing Wall pavement into a passageway to the Haram. Early in May, 1929, the High Commissioner requested the Mufti to halt all work until he had received a ruling from London. Following a decision by the law officers of the crown in favor of the Moslems, provided their operations did not cause disturbance and annoyance to Jewish worshippers, however, the Mufti was authorized to continue building. Resumption of construction on July 20th was received by the Jews with disappointment and anger and by a press campaign in defense of their alleged rights at the Wailing Wall.

July and August, 1929, offered a peculiarly favorable opportunity for agitation in Palestine. Chancellor was absent on leave and acting officials held the posts of High Commissioner, Chief Secretary, and Deputy District Commissioner for the Jerusalem Division. Moreover, the responsible heads of the Palestine Zionist Executive and of the Jewish community were in Zurich where the Sixteenth Zionist Congress was in session from July 28th to August 11th. Under these circumstances the Arabs and Jews worked themselves into a fury of accusation and recrimination over the Wailing Wall. Rumors spread among the Arabs that the Jews intended to attack the Moslem holy places and mosques. Finally, news from Zurich of the formation of an enlarged Jewish Agency which brought the wealth of American non-Zionists to the support of the national home, coupled with the already increasing immigration of 1929, reawakened Arab fears of political and economic domination and encouraged the Jews to press their claims with renewed vigor.³⁴

Reports reaching Zurich from Palestine appeared so serious that early in August a delegation led by Colonel Kisch, head of the Palestine Zionist Executive, was sent to London to give warning of the danger of an outbreak.³⁵ In Palestine only slight precautions were taken despite the approach of the Jewish fast of *Tisha b'Av* which marked a period of mourning for the destruction of the temple.³⁶ On the day of the fast, August 15th, a band of Jewish extremist youths from Tel Aviv sought permission to march to the Wailing Wall as part of a demonstration against the police action on the Day of Atonement, 1928, and against government officials who were opposed to the creation of a Jewish state. To grant such a request in a time of marked Jewish-Arab strain, was a highly dangerous step, but provisional consent was given by Harry Luke, the Acting High Commissioner, and the youths proceeded to the Wall where they raised the Zionist flag and sang the Hebrew national anthem. On the following day the Moslems held at the Wailing Wall a counter-demonstration which the government made a half-hearted and futile at-

tempt to prevent through the agency of the Mufti. In contrast to the Jewish meeting which had been peaceful though ill-advised, the Moslem assembly degenerated into riotous destruction of Hebrew prayer-books and the written petitions deposited by pious Jews in the crevices of the Wailing Wall.

The week which followed was one of growing tension in Jerusalem. On August 17th, a young Jew was stabbed to death by an Arab into whose tomato garden he had followed a lost football, and his funeral on August 21st became the occasion for an anti-Arab demonstration so serious that the police were called upon to quell it. Alarmed at last, Luke assembled three Jewish and three Arab leaders to draft a program of common action to quiet the population. No agreement could be reached, however, and on Friday, August 23rd, large numbers of fellahin arrived in the capital carrying heavy sticks and clubs. Shortly after noon, following the services in the mosques, Arabs armed with knives and clubs invaded the New City of Jerusalem and began a massacre of Jews.³⁷

The Arab assaults were not confined to the holy city. On August 24th, more than sixty Jews were killed in a ferocious onslaught at Hebron. During the next two days a number of Jewish colonies were attacked and the police had to open fire in order to prevent Arab outrages in Nablus and Jaffa. On August 29th, after two days of quiet, the Arabs attacked the Jewish quarter in Safad, killing or wounding forty-five persons and wantonly destroying considerable property. The victims of the massacres in Hebron and Safad included women and children and were, for the most part, orthodox non-Zionist Jews of the pre-war religious settlement. The disturbances resulted in 133 Jewish deaths and 116 reported Arab deaths, many of them the result of police and military activities.

The government was ill-prepared to offer protection to the Jews or to restore peace. Not until nearly two hours after the disturbances in Jerusalem began did the police open fire upon the rioters and they quickly revealed their utter incapacity to enforce order. Luke therefore summoned armored cars from Ramleh and Trans-Jordan, turned control of public security over to the Royal Air Force, and telegraphed to Malta and London for naval and military assistance. On the morning of August 24th, finding the scanty air squadron insufficient to maintain order pending the arrival of more distant help, he telephoned to Egypt for immediate reinforcements. By August 27th, five naval vessels and three battalions and a detached company of infantry were either in or on their way to the Holy Land, and, though martial law was not declared, Brigadier General William G. S. Dobbie had assumed command of the British garrison and accepted responsibility for public security.³⁸ The activity of the authorities following the riots did not prevent Jewish

charges of criminal carelessness being leveled against the Palestine administration.³⁹ To such charges the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations lent weight in June, 1930, by reporting to the Council that in view of preceding events the disorders should not have caught the government entirely unprepared.⁴⁰

The horror which the Hebron and Safad massacres awakened throughout the world was reflected in a strongly worded proclamation issued by Chancellor on September 1st, shortly after his return to Palestine, in which he denounced Arab atrocities and declared that the discussions he had commenced in London on the question of representative institutions would be suspended.⁴¹ To this the Arab Executive made a public reply in which it accused the High Commissioner of condemning the Arabs without investigation and attempted to lay the blame for the disturbances upon the Jews, some of whom were illegally possessed of firearms.⁴² This reply antagonized rather than placated British opinion,⁴³ but the demand for an investigation was repeated in many quarters and, when, on September 3rd, the Colonial Office announced the appointment of a commission of inquiry, the Arabs regarded it as a victory. Violence had again brought them an opportunity of presenting their case.

THE SHAW REPORT AND THE PASSFIELD PAPER

The disturbances of 1929 awakened a general demand for a new statement of policy on Palestine. The British cabinet, however, representing a minority government recently formed by the Labor Party, was peculiarly ill-prepared to take decisive action upon so controversial a question. Like the Lloyd George coalition in 1922, it was severely handicapped by the weakness of its political position at home. Furthermore, in making a decision concerning the Holy Land, it was hampered, on the one hand, by Labor's record of consistent support for Zionism and by the presence within the party of a considerable body of Jewish and pro-Jewish sentiment and, on the other hand, by a disinclination to antagonize Arab and Moslem opinion during negotiations with Egypt for a treaty to regulate the status of that country and on the eve of a round table conference to settle the future administration of India. It was therefore not surprising that the government, acting in the light of an official report on the riots which emphasized Arab grievances, sought to compromise the interests of the rival communities in Palestine by limiting Zionist activities and then, faced with Jewish protests and political pressure, explained away its earlier action.

The dispute over rights at the Wailing Wall which had precipitated the Palestine disorders did not directly involve matters of policy and thus, from the British point of view, proved relatively

easy of settlement once its importance as a cause of friction had been clearly demonstrated. On the basis of the evidence collected by the Palestine administration, provisional rules were issued in September, 1929, defining what appurtenances of worship the Jews might bring to the Moslem-owned Wall,⁴⁴ and in January, 1930, the League of Nations Council consented to the creation of an international commission to investigate the rival claims of Jews and Arabs and to deliver a final decision.⁴⁵

This commission, composed of three impartial persons whose appointment received League of Nations approval on May 15, 1930, sat in Palestine in June and July of that year and received evidence from representatives of the Supreme Moslem Council and various Jewish organizations. It recommended an agreed settlement to the rival parties and delayed the meeting in Stockholm to consider its report until October in expectation that one might be reached. When this hope did not materialize, the commission proceeded to draft a decision which rejected Arab claims that the Jews had no right but only a Moslem-granted privilege of approaching the Wailing Wall. It declared that the area in dispute was used as a site for worship solely by the Jews and assured them unhindered access to it. In general, the provisional rules of September, 1929, were reaffirmed.⁴⁶

Since the Moslems had declared in advance that they did not recognize the mandate nor the competence of any body except a Sharia court to settle a question concerning a Moslem holy place, the British government enacted into law by an order-in-council the terms of the commission's report before releasing it for publication in June, 1931.⁴⁷ This new law, like most compromises, was satisfactory to neither Jews nor Moslems, but by the time it was enacted, attention had been largely distracted from the religious quarrel.

The Labor Party had, ever since the First World War, offered consistent support to Zionism.⁴⁸ Two of the strongest Parliamentary warriors in the cause of the national home were the Labor members, Joseph Kenworthy (later Lord Strabolgi) and Josiah Wedgwood, both of whom as late as April, 1929, protested that the Conservative government was not adequately fulfilling its obligations under the Balfour Declaration.⁴⁹ In 1927, Wedgwood, Ramsay MacDonald and Philip Snowden were active in organizing the Palestine Mandate Society for the purpose of disseminating pro-Zionist information in England.⁵⁰ Wedgwood was a leading figure in the Seventh Dominion League which advocated a position within the British Commonwealth of Nations for a predominantly Jewish Palestine.⁵¹ It was therefore not surprising that, in announcing the appointment of a commission of inquiry into the 1929 riots, the

Colonial Office made this declaration: "No inquiry is contemplated which might alter the position of this country in regard to the Mandate or the policy, laid down in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and embodied in the Mandate, of establishing in Palestine a national home for the Jews."⁵²

The commission which the Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb), appointed on September 13, 1929, was headed by Sir Walter Shaw, retired Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements, and contained Parliamentary representatives of the Conservative, Liberal and Labor parties in the persons of Sir Henry Betterton (later Lord Rushcliffe), R. Hopkin Morris and Harry (later Lord) Snell. Its terms of reference required it to "enquire into the immediate causes" of the riots and to "make recommendations as to the steps necessary to avoid a recurrence."⁵³ The commission arrived in Palestine late in October, 1929, and was back in London on January 4, 1930. In the interval it traveled extensively in the Holy Land and heard evidence submitted by the Palestine government, the local Executive of the Jewish Agency, and the Arab Executive Committee.

Inevitably the Palestine administration and the Arabs were placed in the position of defendants at the outset of the investigation. Both found it good tactics to ascribe a portion of the blame to the Jews—the administration by emphasizing the difficulties due to the mandate, the Arabs by insisting that the disorders were basically caused by the intolerable nature of their grievances against Zionist immigration. The ground of the investigation was shifted until it became to a considerable extent an examination of the validity of the national home policy. As a result, the commission reported that, while the immediate revolt was religious and racial in nature, the political and economic grievances of the Arabs were its real causes. From this point of view, it held that Jewish immigration should be more adequately regulated and that legislation regarding property transfers should be reformed to prevent the creation of a class of landless Arabs. It went so far as to repeat with apparent approbation the statement that "there is no further land available which can be occupied by new immigrants without displacing the present population."⁵⁴ In the political field it criticized the lack of any official body through which the Arab population might approach the government and stated that the absence of self-governing institutions would constitute a grievance as long as existing conditions prevailed.

In fulfillment of its assigned task, it found that the riots were precipitated by the Arabs but cleared the administration, the Mufti of Jerusalem, and the Arab Executive of serious blame for the disturbances which, it found, were neither premeditated nor directed

against British authority. As a means of avoiding further trouble, it recommended the retention of two battalions of infantry in the Holy Land and the reorganization of the police and the intelligence service. It considered, however, that these measures would be mere palliatives against the racial animosity of the Arabs which arose from "disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future."⁵⁵

The really significant recommendation of the commission was one calling for a new statement of policy which would define the government's attitude toward "the second part of the Balfour Declaration and . . . those provisions in the Mandate which, being based upon that part of the Declaration, provide for the safe-guarding of the rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine."⁵⁶ The government's action, it was further suggested, should include a reaffirmation that the economic absorptive capacity of the country must place a limit on immigration, a repetition of the Churchill statement that the Jewish Agency was not entitled to any share in matters of government, and provision for a scientific inquiry into the land situation as a basis for an agricultural development scheme to prevent evictions and to improve the lot of the fellahin.⁵⁷

The commission's report, which was published on March 31, 1930, without comment from the government, was received by the Arabs with jubilation as a vindication of their case against the national home. The Jews, however, who had made use of the riots as an occasion to demand greater cooperation from the mandatory in the fulfillment of the Zionist program,⁵⁸ were acutely disappointed that the commissioners, after adjudging them the victims of Arab aggression, found that they had indirectly provoked the attack. Indeed, the report evinced a too facile acceptance of Arab facts and figures in matters of economics for, with few exceptions, the Christians and Moslems had benefited rather than suffered from the importation of Jewish capital and the introduction of improved methods of farming. The commissioners had, moreover, far exceeded their terms of reference. The most serious fault of the report was that, once having launched upon the question of general policy, it endeavored to eliminate Arab grievances and at the same time enable the government to fulfill its announced policy of maintaining the mandate. The ground was thus laid for a new attempt at reconciling the aims of Jewish and Palestine Arab nationalism.

In seeking the elements of compromise, the commission adopted the basic assumption that the Balfour Declaration and the mandate placed two equal obligations upon Great Britain—one to the Jews and one to the Arabs. It recognized that this interpretation was satisfactory to neither,⁵⁹ but it refused to draw the logical conclusion that this very fact would make mandatory administration

on the basis of an equality of obligation a cause of growing friction and not of peace.

Despite the dangerous implications of the theory accepted by the Shaw Commission, it appeared to offer a harassed government what it most desired—a basis for compromise. On April 3rd, therefore, Prime Minister MacDonald formally enunciated the theory of duality of mandatory obligation as the official policy of the government when he said of the mandate:

A double undertaking is involved, to the Jewish people on the one hand, and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the other; and it is the firm resolve of His Majesty's Government to give effect, in equal measure, to both parts of the Declaration and to do equal justice to all sections of the population of Palestine.⁶⁰

The government decided to delay a general statement of policy until it had received from an expert a report on economic conditions in Palestine. An investigation had been recommended by the Shaw Commission and was rendered immediately advisable by Jewish denials of the reality of Arab grievances. Early in May, therefore, the appointment of a commissioner to examine and report upon immigration, land settlement and development was announced. The person chosen for the task was Sir John Hope Simpson, a retired Indian civil servant and a member of the League of Nations commission for the resettlement of Greek refugees.

In view of Arab protests against the Jewish influx, it was decided to suspend all labor immigration pending receipt of Hope Simpson's findings.⁶¹ Moreover, a preliminary statement of policy was issued on May 27th in the form of a speech to be delivered before the Permanent Mandates Commission. This announced that the recommendations of the Shaw report were in general being favorably considered, that a proposal for a temporary suspension of immigration was receiving attention, that legislation to prevent dispossession of the agricultural population was to be introduced, and that the suggested reaffirmation of the non-governmental status of the Palestine Executive of the Jewish Agency would be incorporated in a definitive statement to be issued upon the basis of Hope Simpson's supplementary report.⁶² This declaration, which indicated concurrence with the basic economic arguments of the Arabs even before Hope Simpson's investigation had confirmed or refuted them, was met by a storm of Jewish criticism.

The position of the government was not enviable. The Arabs were disappointed that the Shaw report had not been followed by an immediate halting of Jewish immigration and land sales. They were, moreover, angry because a fourth Palestine Arab delegation, sent to London in March, 1930, had been informed that its demands

for democratic, parliamentary government were "wholly unacceptable since they would have rendered it impossible for his Majesty's Government to carry out their obligations under the Mandate."⁶³ The Jews, disappointed over the Shaw report and the preliminary statement of policy, feared that Hope Simpson would bring to his task the narrow outlook of a colonial official, certainly unfamiliar and possibly unsympathetic with the ideals of Zionism. Supporters of both Jews and Arabs questioned and heckled the Colonial Office spokesmen in the House of Commons in hopes of eliciting a statement of policy favorable to their wishes. Finally, the Permanent Mandates Commission, which met in extraordinary session in June, 1930, to consider the Palestine disturbances, severely censured the mandatory power. It reported to the League Council that the Palestine administration should have taken more adequate precautions in the interest of public security and cast justifiable doubt upon the Shaw Commission's findings that the revolt was unpremeditated and not directed against British authority.⁶⁴ Moreover, certain members held that the suspension of labor immigration was unwise and calculated to strengthen the uncompromising attitude of the Arabs.⁶⁵

Hope Simpson's report was presented to the government late in August. The commissioner had spent only about two months in Palestine and therefore had not been able to make very elaborate personal investigations, a fact which, as he himself recognized, robbed his findings of a definitive character. Nevertheless, he proceeded to present facts and figures to show that, on the basis of existing Arab methods of farming, the average peasant was already cultivating less land than was actually necessary for the subsistence of his family. He reached the conclusion that further Jewish purchases of cultivable land were inadvisable pending general agricultural development and improvement in methods of farming. He criticized the existing legislation against eviction of tenants⁶⁶ as inadequate protection against the creation of a class of landless Arabs and condemned the policies of the Jewish National Fund,⁶⁷ which removed forever from the market the land purchased in its name and required its lessees to employ only Jewish labor.

Hope Simpson was dubious of the economic soundness of much of the Jewish industrial development in Palestine which in 1928 had been chiefly responsible for establishing 3,505 factories and workshops employing 17,955 persons. He pointed out that only protective tariffs made possible a profitable production of cement, olive oil and wine, and noted the danger of building an economic structure upon the basis of a perpetual importation of consumers and capital. He also challenged the value of the social experiments of the General Federation of Jewish Labor, the powerful union

which sought to create a Hebrew workers' commonwealth in the national home.

With regard to immigration, the commissioner urged that the labor schedule should be based, not upon economic conditions of the Jewish community, as to a considerable degree it had been in the past, but upon the level of unemployment or the demand for new labor in the country as a whole. He made it clear that this criterion should not apply to immigration intended to supply labor for jobs of a permanent character, created by the introduction of Jewish capital which would not be attracted to Palestine except in the interest of the national home.

Finally, he recommended the drafting of a comprehensive program of agricultural development and the establishment of a commission to put it into effect. The program should, he thought, aim at improving the fellah's methods of farming and so promote close settlement by both Arabs and Jews. As a part of the plan any displaced Arab agriculturalists should be resettled upon the soil. Although he suggested that land transfers should be restricted pending the drafting and introduction of this scheme, he held that there should ultimately be room for not less than 20,000 additional families of immigrants in Palestine.⁶⁸

The Hope Simpson report was published by the government on October 20th, at the same time that it issued the promised definitive statement of policy. This document, the so-called Passfield White Paper, reaffirmed both MacDonald's promise to abide by the mandate and the terms of the Churchill Paper of 1922. It went on to state that in estimating the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine, account should be taken of Arab as well as of Jewish unemployment. It repeated the Churchill Paper's repudiation of any political position for the Jewish Agency and specifically denied that the clauses of the mandate designed to safeguard the rights of the non-Jewish communities were secondary conditions merely qualifying the provisions for the creation of the national home. In so doing, it categorically accepted the theory that the obligations to Jews and Arabs were of equal weight and that they were not irreconcilable.

In the light of these generalizations, the White Paper proceeded to consider specific problems. It announced that the government planned to retain two battalions of infantry and to reorganize the police department. Although the full demands of the Arabs were rejected, it revealed that a legislative council, modeled on the lines of that proposed in 1922, was to be established, the High Commissioner having authority to appoint unofficial members as spokesmen of communities which failed or refused to return representatives. It declared flatly that there was no land available for further Jew-

ish agricultural settlement except vacant areas already in the possession of Hebrew organizations. Finally, it announced the adoption of a scheme for agricultural development which would assure the right of Arab tenants to a subsistence plot, and enunciated the need of more stringently controlled immigration.⁶⁹

The Passfield White Paper was the culmination of the Labor government's policy of concessions to Arab and Moslem opinion. So determined was the Colonial Office to demonstrate its complete impartiality with regard to the allegedly equal obligations to the Arabs and the Jews that its statement of policy assumed a general tone of hostility to Zionist aims and activities which were aggressive in contrast to the largely negative demands of the Arabs. Since it made no reference to Hope Simpson's calculation that 20,000 immigrant families could ultimately be absorbed in Palestine or to his exemption from immigration restrictions of the laborers required for new Jewish enterprises, it appeared that the Colonial Office envisaged a practical cessation of activities in the development of the national home. The plea for Arab-Jewish cooperation with which the White Paper ended seemed to the Zionists to be little more than a politely expressed declaration that the growth of their home was to be made dependent upon Arab consent. The statement, which purported to be a definitive interpretation of policy, was not so clear in its terms that absolute assurance of its meaning could be extracted from its pages, but there could be no doubt that it was, to say the least, extremely tactless in its treatment of Zionism, and that it might, if the authorities so desired, be interpreted in a manner which would severely limit Jewish activities.

The Zionist leaders, who had been in consultation with the Colonial Office preceding the issue of the White Paper, were not kept fully informed of the government's plans nor were they shown a draft of the statement until shortly before its publication. When on October 18th Weizmann solicited a final interview with Passfield, he was told that the Colonial Secretary no longer had authority to alter the terms of the declaration which was already approved for issuance.⁷⁰ The Jewish leader thereupon prepared for simultaneous publication with the White Paper a letter of resignation as president of the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency. In it he branded the government's statement as an attack upon the efforts of the bodies he headed and as a declaration that the progress of the national home was to be curtailed.⁷¹

The storm which publication of the White Paper and Weizmann's charges against it evoked proved both startling and embarrassing to the government. Lord Melchett resigned from the Council of the Jewish Agency in a public letter in which he said, "The grotesque travesty of the purpose of the Mandate given in the Gov-

ernment Paper can only be described as an insult to the intelligence of Jewry and a deliberate affront to the Mandates Commission."⁷² The English Zionist Federation supported Weizmann's protests, and American Jewry organized to exert pressure on the British government to force a reconsideration of policy.⁷³ The General Council of the Jewish community in Palestine presented a memorandum of protest to Sir John Chancellor and announced that it would refuse to participate in the revised Legislative Council. Even the *Brith Shalom*, a Palestinian Hebrew organization which had worked for Jewish-Arab cooperation and a binational legislature, let it be known that under the terms of the White Paper its program had become impracticable.⁷⁴

The protests were not limited to Jews and Hebrew organizations. The Conservative leaders, Stanley Baldwin, Austen Chamberlain and Leopold S. Amery, published an open letter accusing the Labor government of issuing a statement the spirit of which was contrary to that of the Balfour Declaration, the comments of the Permanent Mandates Commission and every British announcement of policy for the preceding twelve years.⁷⁵ On October 27th, an exchange of telegrams between Jan Smuts and the Prime Minister was released by the South African statesman who had been a member of the War Cabinet in 1917. On October 22nd, he had telegraphed MacDonald urging an immediate repudiation of the White Paper.⁷⁶ On November 4th, there was published a letter from Lord Hailsham and Sir John Simon attacking the Passfield Paper with the full weight of their legal authority as containing proposals which would violate the terms of the mandate by restricting land sales and immigration.⁷⁷

In addition to these private protests, notice was given on October 28th at the opening of a new session of Parliament that an attack would be made on the government. Baldwin expressed fear that the Passfield Paper involved a breach of pledges and Lloyd George demanded a discussion of Palestine policy.⁷⁸ On November 17th, a debate took place in the House of Commons, opened by Lloyd George who insisted that the establishment of the Jewish national home was the dominant obligation of the Balfour Declaration. He deprecated the secrecy of the preparation of the White Paper and demanded that the mandate either be implemented or surrendered. The former Colonial Secretary, Leopold Amery, criticized Passfield for giving the Arabs and Jews no opportunity to express their views on the projected declaration of policy and demanded a new statement to clarify the situation. Sir Herbert Samuel joined the attack as did such prominent Laborites as Harry Snell and Joseph Kenworthy. Only two voices were raised in support of the government, and its prestige was not

increased by the apparent discourtesy of the First Lord of the Admiralty, A. V. Alexander, who, after endeavoring to close the debate by claiming that there was little serious dissatisfaction with the White Paper, left the house before his opponents had an opportunity to question him.⁷⁹

Even the Arabs were critical of the announced policy. They had expected complete stoppage of immigration and land sales and a democratically elected legislature freed of the limitations imposed by the 1922 constitution. More basically, they had hoped for withdrawal of the Balfour Declaration and revocation of the mandate. As the Jewish wave of protest rose, many of the Arabs became more content. If the Jews regarded the White Paper as a death-blow to their hopes, the Arabs came to think that it must be more favorable to their desires than it had first seemed.⁸⁰ The Husaini faction, however, was adamant against any compromise which accepted the mandate and limited the right of self-government.⁸¹

No sooner had the protests against the White Paper begun than the government, alarmed by the anger of the Jews and its political repercussions, commenced to explain away the anti-Zionist aspects of the declaration. On October 23rd, Ramsay MacDonald assured Smuts that, while the safeguarding of Arab rights necessitated certain restrictions on the Jewish national home, there was no intention of crystallizing the Zionist settlement at its existing stage of development.⁸² Two days later Passfield informed Weizmann that the Jewish leader had misunderstood the White Paper and repeated the Prime Minister's assurances.⁸³ On October 28th, MacDonald told Parliament that the government's statement was intended to mark no change of policy toward the Palestine mandate, and that the mandate would be strictly observed.⁸⁴ On November 6th *The Times* published a letter from Passfield in which he denied the intention to prohibit Jewish immigration if any Arab unemployment existed. The proposed restrictions on immigration were to apply only to the labor category, and account would be taken of new Jewish enterprise as Hope Simpson had suggested.

In the Parliamentary debate on November 17th, Drummond Shiels endeavored to defend the Passfield Paper by insisting that it rested upon the Churchill statement and the previously enunciated theory of duality of mandatory obligations. He pointed out, moreover, that the development scheme proposed by Passfield would benefit Jews as well as Arabs. The Prime Minister repeated his allegiance to the mandate and insisted that there had been no change of policy. At the close of the debate, Shiels was heckled into declaring that the Churchill White Paper would be carried

out as in the past. He clung, however, to the dual obligation theory, saying that the national home would be developed only so far as was consistent with the government's other obligations. His final conclusion that the Passfield Paper still stood only disturbed the already muddied waters.⁸⁵

Three days before the debate, the government had invited representatives of the Jewish Agency, including Dr. Weizmann, who was continuing to fulfill his duties pending the assembling of a Zionist Congress, to confer with a special cabinet committee presided over by Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson. The ensuing meetings, which began on November 18th, culminated in a formal explanation of the Passfield Paper.⁸⁶ On February 11, 1931, MacDonald announced the conclusion of the negotiations and informed the House of Commons that he would incorporate the results in a public letter to Weizmann. He refused, however, to have this released as a White Paper.⁸⁷

The letter, dated February 13, 1931, was published in answer to a question in the House of Commons as the authoritative interpretation of the Passfield Paper. It specifically recognized that the Palestine mandate embodied an obligation to the whole Jewish people and not merely to the Hebrew community resident in Palestine, and denied any intention to cast aspersions on the Jewish Agency. It announced that the mandatory clauses protecting Arab rights were not to be construed as a "freezing" of existing conditions, and agreed that the only landless Arabs for whom provision must be made under the development plan were those actually dispossessed through passage of their land into Jewish hands and that this obligation would not prevent further land acquisition by Jews. It gave assurances that the considerations controlling the absorptive capacity of the country would be purely economic, that the needs of new enterprises would be taken into account in allotting immigration schedules, and that the claim of Jews to a just share of labor on public works in view of their contribution to revenue would be heeded. Finally, it declared that the British government did not object to the Jewish Agency's policy of requiring Hebrew labor for Hebrew work.⁸⁸

Though many Jews were not satisfied with the MacDonald letter which, instead of repudiating the Passfield Paper, merely interpreted it in a spirit apparently contrary to that of its original drafting, the Zionist Organization received it as an acceptable recognition of Jewish rights under the mandate. The Arabs, however, were outraged that the "black letter" had snatched from them their supposed victory. Nothing could convince them that Jewish influence in Parliament and at the Colonial Office had not caused the government to make a complete reversal of the policy of

the Passfield statement.⁸⁹ In general, British opinion, which had disliked the Passfield Paper and had been skeptical of the government's protests that its meaning was being misunderstood, welcomed the Prime Minister's letter as an alteration of policy and a fulfillment of pledges to the Jews.⁹⁰

The Labor government, like its predecessors, adhered to the unsuccessful policy of attempted compromise between the aims of Arab nationalism and Zionism. Such a program, based upon recognition of equal obligations to Arabs and Jews, could have a satisfactory outcome only in the creation of a unitary, binational state, and that goal was entirely foreign to the desires of either community in Palestine. Every new attempt to reconcile the incompatible purposes of Arabs and Jews embittered their relations with one another and with Great Britain and made more difficult a clear decision in favor either of a Jewish autonomous home or of an Arab state. The Passfield Paper and the MacDonald letter were particularly unfortunate applications of the general British policy, for they convinced first the Arabs and then the Jews that sufficient agitation and pressure could alter the intentions of the mandatory. The whole philosophy of compromise was at fault. The effort of the London government to be both pro-Arab and pro-Zionist within the limited confines of the Holy Land was fraught with danger alike to the Arabs, the Jews and the British.

Disorder and Partition

A PERIOD of uneasy peace succeeded the 1929 disturbances in Palestine. Despite a world depression, the country underwent a generally favorable economic development. The administration, intent upon implementing the policy of compromise, hoped that under such favorable conditions Jewish-Arab cooperation might be attained by the gradual introduction of self-government, first in local and then in national affairs. In this, however, it was disappointed. The failure of the program was made evident by Zionist dissatisfaction and by an Arab general strike which in 1936 again brought the Palestine problem sharply to the attention of the London authorities.

In the light of a lucid and convincing report presented by a Royal Commission of Inquiry, the British government finally acknowledged that Arab and Jewish objectives were incompatible within a single state. Yet this admission did not involve a basic change of policy, for the government sought in the partition of Palestine a means of fulfilling the desires alike of Jews and of Arabs. When the impracticability of creating two states in Palestine was demonstrated, the cabinet declared again in November, 1938, that some compromise of Jewish-Arab disagreements would have to be reached.

In the years from 1931 to 1936, the material progress of Palestine partially concealed the continued existence of political unrest and racial animosity. The disturbances of 1929 and the world depression of that and the succeeding years retarded but did not prevent the country's emergence from the domestic recession of the late 1920s. Though the economic collapse in the United States disappointed Zionist expectations of greatly increased financial support from the enlarged Jewish Agency, the growth of anti-Semitism in eastern and central Europe insured Palestine of a plentiful supply of colonists, many of them bringing capital for investment. By 1933 conditions were generally prosperous and the following year saw the development of a definite boom with commerce and industry flourishing and land values and the cost of living soaring. Not until the end of 1935, when the political uneasiness of Europe and growing Italo-Ethiopian tension resulted in a contraction of credit

and general financial instability, was there any concrete evidence of an impending depression. Even then the resulting insecurity was not sufficiently serious to cause grave doubts of Palestine's economic future until it was aggravated by local political disturbances in the spring of 1936.

The new Palestinian prosperity, like that of the preceding decade, was both based upon and responsible for a wave of Jewish immigration which went far to disprove the statements of British investigators that only widespread changes in agricultural methods could increase the country's absorptive capacity beyond the 1929 level. In April, 1930, as an answer to criticism of uneconomic population increases, the immigration categories were redefined. The capital requirement for unrestricted entry was raised from 500 pounds to 1,000 and category B, providing entry for otherwise satisfactory immigrants who failed to meet that condition, disappeared entirely, being replaced by a new classification of supported persons including orphans, individuals in religious occupations and students. However, provision was still made under category A for the admission of professional men with only 500 pounds capital and for craftsmen with only 250.¹ In 1932, when prosperity was justifying Jewish demands for greater leniency, a new subdivision of category A was created to allow the entry of any person with 500 pounds who convinced the Palestine authorities that he would prove a valuable addition to the economic life of the country.² The result was that restrictions on Jewish immigration outside the labor category became scarcely more severe than they had been before 1929. A new immigration ordinance, enacted in 1933, merely coordinated and integrated earlier regulations.³

In 1930, there were 4,944 Jews who entered Palestine as immigrants or were granted permission to remain after coming by surreptitious means or as tourists. In the following year this figure fell slightly, but in 1932 a definite upswing began with the entry of 5,823 registered Hebrew immigrants and the legalization of the presence of an additional 3,730. In 1933, the number of Jewish arrivals, augmented in some measure by German anti-Semitism, rose sharply to 30,327 persons, and the ensuing years saw even this figure more than doubled by an influx of 42,359 in 1934 and of 61,854 in 1935.⁴

Despite this vast increase in authorized immigration, the Jewish Agency protested the restrictions placed upon the labor category and the increasingly stern measures adopted to cope with illegal immigration. The old struggle between the Agency and the administration over the labor schedule showed itself in aggravated form in 1933 and 1934 when out of requests for three separate six-month quotas, one for 12,750, another for 24,490 and a third for

20,100, the government granted only two schedules of 5,500 certificates and one of 6,800.⁵ The Zionists insisted that a Jewish labor shortage required greater immigration, while the administration protested that work in booming activities such as the building trade did not offer prospects of permanent employment adequate to justify an unrestricted influx of persons dependent entirely upon their own labor.

One result of the government's policy was a startling rise in the figures for illicit immigration of persons unable to qualify in any but the labor category and barred from it by arbitrary quota limits. It was estimated that 22,400 Jews entered Palestine illegally in 1932 and 1933,⁶ and by the next year the Arabs of Syria and the Lebanon and owners of boats operating from Egypt and the Greek islands were carrying on a well-organized and lucrative trade in smuggling human cargoes. In November, 1933, the administration began an only partially successful campaign to halt these activities both by tightening control over immigration and by deducting from the authorized labor schedules sufficient certificates to compensate for the estimated number of illegal entrants into the ranks of Jewish labor.⁷ In view of the fact that many Syrians were filtering across the frontier to compete with the local Arabs in the largely Jewish-created labor market,⁸ the Zionists protested bitterly against restrictions and penalties which they regarded as contrary to the mandate and unjustified by economic considerations.

By 1936 the total population of Palestine was officially estimated at 1,336,518 persons, of whom 370,483, or 27.7 per cent, were Jews. Numerically the non-Jewish communities had increased by 297,777 persons since 1922, while the Jews had added only 286,693 to their number.⁹ The relative positions of the groups, however, were changing. If Jewish immigration could be maintained at the 1934 and 1935 levels, a Jewish majority would become a reality in the 1940 decade. Such a possibility naturally outraged the Arab leaders, who felt that self-government would not be withheld from a Hebrew as it was from an Arab majority.

Palestinian prosperity was revealed chiefly in the growth and development of the Jewish urban community which in 1936 embraced about 76 per cent of the Hebrew population.¹⁰ The other religious groups, however, shared in an industrial advance which created some 6,000 enterprises with an invested capital of more than 10,000,000 pounds and an employment of more than 40,000 persons.¹¹ The value of exports of local origin rose from 1,572,061 pounds to 4,215,486 between 1931 and 1935,¹² and the Palestine treasury, which in 1931 suffered an excess of expenditure over revenue of 40,972 pounds, rapidly developed a surplus which in April, 1936, amounted to 6,267,000 pounds.¹³ The necessity of fos-

tering local industry by protective tariffs and the constantly growing importation of consumption goods, which in 1935 had a value of 17,853,493 pounds,¹⁴ raised doubts concerning the basic solidarity of the economic structure but, in the development of what was practically a new country, such conditions, if gradual rectification proved possible, need not have constituted signs of ultimate collapse.

Unfortunately, the agriculturalists shared only slightly in the prosperity of urban Palestine. Jewish farmers were partially protected against adversity by the financial support of colonization agencies, by training in modern methods of farming, and by occupation of land in the plains, the actual or potential fertility of which was greater than that of the hill areas. However, the Arab peasants in general lacked these advantages. The droughts and locust invasions which plagued Palestinian agriculture in the early years of the 1930 decade had been a setback to the Jews but had brought dire distress to the Arabs. Nationalist leaders found in this situation an opportunity for anti-Zionist activity and blamed the depressed conditions of the natives upon Jewish land purchases, which by 1936 had transferred about 12 per cent of the cultivable land into Hebrew hands.¹⁵ In making such charges they ignored the fact that much of the land purchased by Jews had been rendered cultivable only through expensive drainage or irrigation projects and the further fact that the natural increase of the native population and its inability through lack of education and finances to adopt methods of intensive farming were largely responsible for such overcrowding as existed.

The attention of the government had been attracted to the economic grievances of the Arabs by the report of the Shaw Commission and the Hope Simpson inquiry. Both the Passfield Paper and the MacDonald letter had enunciated plans for agricultural development, which, the letter had added, was not to involve discrimination against Jewish agricultural settlement. In April, 1931, therefore, the British government expressed a wish to assemble Jewish and Arab spokesmen in London to assist the Colonial Office in drafting a program for the fulfillment of these promises. Refusal of the Arab Executive to negotiate in the presence of Jews necessitated conversations with the Jewish Agency in London and with the Arab leaders in Palestine.¹⁶ Nevertheless, by June the government had evolved a comprehensive scheme under which there was to be appointed a Director of Development to prepare a register of dispossessed Arabs and a scheme for their resettlement and to investigate methods of facilitating Jewish colonization, relieving Arab congestion in hill areas and bringing uncultivated land into use. Further, he was to study proposals for the extension of agricultural

credits and plans for drainage, irrigation and other means of land reclamation. The British government proposed to guarantee a new Palestine loan as a means of giving effect to his recommendations.¹⁷

This project was speedily implemented by the selection of Lewis French, formerly Chief Secretary in the Punjab, as Director of Development. In December, 1931, and April, 1932, he presented reports which provided an elaborate and expensive plan for the resettlement of landless Arabs whose numbers, it was ultimately found, did not exceed 664 families.¹⁸ French's other proposals appeared to be predicated upon preservation of the *status quo* through restrictive legislation to prevent Arab evictions rather than upon a comprehensive scheme for improving the lot of the fellahin through the introduction of intensified farming. His recommendations provided the basis of a plan formally promulgated by the Colonial Secretary on July 14, 1933.¹⁹

In practice, however, no comprehensive program of development was instituted, and the projected loan of 2,000,000 pounds was not raised. Instead, the Palestine government utilized some of its recurrent surpluses in piecemeal efforts to alleviate the distress of the fellahin. The few displaced Arabs who were willing to accept the lands offered were established in new homes. An ordinance was enacted to create a class of statutory tenants who might not be dispossessed unless they were provided either with other land adequate for their maintenance or with another occupation.²⁰ Government loans were made from time to time to hard-pressed farmers, large remissions in agricultural taxation were allowed, and a movement was begun to foster the creation of cooperative societies among the Arab peasants. In 1935 a rural property tax finally replaced the unsatisfactory tithe.²¹ Plans for legislation to prohibit the sale of a minimum subsistence area were in existence when in 1936 a new outbreak of violence resulted in reconsideration of the whole Palestine problem.

It is not impossible that a more extensive and better integrated program of agricultural development would have both improved the lot of the Arab peasants and made more land available for settlement by the Jews. It is not likely, however, that such a policy would have removed the opposition of the Arab leaders to Jewish immigration and land purchases for, despite their readiness to employ economic arguments against the Zionists, their attitude was based fundamentally upon psychological and political grounds. At any rate, the period of peaceful development which came to an end in 1936 closed, with the Arabs as unwilling as ever to accept the Jewish national home.

THE POLITICAL SCENE

The absence of political activity in the years immediately following 1931 formed a marked contrast to the material progress of the period. The unfavorable reception given by both Jews and Arabs to the Passfield Paper's legislative council proposals, and the emphasis placed upon the necessity of economic development by the Shaw and Hope Simpson reports, served to convince the authorities that Palestine was not immediately ready for an experiment in centralized self-government, though they did not destroy hopes that a unitary state endowed with democratic institutions might ultimately be created in the Holy Land. In conformity with this belief and with the announced theory that Arab and Jewish interests were not irreconcilable, Sir Arthur Wauchope,²² who succeeded Chancellor as High Commissioner in 1931, became the exponent of a long-range program which contemplated the material upbuilding of Palestine through joint British, Jewish and Arab efforts. The good will and cooperative spirit engendered in this activity were to be transferred to the political scene, first in the field of local self-government, expanded and freed of its fetters, and then in the sphere of national administration where a legislative council, representative of the various elements in the population, would ultimately be created.²³ In this project he had the support of the Colonial Office which, under the National coalition, was headed by the Conservative, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister (later Lord Swinton). A limited measure of success crowned attempts to secure Arab and Jewish cooperation in semi-official advisory capacities in connection with the economic life of the country but, pending the completion of this first phase of the plan, the Crown Colony system of administration was retained almost unaltered.

Formal announcement of the new policy was made on November 10, 1932, when, speaking before the Permanent Mandates Commission, Wauchope revealed that the government intended to fulfill the Passfield promise of a legislative council after local self-government had been reorganized and expanded in accordance with a new ordinance then being drafted.²⁴ It was several years, however, before the project for the establishment of a legislative body entered the realm of practical politics. Both Jewish and Arab municipal leaders found the draft local government ordinance unsatisfactory in the excessive control retained by the central authorities and it became necessary to alter the bill in light of their protests. Thus it was not until the autumn of the following year that the High Commissioner was in a position to announce that the new ordinance would be enacted early in 1934 and to reaffirm his intention of establishing a legislative council once local self-government on the new model became a reality.²⁵

Meanwhile the Arab Executive Committee had been aroused by a vigorous press campaign against the rapidly increasing Jewish immigration. In March, 1933, it assembled a general conference at Jaffa which protested against the pro-Zionist policy of the mandatory and passed resolutions for non-cooperation with the government and for a boycott of British and Jewish goods. In August the flames of Arab displeasure were fanned by the activities of the Eighteenth Zionist Congress in Prague, and early in October the Executive Committee proclaimed a general strike for October 13th and made plans for a public procession and demonstration in Jerusalem. To disperse the parade, which had been prohibited by the government, the police found it necessary to resort to baton charges. When a similar demonstration was attempted at Jaffa on October 27th, the police had to use their guns to preserve order. Exaggerated rumors of this affair precipitated trouble in Haifa and Nablus, and on October 28th and 29th new disorders broke out in Jerusalem. In the course of the October disturbances twenty-six demonstrators and bystanders and one policeman were killed. The local commission which investigated the riots found that they were caused by Arab apprehension over Jewish immigration and land purchases.²⁶

These disturbances revealed clearly that the administration's hopes of achieving Jewish-Arab unity through common action in the economic sphere had failed. Nevertheless, the High Commissioner persevered with the extension of local self-government. The Municipal Corporations Ordinance was enacted on January 12, 1934,²⁷ and by the end of that year twenty town councils were functioning. The success of this second step in the government's plan, however, was not very great. The ignorance and apathy of much of the Arab electorate made vigorous institutions of self-government impossible in many areas. Moreover, the restrictions on local autonomy, partially necessitated by this condition, stifled initiative in more favored localities. The attempt to foster Arab-Jewish cooperation in mixed municipalities had a limited measure of success, but the unity achieved scarcely gave promise of withstanding a severe crisis in racial relations.²⁸

Despite the uncertain outcome of his efforts to prepare the way for a legislative council, Wauchope, when on leave in London in the autumn of 1934, discussed the plan with the Colonial Office. Upon his return to Jerusalem early in December, he informed the Arab Executive that the government intended to inaugurate conversations with the leaders of the various communities on specific proposals for establishing a legislature as soon as there had been an opportunity of observing the functioning of the new municipal regime. That the type of council contemplated would not be particularly palatable to the Arabs was revealed by his reference to

"safeguards to ensure that the peace and security of the country cannot be endangered, nor the carrying out of the Mandate hampered."²⁹

The Arab organization to which this announcement was made had by 1934 lost its vitality and power of leadership. The ultimately unsuccessful outcome of the Executive's activities between 1929 and 1931 revived Moslem-Christian and factional dissension to a point which threatened Arab unity again. An effort by the Mufti in December, 1931, to strengthen his own position and to rally support to the Palestine Arab cause through the assembly in Jerusalem of a General Islamic Congress was not very fruitful. The important Moslem countries were not officially represented, and Haj Amin al-Husaini's evident desire to use the congress for personal aggrandizement provided his Palestinian opponents an opportunity for a bitter attack upon his character and policies.³⁰ The Executive maintained its attitude of non-cooperation by refusal to participate in the agricultural development scheme and rejection of the Lewis French reports which were regarded as unacceptable because they did not provide for cessation of Jewish immigration or prohibition of further Hebrew land purchases. Its power, however, was gradually waning and efforts to summon an eighth Palestine Arab Congress failed.³¹

In 1932 the decline of the Executive was marked by the creation of a new and unaffiliated Arab political party. Auni Abdul-Hadi and other prominent figures who had been active in the pre-war and wartime movement for Arab freedom and unity formed the Independence Party to advocate the creation of a sovereign Arab state in Palestine and the ultimate establishment of a pan-Arab federation.³² The feverish activity of October, 1933, did not mark a permanent revival of the Executive's power and by 1934 factional differences had become so serious that its very existence was threatened. At this critical time the death of Musa Kazem al-Husaini removed from the presidency a man whose personal integrity had been generally recognized and under whose leadership rival groups had been willing to cooperate.

In an expiring effort to give an appearance of unity to the Arab movement, the Executive acquiesced in what it could no longer prevent and passed a resolution favoring the establishment of independent political parties.³³ Within a brief period, five new organizations had sprung up, the National Defense Party under Ragheb Nashashibi, the Reform Party under Husain Khalidi, the National League under Abdul Latif Salah, the Arab Young Men's Federation under Yaqub Ghusain, and the Palestine Arab Party under the titular leadership of Jamal al-Husaini and the actual control of his cousin, the Mufti of Jerusalem. The Defense and Reform parties

were moderate groups divided chiefly by a quarrel of their leaders arising out of municipal politics in Jerusalem. All the groups, however, as well as the older Independence Party, were united in demanding renunciation of the Balfour Declaration and self-government for Palestine.³⁴ The Arab Executive, with its foundation in the Moslem-Christian Associations and their periodic congresses undermined by the rise of the new parties, was allowed to become dormant without being formally disbanded.

Prior to his departure for a vacation in England in August, 1935, Wauchope held preliminary discussions with the leaders of the various Arab parties on the subject of the legislative council. During the succeeding months definite plans were evolved at the Colonial Office and it was decided that the High Commissioner should be appointed for a second five-year term so that his program for the gradual introduction of joint Arab-Jewish self-government might have a satisfactory trial.³⁵ Before the new scheme was ready for publication, however, several events had occurred which further darkened the never bright prospect of its being wholeheartedly accepted by the rival groups in the Holy Land. On September 3rd, the Zionist Organization, meeting in its biennial congress at Lucerne, passed a resolution voicing opposition to the immediate creation of a legislative council.³⁶ Later in the autumn five of the six Arab parties formed an alliance for common action and on November 25th presented to the High Commissioner a memorandum which asked for the establishment of democratic government, the prohibition of land transfers to Jews, and the immediate cessation of Jewish immigration.³⁷ Before Wauchope presented his legislative council proposal in December, it was predicted by foreign observers that neither Jews nor Arabs would accept it. The Jews were obdurate in their opposition, and young extremists were becoming so influential in the Arab nationalist movement that it was thought the older leaders would hesitate to approve anything short of a project looking toward responsible government and abrogation of the mandate.³⁸

On December 21st and 22nd the High Commissioner presented his scheme, first, to the representatives of the Arab parties, and then to those of the Jewish Agency and the Hebrew community. Wauchope introduced the plan with the remark that "we propose to throw open to the Council a wide field for debate and to impose on its deliberations such restrictions only as are essential to enable the High Commissioner to discharge his responsibilities and to fulfil the international obligations of His Majesty's Government." He then proceeded to outline a project for a legislature of twenty-eight members, composed of five officials, eleven nominated representatives—including three Moslems, four Jews, two Christians and

two spokesmen for the foreign commercial interests—and twelve elected delegates of whom eight were to be Moslems, three Jews and one Christian. The president was to be an impartial person appointed from outside Palestine, six members were to form a quorum, and the High Commissioner was to have the power to appoint any persons he saw fit in place of the elected delegates of any community which refused to take part in the elections. Moreover, the High Commissioner was to retain an absolute veto, the authority to enact necessary legislation in case of its rejection by the council, and control over immigration. No action was to be taken by the council which might, in the opinion of the president, call into question the validity of the mandate or suggest that it should be annulled or disregarded.³⁹

This proposal, like earlier British plans, was based upon the assumption that Arab and Jewish interests were not irreconcilable. It attempted, therefore, to concede the Arab demands for self-government without destroying the bases of the Jewish national home, and sought to provide a laboratory in which representatives of the rival communities might cooperate in the common interest and so to foster the creation of a unitary state in the Holy Land. The falsity of the basic assumption vitiated the whole scheme. The Jews objected to placing the fate of their national home, even under stringent safeguards, in the hands of a body at least half of whose members would almost inevitably have an anti-Zionist attitude. The Arabs, who wanted a legislative council as a means of annulling the Balfour Declaration and abrogating the mandate, would accept such a restricted grant of representative government only as a means of airing their grievances, hampering the development of the national home, and working to achieve their original ends. For common action of opposing factions in a legislative assembly, there must be some general agreement on the purposes of government. In Palestine there was none. The Arabs wanted independence. The Jews wanted to develop a Hebrew community free from alien interference. Under these conditions, the enforced proximity in the council chamber of representatives of the conflicting groups would have served to increase the friction between them rather than to foster cooperation.

The Jews rejected the proposals outright with a reference to the resolutions of the Lucerne congress. The Arab leaders requested time to deliberate. In January, the National Defense, the Palestine Arab, the Reform and the Arab Young Men's parties submitted their comments. All criticized the government's proposals but none rejected them completely. The Arabs had long since become convinced of their error in refusing the 1922 proposals which would at least have provided them with an opportunity for official

statements of their grievances, and Jewish opposition to the current project was serving to make it appear more favorable than it had first seemed. Though they protested against the small elective element in the council and against restrictions which would prevent the Arab majority from employing its elected representatives to stop immigration and land sales and to annul the Balfour Declaration and the mandate, they appeared ready to cooperate in the establishment of a council upon the government's terms if no better ones could be immediately secured. Later, the National League joined the other parties in giving tentative assent to the project. The Independence Party, however, which stood apart from the Arab coalition, maintained an attitude of complete non-cooperation.⁴⁰

Arab dissatisfaction with the details of the council scheme and with British policy in general was not alleviated by a reply from the Colonial Office which the High Commissioner delivered on January 29, 1936, to the Arab memorandum of the preceding November. This assumed that the projected council was a satisfactory response to the demand for democratic government and declared, "There can be no question of the total stoppage of Jewish immigration into Palestine."⁴¹ Despite their discontent with the proposal, however, Arabs were incensed when it appeared that Jewish agitation and Parliamentary displeasure in England might result in the postponement or withdrawal of the legislative council scheme.

In February, Lord Snell, leader of the Labor opposition in the House of Lords, precipitated a debate upon Palestine policy. The usual pro-Arab bloc was conspicuous by its absence, and peer after peer rose to condemn the legislative council plan and to demand its deferment until there was some possibility that it would serve as a means of Jewish-Arab union rather than as a weapon in the hands of the anti-Zionist Arab leaders. The Under-Secretary for Colonial Affairs found no support in his defense of the government's policy and, though Snell did not demand a division, there was no doubt of the unfavorable opinion of the house.⁴² A month later Josiah Wedgwood raised the question in the House of Commons and explained that the Labor Party opposed the grant of a legislative council to Palestine because it would not be a step in the direction of democratic control but would merely increase the power of the effendis over the politically ignorant masses and provide a battleground where Jewish-Arab antagonism would become further embittered. It was impossible at the time to bring the question to a vote, but it became quite evident that Parliament did not approve of the government's policy. Only one vigorous speech, with the exception of that of the Colonial Secretary, J. H. Thomas, was delivered in support of the council scheme, and two of Thomas' predecessors, Wins-

ton Churchill and Leopold Amery, joined the array of speakers who denounced it.⁴³

The unanimity of Parliamentary opposition to the government's policy was apparently caused more by a sincere conviction that a legislative council would prove an additional irritant in Jewish-Arab relations than by Zionist outcry against its establishment. The Arabs, however, regarded it as a new proof of Jewish control of Parliament and watched the government's actions with increased suspicion. At this juncture the Colonial Office, impressed by the Parliamentary rebuke, hesitated to proceed with the legislative council scheme and yet feared to abandon it in the face of its virtual acceptance by the Arabs. From this dilemma it finally found a temporary escape by basing a reopening of the whole question upon the fact that the Jews were actively opposing the scheme in London. On April 2nd, the High Commissioner informed the Arab leaders that the Colonial Secretary, who had recently received a Jewish delegation, would be pleased to confer with Arab spokesmen who, it was suggested, might be glad to avail themselves of a like opportunity to present their case for modification of the project.⁴⁴ To this proposal the Arab leaders, now determined that no action of theirs should give the British government cause to withdraw its offer, agreed.⁴⁵ Before the rival factions decided upon the composition of their delegation, however, civil disturbances in Palestine widened the field of discussion far beyond the introduction of a legislative council.

THE DISTURBANCES OF 1936

In April, 1936, tension in Palestine was high. The legislative council negotiations had strengthened Jewish-Arab antagonism, while the Moslems and Christians had become convinced that Zionist influence in London was endangering their chances of securing even an unsatisfactory council. A degree of financial stringency and economic depression had been induced largely by the Abyssinian crisis and the growing political tension in Europe. Arab unrest was intensified by the external events. The Italo-Ethiopian War, then drawing to its close, had seriously weakened English prestige throughout the Near East.

There was the real possibility of an Anglo-Italian war in which the British position in the eastern Mediterranean would be threatened. Strikes and demonstrations by students in Egypt had preceded the reopening of conversations with England for a treaty to regularize the status of that country as an independent nation, and an Arab general strike had resulted in the commencement of negotiations in Paris for treaties on the Anglo-Iraqi model to replace the mandate over Syria and the Lebanon. From these circum-

stances the Palestinian nationalists drew the conclusion that England and France were on the defensive in the East and that the time was propitious for the application of pressure upon Great Britain. Furthermore, foreign propaganda was playing a part in arousing the Arabs. The Communist Party in Palestine had been thoroughly Arabized and was conducting a campaign against both Britain and Zionism.⁴⁶ Italian agents were spreading anti-British propaganda in an effort to embarrass an opponent of the Ethiopian adventure and to strengthen Italian influence in the Arab lands to the east of the Mediterranean Sea.⁴⁷

At this point an event occurred which in ordinary times might have resulted in nothing more than an acrimonious Arab-Jewish press campaign, but under the existing circumstances gave rise to an outbreak of violence which was unprecedented alike in length and ferocity. On the night of April 15th, Arab highwaymen held up ten automobiles on the Tulkarm-Nablus road and robbed their passengers. They then placed three of their captives together in a truck and shot them in cold blood. One was killed outright and another later died of his wounds. Because these victims were apparently selected solely on the ground that they were Jews, anti-Arab feeling in the Hebrew community rose to dangerous heights. On the following night, two Arabs were murdered near the Jewish town of Petah Tiqva, probably as an act of revenge on the part of irresponsible Jews. On April 17th, the funeral of one of the Jewish victims of the Tulkarm outrage offered the occasion for a disorderly anti-Arab demonstration in Tel Aviv, and two days later mobs in Jaffa, excited by false rumors that Jews were murdering Arabs, fell upon the Hebrew population and killed three persons before the police, reinforced by troops, managed to disperse them.⁴⁸

This eruption of violence strengthened the influence of Arab extremists and intensified their campaign for adoption of the tactics successfully employed by their Egyptian and Syrian brothers. On April 20th, an Arab National Committee was formed at Nablus to advocate a strike in support of the demands presented to the High Commissioner on November 25, 1935. By the end of the month, similar committees had sprung up in every city and town and many of the villages. The strike, immediately approved by the coalition of Arab parties, became a reality on April 22nd with a general cessation of Arab business and labor. To direct it and represent the nationalists in their relations with the government, a new organ, the Arab Higher Committee,⁴⁹ was created under the presidency of Haj Amin al-Husaini. This body represented a working union not only of the five affiliated political groups, but also of the Indepen-

dence Party and the Moslem religious interests headed by the Mufti of Jerusalem. It acted, moreover, as a central and permanent Executive for the local National Committees. As the official spokesman of the Arab movement, it formally stated the objectives of the strike as: (1) the stoppage of Jewish immigration; (2) the prohibition of transfers of Arab land to Jews; and (3) the establishment of a national government responsible to a representative legislative council. It also indicated that the strike would continue until, by prohibition of immigration, the British government evinced a disposition to alter its policy.⁵⁰ By this declaration the Arabs virtually rejected the proposed legislative council and delivered an ultimatum to the administration on the matter of immigration.

The High Commissioner attempted at first to deal with the Arabs on the basis of the earlier legislative council negotiations. On May 5th, he warned the members of the Higher Committee against perpetrating or encouraging illegal acts and advised them to send the promised delegation to London. In their reply, the Arabs expressed regret that violence was accompanying the strike but refused to end it or to undertake any negotiations in London until Jewish immigration had been suspended.⁵¹ This attitude led to a complete impasse, for the home government, apparently determined not to lay itself open to new League of Nations criticisms by halting immigration in the face of Arab violence, immediately rejected the demand for its suspension.⁵²

On May 8th, a general congress of delegates from the local National Committees was assembled in Jerusalem to approve the activities of the central Executive. Its action in voting to continue the strike was expected, but a unanimously adopted resolution calling for civil disobedience in the form of non-payment of taxes after May 15th, unless by that time the government had prohibited Jewish immigration, flatly challenged the authority of the administration. Faced with this direct threat to public order, Wauchope asked for and received military reinforcements to strengthen the regular garrison and announced that disturbances would be promptly suppressed.⁵³

The government, however, hesitated to apply the force necessary to repress the disorders. The hope of reconciling Arab and Jewish interests and of carrying through the Wauchope program was still alive, and on May 13th the High Commissioner informed the Arab committee that as soon as order was restored the mandatory would establish a Royal Commission to investigate Arab grievances. Though the nationalist leaders again protested their inability to end the strike unless immigration was stopped, the government proceeded with its plans, and on May 18th the Colonial Secretary told Parliament that the cabinet intended to request the ap-

pointment of a Royal Commission, "which, without bringing into question the terms of the mandate, will investigate causes of unrest and alleged grievances either of Arabs or of Jews." He said that the commission might decide whether the mandate was being "fairly" interpreted, but that it would not be empowered to question the instrument itself. To avoid the appearance of a concession to violence, Thomas declared that civil order would have to be restored as a preliminary to the new investigations,⁵⁴ and on the same day the High Commissioner published a labor schedule of 4,500 certificates for the period of April to September, 1936.⁵⁵

The government's offer of an inquiry into the Palestine situation failed to restore order. Coupled as it was with a reaffirmation of the mandate and a refusal to halt immigration, it was inadequate to quiet the Arabs, but was sufficient to encourage them in their policy of violence. In May and June, therefore, the strike was made effective through persuasion and intimidation. Jewish colonies became objects of persistent sniping and their property was destroyed; the public roads became unsafe for travel, and armed bands of terrorists appeared in the hills.⁵⁶

As early as April 19th the High Commissioner had invoked the Palestine (Defense) Order-in-Council under which he might exercise extensive emergency powers for the preservation of domestic peace⁵⁷ and had enacted regulations authorizing the seizure and use of buildings and road transport, the imposition of curfews, the censorship of mail and the press, the deportation of undesirables, and unusual privileges of arrest and search.⁵⁸ Neither these powers nor the military reinforcements which began to arrive on May 10th, however, had been vigorously employed for the prevention of the growing disorder lest their use compromise attempts at a negotiated settlement. When it became clear that the offer of a Royal Commission was not going to restore peace, more vigorous methods of combating disorder were introduced, but even then they were instituted slowly and with the purpose of winning the Arabs to peaceful negotiation rather than of crushing what was rapidly becoming an armed revolt against the authority of the mandatory.

On May 23rd, more than sixty Arab agitators were arrested and placed under police supervision. In June, some of the more prominent leaders, including Auni Abdul-Hadi, the Secretary of the Higher Committee, were interned in a concentration camp. Measures such as these appeared merely to intensify Arab activity. Even drastic regulations providing for collective fines on villages and for the forfeiture and demolition of houses as a punishment upon an area whose unidentifiable inhabitants had committed a crime⁵⁹ failed to restore order. By the end of August the rebel bands had grown in size and boldness and had been joined by re-

cruits from the surrounding Arab lands. Conflicts with the British garrison were growing more frequent and terrorism was widespread.⁶⁰

Meanwhile, the disturbances in Palestine were engaging the attention of the neighboring Arab states where popular sympathy with the rebels was strong. The governments of Trans-Jordan and Iraq, bound to Great Britain by mandatory and treaty ties, found themselves in an embarrassing situation and sought to use their influence to secure a settlement as favorable as possible for the Palestine Arabs but also compatible with the British determination not openly to surrender to violence. On June 6th, and again on August 4th, Amir 'Abdullah met members of the Higher Committee in Amman and unsuccessfully sought to induce them to accept the offer of the Royal Commission and declare the strike at an end.⁶¹ Late in August Nuri es-Said, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, visited Jerusalem and attempted to act as intermediary between the government and the Higher Committee.⁶² His activities failed of their desired effect, but they were utilized by the Arab committee as a means both of emphasizing pan-Arab solidarity and of preparing a graceful and effective escape from the dilemma in which the government's continued rejection of its ultimatum on immigration must inevitably place it. In a manifesto issued on August 30th, the committee announced its readiness to accept the mediation of the Iraqi government and of the kings and princes of the neighboring Arab states, but called upon the people to continue the strike until such time as this intervention should "attain the desired result which will safeguard for this brave Nation its existence, secure for it its rights and the realization of its aspirations."⁶³

Late in May, 1936, the Colonial Office had come under the direction of William Ormsby-Gore, whose connection and sympathy with the Jewish national home dated from the First World War when he was British liaison officer with the Zionist Commission in Palestine. There was, however, no change in policy. On June 19th, the new Secretary of State assured the House of Commons that he believed a settlement satisfactory to both Arabs and Jews could be arranged within the framework of the mandate and declared that the Arab demands for stoppage of Jewish immigration, prohibition of land sales, and the creation of a national government "cannot possibly be conceded."⁶⁴ Over a month later, on July 29th, he announced the composition of the projected Royal Commission, a non-partisan body under the chairmanship of Earl Peel.⁶⁵

The policy of waiting more or less passively for a restoration of order in Palestine came to an end in September when the British government was aroused to more decisive action by the growing seriousness of the disorders and by their repercussions in the Arab

states. It was becoming clearly evident that an attempt to frame a policy could no longer be delayed on the assumption that the strike would collapse without a further straining of Anglo-Arab relations through the application of force. Though hope of an agreed settlement in Palestine was not given up, plans were made for the restoration of peace by the application of overwhelming military power. On September 2nd, the cabinet met to consider the situation and two days later the War Office announced plans for further reinforcement of the Palestine garrison.⁶⁶ On September 7th, the Colonial Office issued a statement of policy declaring that the mandate must be enforced and order restored, repeating that the Royal Commission would not enter upon its duties until peace had been reestablished, and announcing the dispatch of an entire division of regular army men and reservists under the command of Lieutenant General J. G. Dill who would replace the Air Force officer then commanding the garrison in Palestine and Trans-Jordan.⁶⁷ At the end of the month, the government enacted a new order-in-council to strengthen the Defense Order of 1931 and permit the imposition of martial law and the abrogation of appeals from military to civil courts.⁶⁸

Application of these elaborate measures for crushing the revolt was, however, delayed while the government made a final effort to induce the Higher Committee to restore peace voluntarily. On September 12th, Waichoape warned its members that drastic military action was planned, and urged them to bring the strike to a conclusion and issue an appeal for a cessation of violence. The district commissioners made similar requests to the local National Committees.⁶⁹ At that time there was considerable likelihood that these appeals would have a favorable reception. The threat of military action was dampening Arab enthusiasm and the strike was showing unmistakable signs of breaking as a result of economic exhaustion. It had never been so complete that business had entirely stopped, but the economic loss to the Arab community had been immense and, with the approach of the citrus season, Arab growers were making preparations to pick and ship as usual.⁷⁰ Moreover, the Arab rulers, with whom the Higher Committee had been in close contact since the failure of Nuri es-Said's attempted mediation, were advising peaceful acceptance of the British offer of a Royal Commission investigation as more likely to have a favorable outcome than a prolonged struggle against the military might of the British Empire.⁷¹

On October 8th, the Higher Committee received from King 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud a telegram announcing that the rulers of Sa'udi Arabia, Iraq, the Yemen and Trans-Jordan had agreed upon a request that it should end the strike and trust to the good

intentions of England. This was coupled with a promise of support for Arab aspirations in the Holy Land.⁷² Similar messages were received the next day from King Ghazi of Iraq and Amir 'Abdullah, and on October 11th the Higher Committee, glad of an opportunity to retreat from its position on immigration under cover of a burst of pan-Arab sentiment, published these telegrams and announced that the strike would end on October 12th.

The conclusion of the strike and the imminent arrival of the Royal Commission, which was announced on October 29th, fortified the Palestine administration in its desire to avoid measures whose stringency might add to Arab discontent. The military forces under General Dill, which by the end of September numbered about 20,000 soldiers,⁷³ were not therefore employed to their full capacity. Though order was gradually restored, the rebels in the hills were in many cases allowed to disband and their notorious leader, Fawzi ed-Din Kawukji, was permitted to escape into Trans-Jordan.⁷⁴ No concerted and effective effort to disarm the Arab population was made, despite the opportunity offered by the presence of the overwhelming military force temporarily stationed in Palestine.

The restrained policy of the government would have been justified had there been any basis for hope that an Arab-Jewish compromise might result from the activities of the Royal Commission. However, in view of Arab intransigence, neglect to crush the revolt held nothing but danger for the future by encouraging the nationalists to think they could defy Great Britain with impunity. The government's activities, nevertheless, had the temporary effect of restoring order and opening the way for the investigation of the Peel Commission.

THE ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT

When the Royal Commission arrived in Palestine on November 11, 1936, the uneasy political peace which succeeded the general strike was already at an end. The Arabs had come to persuade themselves that the conciliatory British government, once the danger of being charged with bowing to force had been removed, would suspend Jewish immigration pending the report of the commission. They therefore regarded themselves as quite aggrieved when, on November 5th, Ormsby-Gore informed Parliament that there would be no suspension and that the High Commissioner had approved a labor schedule of 1,800 certificates for the ensuing period.⁷⁵ The Jews, who had asked for a quota of 10,695 persons,⁷⁶ were disappointed with what they regarded as little more than a token grant, but were happy that the principle of continued immigration was acknowledged. The Higher Committee, however, announced that as long as Jewish immigration continued, no representative of the

nationalist movement would appear before the Royal Commission.

Despite this refusal of the Arabs to cooperate, Lord Peel and his colleagues began their work on November 12th and proceeded to accept evidence from the government and from Jewish spokesmen. When it became clear that the Arabs' boycott was having no effect other than to prevent the presentation of an authoritative version of their case, public opinion demanded its revocation. Moreover, the Arab princes brought pressure to bear upon the Palestine leaders. On January 6th, therefore, the Higher Committee published identic notes from Iraq and Sa'udi Arabia recommending the end of the boycott and announced that it had acceded to the wishes of its powerful friends and that the Arab case would be presented.⁷⁷ The Royal Commission, which had announced its departure for January 12th, thereupon postponed its return to England for a week to enable Arab evidence to be heard.

Though its terms of reference apparently bound it to restrict its recommendations to methods of applying the Palestine mandate to the satisfaction of both Arabs and Jews, the Peel Commission adopted from the outset a broad interpretation of its powers.⁷⁸ It therefore undertook an exhaustive investigation into the general situation. With a single sentence it swept away the theory of equality of mandatory obligations to Jews and Arabs when it said: "Unquestionably . . . the primary purpose of the Mandate, *as expressed in its preamble and its articles*, is to promote the establishment of the Jewish National Home."⁷⁹ It pointed out, however, that the mandate was predicated upon a supposition that the Palestine Arabs would accept the home and cooperate with their new Hebrew fellow-citizens, and declared that to enforce the mandatory program upon unwilling Arabs would alike violate British ideas of justice and the basic principles of the mandates system. In the absence of any evidence that the Arabs were prepared voluntarily to forego their objection to the national home, the commission reached the conclusion that the mandate had become unworkable and must be abrogated.

This decision, though valuable in clarifying the situation created by years of attempted compromise, did not of itself provide a basis for a positive policy. The commission was convinced that the aims of Jews and Arabs could not be reconciled in a single state. It could not, however, recommend the complete sacrifice of either. On the one hand, the commission realized that continued British support of the Hebrew home, even if only to prevent the subjection of the existing population to a hostile Arab government, would not satisfy the Moslem and Christian nationalists who insisted upon complete independence. Moreover, it recognized that if Arab

demands were not met, Great Britain would have to maintain military forces in Palestine and face the actual or potential enmity of the Arab and Moslem worlds. On the other hand, it saw that a grant of independence to an Arab majority, even with stringent guarantees for the rights of the Hebrew community, would leave fundamentally unprotected the Jews who had entered Palestine under British promises of security and that the Zionists could justly claim betrayal by the mandatory. "We cannot, in the present state of affairs," said the Royal Commission, "abandon them [the approximately 400,000 Jews in Palestine] to the good intentions of an Arab government."⁸⁰ If, then, compromise within a single state were impossible and rejection of the claims of either Arabs or Jews impracticable, the only alternative appeared to be some form of division which would allow separate development of the Jewish and Arab communities and the realization within limited scope of the ideals of each. This solution the Peel Commission adopted.

Since the commission did not conclude that the mandate was unworkable until relatively late in its investigations, it devoted the greater part of its report to fulfillment of the assigned task by suggesting means for improving the existing regime. It made clear, however, that it regarded these measures as insufficient to secure peace in the Holy Land. Of them it said:

They are the best palliatives we can devise for the disease from which Palestine is suffering, but they are only palliatives. They might reduce the inflammation and bring down the temperature, but they cannot cure the trouble. The disease is so deep rooted that, in our firm conviction, the only hope of a cure lies in a surgical operation.⁸¹

The suggestions included the creation of an international Arab Agency containing representatives of the neighboring states to balance the Jewish Agency, an elaborate scheme of agricultural development which would benefit both Arabs and Jews and regulate land purchases by the latter, the institution of a "political high level" for Jewish immigration which would give the administration power to limit the total number of entrants to 12,000 persons a year for five years, a greatly expanded educational program, a thorough revision of the legislation controlling local self-government, and abandonment of the plans for a legislative council.⁸² These proposals were, of course, simply an extension of the old plan of compromise and conciliatory compliance with subsidiary Arab demands which the commission itself announced had consistently failed over a nineteen-year period.

When it turned to consideration of a means of implementing its suggestions for abrogating the mandate, the commission became cognizant of a variety of schemes which had been placed before the public as possible solutions of the Palestine problem. These ranged

from acceptance of the Arab case for revocation of the Balfour Declaration and establishment of an Arab state with a permanent Jewish minority to strict enforcement of the mandate in the light of the Zionist interpretation of the Balfour promise and the speedy creation of a Jewish state with a dwindling Arab minority. Though many of the suggestions were based upon the theory that the creation of a unitary Arab-Jewish nation was still possible, there appeared to be a growing recognition of the fact that Arab and Jewish interests were essentially irreconcilable and that the effort to weld the two communities into a single whole must be abandoned. Those who held this view but still refused to admit that either the Jews or the Arabs would have to be sacrificed through the complete victory of their rivals were roughly divided into three groups. The first, in which many of the more moderate Jewish leaders were found, advocated various aspects of a plan whose basic features appeared to be the organization of Palestine into two culture groups—Arab and Jewish—somewhat on the design of the existent Hebrew community. Each of these would have the attributes of an autonomous but non-territorial state. Common interests would be managed by a federal government in the legislature of which the two communities would be equally represented regardless of differences in population.⁸³ The second group, doubtful of experiments in non-territorial states, advocated various schemes to which the common name of cantonization was given. In general, their plans provided for a Jewish province, including the coastal area north of Jaffa, the Plain of Esdraelon, and a detached region south of Jaffa where Jewish colonization had been most successful, and an Arab province (probably including Trans-Jordan) covering the rest of Palestine except Haifa, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and possibly other Moslem and Christian holy cities which would remain under British supervision. A large measure of autonomy would be given to the provincial governments, but matters of common interest would be controlled by a federal council composed of Arab, Jewish and British representatives.⁸⁴ The third group, scarcely vocal before the Royal Commission gave approval to its scheme, advocated outright partition and the creation of separate Jewish and Arab states with frontiers somewhat similar to those proposed for the provinces under the cantonization plan.

The Royal Commission quickly rejected the proposal for parity in a legislative council as impracticable and almost certain to be refused by the Arabs.⁸⁵ It was then faced with the alternatives of cantonization and partition. Finding that the former offered nearly all the difficulties of partition and still left unsatisfied the Arabs' demand for independence and the Jews' wish for complete freedom in the development of their own community, it decided to recom-

mend the division of Palestine and Trans-Jordan into three regions—a Jewish sovereign state including all of Palestine north of Beisan and the entire coastal region north of a point halfway between Jaffa and Gaza; an Arab state incorporating Trans-Jordan and the rest of Palestine; and an area under permanent British mandate which would include Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Lydda, Ramleh and a corridor to the sea at Jaffa.

The commission drafted its plan hurriedly and without expert advice on the technical matters involved. The specific suggestions it thought fit to make, however, revealed some of the difficulties likely to be encountered in carrying it into effect. A new League of Nations mandate was to be drafted for the Jerusalem district, and treaties were to be arranged with the Zionist Organization and some undetermined body representative of the Palestine and Trans-Jordan Arabs. These were to provide for the establishment of independent states, for strict minority guarantees, and for military alliances with Great Britain. It was further suggested that Nazareth, the Sea of Galilee, and an area at the head of the Gulf of 'Aqaba should be permanently attached to the Jerusalem district, and that Safad, Tiberias, Acre and Haifa should remain temporarily under mandatory administration. Jaffa was to be attached to the Arab state, though it would be surrounded by a band of mandated territory separating it from the two sections of the Jewish area. The Arab state, deprived of Jewish revenue and including poverty-stricken Trans-Jordan, was to be assisted by a subsidy from the Jewish government and an outright grant of 2,000,000 pounds from the British Exchequer. Finally, it was suggested that transfers of land and populations might prove necessary in an effort to reduce the large Arab minority in the Jewish area. The commission recommended that, during the transition period between the adoption of the plan and the creation of the new states, steps should be taken to prohibit purchases of land by Jews in prospectively Arab areas and to halt all further Jewish entry into them. In the Hebrew regions immigration might be limited, not by the "political high level" which would take account of Arab wishes, but solely by the principle of economic absorptive capacity.

In concluding its report, the commission noted that partition would assure the Jews of freedom to create their national home as they saw fit and of the possession of a sovereign state; and that it would offer the Arabs national independence, a subvention in recompense for their loss of territory, and freedom from the twin fears of Jewish ascendancy and Hebrew domination of their holy places.

Simultaneously with the publication of the Royal Commission report on July 7th, the government issued a White Paper announcing its adoption of the recommendation in favor of partition. This

statement, which on the surface seemed to indicate a complete reversal in British policy, declared:

In the light of experience and of the arguments adduced by the Commission they [the government] are driven to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of Arabs and Jews in Palestine, that these aspirations cannot be satisfied under the terms of the present Mandate, and that a scheme of partition on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock.

The statement went on to say that, until the projected new states were established, the mandate would be enforced and order maintained, and threatened that the High Commissioner would delegate his powers under the Defense Orders to the General Officer commanding in Palestine if serious disturbances again developed. It stated, however, that, pending completion of the details of a partition scheme, steps would be taken to prevent Jewish land purchases prejudicial to its probable terms and that for the period of August, 1937, to March, 1938, no more than 8,000 Jewish immigrants of all categories would be admitted to Palestine.⁸⁶ Already the government had sent a letter to the League of Nations requesting that the Permanent Mandates Commission be asked to study the Peel report and to submit a recommendation in view of its suggested solution of the Palestine problem.⁸⁷

The alteration of policy which these actions marked was startling. Insistence that the mandate was enforceable and the interests of Jews and Arabs compatible was suddenly given up in favor of recognition that the mandate was unworkable and the rival interests irreconcilable. However, no fundamental change had occurred. A compromising effort to meet the demands of both the Arabs and the Jews remained the basis of British policy. It was still hoped that the aspirations of both groups might be satisfied within the Holy Land.

THE WOODHEAD COMMISSION REPORT

The White Paper of July, 1937, apparently portended the immediate creation of a technical commission to draft a detailed plan of partition. Nearly a year passed, however, before the new investigating body visited Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the government's program encountered serious and widespread opposition, local disturbances were renewed in Palestine, and the impossibility of evolving a feasible plan of partition became evident.

The Peel report and the July White Paper were received by the British press without enthusiasm but with a feeling that they offered a means by which British obligations to Arabs and Zionists might be discharged and the friendship of both retained.⁸⁸ In Jewish and Arab circles, however, their reception was generally unfavorable. At the end of April, the Zionist Executive had issued a

statement announcing that its organization would oppose any attempt to curtail Jewish rights, to crystallize the national home, or to reduce its territory by partition or cantonization.⁸⁹ In the spirit of this uncompromising resolution, the Jewish Agency protested that the palliatives suggested by the Royal Commission were contrary to the mandate and attacked the partition scheme as a breach of the Balfour Declaration which had promised a national home in the whole of Palestine.⁹⁰ The Higher Committee announced its intention to consult the Arab princes before making any official reply to the White Paper, but Moslem-Christian opinion showed itself strongly opposed to losing the fertile valleys and the citrus lands of the coast and especially resentful over the attribution to the projected Jewish state of the hill region of Galilee where about 96 per cent of the population were Arabs.

On July 11th, the National Defense Party, which had dissociated itself from the Higher Committee, issued a statement rejecting partition as incompatible with Arab aspirations.⁹¹ King Ghazi of Iraq informed the Higher Committee that he regarded the Royal Commission plan with disfavor, while his Prime Minister announced uncompromising opposition to partition and, in a warning aimed apparently at 'Abdullah, who might expect to become king of the projected Arab state and who had advised careful study of the proposal, threatened that the effective displeasure of the Arabic world would fall upon anyone who agreed to serve as head of the new country.⁹² The enthusiasm evoked by Iraqi support for the campaign against partition was scarcely dampened by a non-committal reply from 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, and on July 23rd the Higher Committee formally rejected partition and reiterated demands for independence, cessation of the national home experiment, and, pending the negotiation of an Anglo-Arab treaty, the complete suspension of Jewish immigration and land purchases.⁹³

The government's proposal, rejected at first by both Jews and Arabs and receiving only mild support from British public opinion, met further opposition at the hands of Parliament and the Permanent Mandates Commission. The cabinet had announced a major decision on policy and had sought League of Nations approval of its action before it afforded Parliament an opportunity to express an opinion on the Royal Commission report. When the matter came up for debate in the House of Lords on July 20th and 21st, the government was subjected to severe attack. More important, the practicability of the proposed plan of partition received telling blows from the Labor spokesmen, Lord Snell and Lord Strabolgi, while Viscount (formerly Sir Herbert) Samuel ridiculed the scheme of corridors and enclaves with the remark that "The Commission seem to have gone to the Versailles Treaty and picked out

all the most awkward provisions it contained.”⁹⁴ The question was not brought to a vote in the upper chamber, but on July 21st Ormsby-Gore introduced in the House of Commons a resolution asking formal approval of the government’s new policy which, he pointed out, did not commit it to the details of the Royal Commission’s proposals but only to the principle of partition. This action precipitated an acrimonious debate during which the project for the division of Palestine received scathing criticism and the Labor Party demanded a Joint Select Committee to study the Peel report. Finally, Winston Churchill, who had announced that he could not support the government, suggested a compromise whereby the cabinet would be authorized to seek League of Nations approval of partition as a necessary preliminary to the drafting of a definitive plan for submission to the House of Commons. To this proposal, which left Parliament entirely unpledged to even the principle of a divided Palestine, Ormsby-Gore and the Labor leadership agreed and a resolution on those lines was adopted.⁹⁵

At the end of July, the Colonial Secretary appeared before an extraordinary session of the Permanent Mandates Commission and announced the failure of conciliatory efforts to secure Arab acceptance of the mandatory provisions for the establishment of a Jewish national home. Declaring that the government had adopted tripartite division as the most hopeful solution of the Palestine problem, he unfolded a project for the establishment of a technical body to draft a detailed plan and asked that the Mandates Commission recommend Council approval of the British scheme.⁹⁶ The League commission, however, was loath to commit itself. Prefacing its report with a suggestion that the mandate might not have proved unworkable had Great Britain applied a firmer and more consistent policy, it grudgingly conceded that it would be desirable to examine a plan of partition which “should . . . deprive the Arabs of as small a number as possible of the places to which they attach particular value, either because they are their present homes or for reasons of religion” and should allot to the Jews areas “sufficiently . . . well situated from the point of view of communications by sea and land to be capable of intensive economic development and consequently of dense and rapid settlement.” It announced its opposition, however, to the immediate creation of nominally independent countries on the ground that they would be economically and politically unprepared to sustain the position of sovereign states and members of the League of Nations. It suggested for the embryo countries a period of apprenticeship which might be served under the form either of provisional cantonization within a single mandate or of separate mandates.⁹⁷

Though the report of the Mandates Commission was not highly

encouraging, the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, proceeded in September, 1937, to request authority from the League Council for the preparation of a scheme envisaging a threefold division of Palestine. The sub-committee which reported on the matter recommended compliance with this request but urged that the Council reaffirm the efficacy of the existing mandate until it was formally abrogated and take note of the fact that the proposed limitation on Jewish immigration was a purely temporary measure. On these lines the Council agreed to an investigation of partition but reserved full freedom of action to reject any plan which might be presented.⁹⁸

The government gained scant comfort from the grudging assent given to its proposal by Parliament and the League of Nations. It found little more in the action taken in August by the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency. Weizmann, who understood that the British government, whatever its legal obligations, was no longer prepared to enforce strictly the national home provisions of the mandate at the expense of constant unrest in Palestine and growing enmity on the part of the Arab states, urged the delegates to the Twentieth Zionist Congress at Zurich to accept partition in principle. He admitted that the Peel proposals were unsatisfactory but pointed out that a small Jewish state would be preferable to minority status in the larger area of a hostile Arab nation. Supported by the Labor bloc, he secured by a vote of 300 to 158 the passage of resolutions which, on the one hand, demanded fulfillment of the mandate, protested against the curtailment of immigration, and rejected the details of the Peel proposals, but, on the other hand, authorized the Executive to enter into negotiations with the British government to ascertain the precise terms to be advanced for the creation of a Jewish state.⁹⁹ At the subsequent meeting of the Jewish Agency Council, the American non-Zionists, led by Felix Warburg, opposed sovereignty in Palestine on the ground that it would endanger the position of assimilated Jews abroad. Weizmann, however, procured adoption of the Zionist resolution tempered by a request that the British government convene an Arab-Jewish conference to seek a solution within the terms of the mandate.¹⁰⁰

At most, the government's efforts had succeeded in securing limited agreement to the principle of partition from Parliament, the League of Nations and the Jews. The fourth party to any settlement—the Arabs—had made no concessions. Observers in Palestine were inclined to feel that the moderates, particularly of the Nashashibi faction, might agree to a divided land if the government showed its absolute determination to carry through such a program.¹⁰¹ The Mufti of Jerusalem, however, who had

been one of the most active opponents of the government during the general strike, was adamant against any surrender of Arab territory to the Jews. Since the administration retained him in his influential position as head of the Supreme Moslem Council and the General Waqf Committee, many of his supporters and enemies alike suspected that it was not truly desirous of seeing partition carried into effect. Moreover, expressions of sympathy from the neighboring countries strengthened the hands of the enemies of the Royal Commission plan. At a pan-Arab congress held in September at Bludan under the auspices of the Syrian Committee for the Defense of Palestine, the delegates heard their presiding officer, a former Prime Minister of Iraq, refer to Zionism as a cancer which ought to be removed from the body politic and hint at the possibility that the Arab states might sever their British and French relations in favor of a new connection, presumably Italian. Fervent appeals to the world's 400,000,000 Moslems to support their Palestine brothers in preserving the sanctity of the Islamic holy places marked the sessions.¹⁰² By the end of September, Arab opinion in Palestine had hardened into opposition to partition and the leaders were threatening to boycott any commission established to prepare a detailed scheme.¹⁰³

Meanwhile, the state of public security was steadily deteriorating. Despite reductions in the garrison in the winter of 1936-37, the military force at the disposal of the administration should have been sufficient to preserve order. However, the obstacles which the hill country offered to military maneuvers as well as clandestine aid given the terrorists made the suppression of scattered disorders and guerilla attacks an extremely difficult task. The government was persistent, moreover, in maintaining the hitherto unsuccessful policy of restraint in dealing with Arab violence. A brief period of peace which followed the issuance of the July White Paper was succeeded by renewed Arab disturbances as an expression of opposition to partition. Beginning in the last ten days of July, they reached a climax on September 26th when L. Y. Andrews, District Commissioner for Galilee, and his police escort were assassinated in Nazareth.¹⁰⁴ This direct attack upon British authority awakened the administration to a belated policy of severity which tended to create martyrs for the Arab cause without altering the now fixed opposition to partition.

On September 30, 1937, the administration, acting under emergency powers conferred by a new Defense Order-in-Council,¹⁰⁵ enacted regulations allowing the government to detain political deportees in any part of the British Empire and authorizing the High Commissioner to outlaw associations whose objectives he regarded as contrary to public policy.¹⁰⁶ Simultaneously, announce-

ment was made of the removal of Haj Amin al-Husaini as head of the Supreme Moslem Council and the General Waqf Committee and of the proscription of the local National Committees and the Arab Higher Committee.¹⁰⁷ On the following day the government let it be known that warrants had been issued for the arrest and deportation of six Arab leaders among whom was Jamal al-Husaini, the head of the Mufti's party. Four of these persons were already in custody and a fifth was soon apprehended. Jamal, however, escaped to Syria. In explanation of this step the government charged that the arrested Arabs were "morally responsible" for recent acts of terrorism and violence.¹⁰⁸ The deportees were sent to the Seychelles and Haj Amin, who suspected that he would be the next object of deportation proceedings, went into hiding in the Haram esh Sharif and soon fled to the Lebanon, where he established in the vicinity of Beirut a center for international agitation against the British regime in Palestine and particularly against the partition plan.

The government's attacks upon the Arab organization resulted in a momentary lull in acts of violence directed against the Jews, the government, and moderate Arabs whose support of the nationalists' demands appeared inadequate to the extremists. In mid-October, however, a revival of terrorism occurred on a larger scale. The new civil airport at Lydda was attacked and its buildings burned, the oil pipeline from Mosul to Haifa was several times seriously damaged, and Jewish forests were destroyed by Arab arsonists. To meet this new wave of violence, the administration established military courts to deal with cases arising out of the disturbances, increased the severity of other restrictive measures, and toward the end of December launched extensive military operations in the northern hills against the rebel bands which were again receiving recruits and arms from across the Syrian frontier.¹⁰⁹ A momentary improvement in the situation ushered in the new year, but the first half of 1938 was marked by continued acts of violence which the authorities proved themselves unable to prevent.

Meanwhile, as a preliminary to the ultimate application of the Peel Commission's plan, Jewish immigration was curtailed. In October the draft of a new ordinance was published which would have made control over immigration more stringent and given effect to the July White Paper's decision in favor of temporary limitations on entry into Palestine. Under its terms, the High Commissioner was given power to prescribe the aggregate immigration and to fix the maximum and the proportion of Jews in each category of entrants.¹¹⁰ The Jewish Agency protested that this ordinance would give an admittedly temporary provision, which was contrary to the principle of economic absorptive capac-

ity, the status of permanent law and that it was contrary to mandatory provisions for fostering Jewish immigration and the prevention of racial or religious discrimination. As a result, the bill was modified by deletion of the clause relative to limiting the proportion of Jews, and the entire provision was made terminable on March 31, 1938, or on such later date as the High Commissioner might set with the approval of the Colonial Secretary.¹¹¹ Under this enactment the government authorized for the period of August, 1937, to March, 1938, an aggregate immigration of 9,600 persons of whom 1,780, entering Palestine between October, 1937, and March, 1938, might fall into the labor category.¹¹²

Aside from the new restrictions on immigration and an official announcement that the technical commission would be established, the British government gave little indication of an intention to adhere to the partition scheme in the face of continued Arab opposition. Appointment of the new body was delayed from month to month, apparently in the hope that peace would be restored and that some group of representative Arabs would follow the lead of the Jewish Agency and accept at least the principle of partition. Finally, however, on January 4, 1938, the terms of reference of the commission were published. They required it to recommend for the proposed Arab and Jewish areas boundaries that would afford prospect of the eventual establishment of independent states and necessitate the inclusion of the smallest number of Arabs in the Hebrew area and of Jews in the Arab area, and to report upon the economic and financial questions involved in partition. It was to consider the proposal of the Royal Commission, but was to retain full liberty to suggest modifications of that plan.¹¹³ Two additional months passed before the selection of three of its members was announced,¹¹⁴ and it was not until April 27th that the commission, under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead, arrived in Jerusalem.

During May, June and July, while the commissioners were conducting their investigations, local disorders continued and a strict boycott was enforced against their efforts to secure evidence from the Arab nationalists. The period which followed their return to England was marked by even greater unrest, for Jewish extremists began to take matters into their own hands in fighting Arab terrorism; and the Arab campaign against the national home and the mandate developed into guerilla warfare of alarming proportions. While the Czechoslovak crisis prevented a further strengthening of the British garrison, the situation steadily deteriorated until in October the authorities abandoned to the rebels most of the Old City of Jerusalem. Rural districts were infested with partisan bands, and many towns and villages were entirely lost to British control.

As soon as the Munich Accord had restored temporary peace to Europe, reinforcements were rushed to the Holy Land and the High Commissioner authorized the General Officer commanding the forces to appoint military officials to supersede the civil authorities in the enforcement of order under the various emergency and defense regulations.¹¹⁵ As a result of the reoccupation of the Old City and extensive field operations, a semblance of order was restored to the towns, but terrorism was scarcely checked in rural areas.¹¹⁶

The situation in Europe during the summer of 1938, when England and France were ranged against Germany and Italy over the tense Czechoslovak affair, incited the Palestine Arabs to violence and prevented the British government from applying sterner measures of suppression. It also served to emphasize the importance to the British Empire of Arab friendship and so to give added weight to the protests against partition which continued to come from Iraq and Egypt. Early in October, the Iraqi Foreign Minister presented to the Colonial Secretary his government's arguments against partition,¹¹⁷ and the Egyptian Parliamentary Committee for the Defense of Palestine assembled in Cairo a new pan-Arab congress which demanded self-government for the inhabitants of an unpartitioned Palestine and abandonment of the national home policy.¹¹⁸ In mid-September an official spokesman had assured the Council of the League of Nations that the government adhered to the principle of partition.¹¹⁹ By October, however, it was generally conceded that the Woodhead Commission would report unfavorably on any scheme to divide Palestine and that the government would accept its conclusions. Both Wauchope, who had espoused a policy of compromise for the creation of a unitary state, and Ormsby-Gore, who was identified with the partition scheme in which he had seen a possible means of reconciling support for a strong Jewish national home and recognition of imperial interest in Arab friendship, had been replaced—Wauchope by Sir Harold MacMichael, formerly Governor of Tanganyika, and Ormsby-Gore by Malcolm MacDonald, the Dominion Secretary. Thus the way seemed clear for a second change in policy.

On November 9, 1938, the Woodhead report was presented to Parliament. As expected, it announced in effect that no plan of partition could be evolved which would offer much hope of successful application. It showed that under the Peel proposals the Jewish state would have a population of 304,900 Jews and 294,700 Arabs, or an Arab minority of 49 per cent, and that the Jews would possess 1,140,200 dunums of land and the Arabs 3,854,700 dunums.¹²⁰ Under these circumstances, with an exchange of populations excluded by the small number of Jews left to the Arab

state, the Jewish-Arab problem, even assuming the Arabs outside did not regard the Hebrew state as an irredenta, would not have been solved but merely transferred to a smaller area. The commission therefore decided that the Peel plan was impracticable and presented two possible alternatives for consideration in case the government determined to adhere to some form of partition. Under the first (Plan B), the Jewish state would be reduced in size by the addition of Galilee to the permanently mandated area and of the southern part of the region south of Jaffa to the Arab state. Under the second (Plan C), the Hebrew area would be limited to the coastal region between Zikhron Ya'akov and Rehovot, while northern Palestine, including the Plain of Esdraelon, and all the semi-arid region of southern Palestine would be placed under separate mandates. To unoccupied areas in the southern mandate, Jews would be admitted provided the land could be made suitable for settlement. Two members of the commission favored Plan C, one favored Plan B, and one declared flatly that no practicable plan of partition could be devised.¹²¹

Turning to details, the commission found that no division could be made which would both include few Arabs in the Jewish state and allow it space for the absorption of numerous immigrants. It reported that both Jews and Arabs were opposed to partition and that there were no defensible frontiers west of the Jordan. Finding that, while a Jewish state would be economically self-sufficient, no Palestinian Arab state deprived of Jewish areas could possibly be so,¹²² it calculated that Parliament would probably have to provide 1,250,000 pounds a year in support of the Arab and mandated regions aside from the cost of defense.¹²³ Finally, it reported that any economic division within Palestine would mark the ruin of the agricultural Arab state and would place a severe limitation upon the development of the industrial and commercial Jewish area. It therefore recommended an enforced economic union, though it recognized that this would effectively deprive the new states of sovereign powers.¹²⁴

The arguments against partition appeared so convincing and the suggested plans so little likely to commend themselves to the Arabs, the Jews or the British government, that the Colonial Office had no difficulty in announcing, in the White Paper which accompanied the publication of the Woodhead report, that the commission's investigations had "shown that the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable." The new statement of policy then proceeded to suggest that an Arab-Jewish agreement might still be possible and announced that representatives

of the Palestine Arabs and the neighboring states and of the Jewish Agency would shortly be invited to London to confer with the government. It warned, however, that, if no agreement were forthcoming within a reasonable period, the mandatory would be obliged to impose a settlement.¹²⁵

This new statement merely bowed to the inevitable in recognizing the impracticability of partition and putting an end to its further official consideration. Superficially regarded, a division of Palestine between Arabs and Jews seemed designed to satisfy both. Actually, even if it had been possible to secure Arab assent to such a scheme, partition would have created two small, uneconomic states, lacking adequate frontiers and plagued by inconvenient corridors and enclaves. Moreover, the Jews would have regarded themselves as betrayed by Great Britain and the Arabs would have continued their hostility against the protector of a Hebrew Palestine which they would have regarded as an Arabian irredenta. Stationed in the Jerusalem mandate, Britain would have appeared to both Jews and Arabs as the upholder of a detestable *status quo*. It was quite as impossible to settle the Palestine problem by dividing the Holy Land as by creating a unitary state out of the antagonistic Hebrew and Arab nationalities. Nevertheless, it is probable that such an attempt would have been made in an effort to reconcile the Balfour Declaration with the desire to avoid coercion of the non-Hebrew Palestinians and the need to retain Arab friendship. The intransigence of the Palestine nationalists and their foreign brethren, however, convinced the British government that nothing would cause them voluntarily to acquiesce in a scheme of partition, and in the fall of 1938 the application of force to fulfill a program abhorrent to the Arab and Moslem worlds was unthinkable. Partition was therefore abandoned, but the policy of compromise was still not surrendered.

Wartime Problems and Policies

THE British government was impelled by the increasing danger of war in Europe to seek a settlement in Palestine which would strengthen its position among the Arab and Moslem peoples of the East. Yet it could not abandon the Jewish community to the animosity of the Arabs. Consequently, when the London Conference, summoned in accordance with the terms of the White Paper of November, 1938, failed to produce any basis for an understanding, the cabinet decided to issue a new statement of policy. The MacDonald White Paper followed the lines of earlier attempts at compromise, but went further in the effort to satisfy Arab demands. It provided for a virtual cessation of growth within the Jewish national home after five years, and foreshadowed the creation of a self-governing Palestinian state having an Arab majority. Nevertheless it postponed independence until such time as the Arab and Jewish communities demonstrated a capacity for peaceful cooperation.

The outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany in September, 1939, and the spread of hostilities to almost every part of Europe and to North Africa, brought an end to the Palestine disturbances but added to the complexities of the underlying situation. The number of Jewish refugees seeking asylum in the Holy Land was increased. Arab good will became still more important for the preservation of the empire and the survival of England. German and Italian propagandists found in the Palestine imbroglio fruitful material for use in their effort to employ pan-Arab sentiment against Great Britain. In meeting these conditions, the English government clung to the MacDonald policy. But even though restrictions were placed upon Jewish immigration and land purchases, the fulfillment of the hopes of Arab nationalists for independence remained remote.

The White Paper of November, 1938, brought no peace to Palestine where the prolonged disturbances following the Arab general

strike were sapping the foundations of commercial and industrial prosperity, and terrorism and violence were rampant. Even if the mandatory had announced a definite program and taken immediate steps to carry it into effect, months of intensive effort would have been necessary to restore order to the distracted country and to suppress the guerillas whose interest in banditry was at least as great as their attachment to the nationalist cause. Without any plan other than that of an Arab-Jewish conference, the administration was handicapped at the outset and its continued attempts to reestablish its authority were largely unsuccessful.¹

While the economic life of the country stagnated and unemployment mounted, the financial position of the government rapidly deteriorated. Reduced revenues and the enormously increased expenditures for public safety had, by the close of the financial year 1937-38, seriously depleted the treasury surplus.² Under these circumstances the British government arranged to assume full responsibility for the expenses of the garrison, to which Palestine had been contributing the excess cost of maintenance outside the British Isles.³ Despite the relief afforded by this measure, however, a considerable drain on Palestinian resources continued through the necessity of maintaining large local defense forces of police and watchmen.⁴

Economic stringency and lack of security rendered the Holy Land less attractive to Jewish immigrants than it had been before 1936, but the growing severity of anti-Semitic legislation in Germany and depressed conditions in the ghettos of eastern Europe drove the Jews of those areas to seek refuge elsewhere. With restrictive laws closing the doors of almost every civilized land, necessity and the lure of the national home caused masses of wanderers to seek entry into Palestine despite reductions in the economic absorptive capacity of the land and the resolute opposition of the Arabs. On March 10, 1938, Ormsby-Gore instructed MacMichael to extend the temporary immigration legislation until March 31, 1939.⁵ Though it was not employed to set an aggregate figure for immigration as in the preceding eight months, the categories of students and close dependents of residents and immigrants being left unlimited, quotas were established for all other classifications. For the year April, 1938, to March, 1939, authorization was given for the entry of only 4,120 persons in the capitalist class and 2,300 laborers.⁶ Despite all restrictions, however, 12,868 Jews entered Palestine legally in 1938, an increase of more than 2,000 persons from the low of the preceding year.⁷ Illegal immigration considerably swelled this figure and Arab opposition to further Jewish arrivals was thus kept alive. It was officially estimated that at the end of 1938 the Hebrew population consisted of 411,000 persons, or

slightly more than 28.6 per cent of the total population of 1,435,000.⁸

THE LONDON CONFERENCE

Superimposed upon continued disorder and economic depression in Palestine were preparations for the London Conference. The November White Paper originally brought satisfaction to neither Jews nor Arabs. The former protested that the government, in repudiating partition, had not reaffirmed the mandate, and the Jewish Agency announced that it could not enter any negotiation which did not have as its basis the Balfour Declaration and the mandatory instrument.⁹ The Arabs complained that their demands were still being thwarted and expressed fear that their exiled leaders would be excluded from the conference.¹⁰ On November 10th, Malcolm MacDonald endeavored to clarify the situation by announcing in the House of Commons that representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Sa'udi Arabia, the Yemen, Trans-Jordan and Palestine would be invited to London but that the government would refuse to receive the Mufti of Jerusalem. He went on to explain that it was proposed at first to hold separate conversations with the Arab and the Jewish delegates, though ultimately these might develop into a round-table discussion. Finally, he said that the government would enter the conferences bound by the mandate, but that there would be no endeavor to bar suggestions for its modification.¹¹ These last statements brought little pleasure to the Zionists, worried over restrictions on the national home provisions, and they proved insufficient to satisfy the Palestine Arabs who began to clamor for the appointment as their delegates of the leaders interned in the Seychelles.¹²

The representatives from the Arab states were chosen fairly promptly, and the Jewish Agency made arrangements to receive the assistance of both Zionist and non-Zionist Jews from the United States, Great Britain and Palestine in the presentation of its case. By the second week in December it was expected that the conference would assemble in mid-January. The choice of Palestine delegates, however, proved a source of friction and vexatious delays. In the absence of any legal body representative of the Arab population, the delegation necessarily had to be self-appointed and a bitter quarrel between the Nashashibis and the Husainis developed. From Egypt, where he had sought refuge from Husaini-inspired terrorism, Ragheb Nashashibi directed a campaign to convince the government that the National Defense Party reflected the wishes of more than half the Arab population and should be strongly represented at London. In Beirut the exiled Haj Amin al-Husaini endeavored to revive the Higher Committee which he claimed was representative of all but a minute fraction of Arab opinion and should have the

sole right of speaking in its name.¹³ The British government would, no doubt, have preferred to deal with delegates of the moderate Nashashibi party rather than with those of the radical and embittered Mufti, but it could not close the conference to the delegates of the five Arab parties represented in the Husaini-guided coalition of the Higher Committee. The Seychelles deportees were therefore released and allowed to proceed to the Lebanon to consult the Mufti.¹⁴

The Arab leaders who met in Beirut with Haj Amin finally decided upon the composition of a delegation from which all Nashashibi partisans were eliminated. Though British pressure and the more moderate counsels of the Arab state delegates assembled in Cairo persuaded the Mufti to admit two Nashashibi representatives, they were to be chosen by the Higher Committee. When their names were announced, it was discovered that one was too ill to travel and that the second had recently withdrawn from the Defense Party to join the Husainis.¹⁵ Ragheb Nashashibi therefore rejected this suggested compromise and demanded that half the Palestine delegates should be appointees of the Defense Party. Failing to secure assent to this, he announced on February 1st that a separate delegation of three members and an adviser would be sent to London.¹⁶ The British government was perforce obliged to agree to receive it. Thus a temporary settlement was reached on the eve of the opening in St. James Palace of the long-delayed conference.

The conversations which began on February 7th gave little promise of success. The Arabs declined to sit with the Jews, while the Mufti's partisans refused to meet the Nashashibi representatives. The British delegation, composed of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, and Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald, was thus obliged to carry on three simultaneous negotiations. Even after the British and Arab state delegates succeeded in getting two Nashashibi partisans accepted by the Mufti, there was no sign of Arab-Jewish rapprochement. The Jewish Agency spokesman, Dr. Weizmann, asked for fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration and expressed the opinion that there was opportunity for Arab-Jewish cooperation because, while the Jews could not agree to any foreign domination, they had no wish to impose Hebrew control upon the Arabs. He asked for a program which would promise observation of "the Mandate, implemented in spirit and in letter; large-scale Jewish immigration in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity principle; active development [of the country's material resources]; and effective safeguards against minority status."¹⁷ Jamal al-Husaini, speaking for the Arabs, declared that the mandate violated the McMahon pledges to Husain and the League of Nations Covenant, and reiterated Arab

refusals to recognize either the Balfour Declaration or the mandatory instrument. He demanded acknowledgment of the Arabs' rights to independence in their own land of Palestine, abandonment of the attempt to establish a Jewish national home in Arab territory, abrogation of the mandate and recognition of a sovereign Arab state in treaty relationship with Great Britain, and the immediate cessation of all Jewish immigration and land purchases. He explained, however, that the Arabs were prepared to concede all "legitimate" minority rights to the Jewish community already resident in the Holy Land.¹⁸ These statements clearly revealed the irreconcilable nature of Jewish and Arab demands. There could be no room for compromise when any concession that might be made was bound to strike at the roots either of Zionism's ideal of a growing and unfettered national home or of Arab nationalism's central dogma, the sovereign independence of the "Arab lands."

Despite the obvious impossibility of a successful outcome, the conference dragged along until March 17th. During the early sessions, the Arab delegates' insistence upon an examination of the McMahon correspondence resulted in its official publication¹⁹ but not in any agreed interpretation of its terms. The committee appointed to report upon it was obliged to announce that the Arab members adhered to the belief that Palestine had been included in the area assured of its independence, while the British members maintained that it had not.²⁰ Discussions of wartime promises could lead to nothing but the conclusion that both Jews and Arabs had been encouraged to different degrees and at various times to expect that their aspirations would be fulfilled in Palestine. The government therefore abandoned this topic and turned its attention to practical efforts to solve the Palestine deadlock.

Though willing to admit, when partition seemed to offer a chance of meeting the demands of both Jews and Arabs, that their aims were irreconcilable within a single state, the government refused to reaffirm this theory once the possibility of a mutually satisfactory settlement in a divided Palestine had vanished. Loath to break the Balfour pledge, to offend the powerful supporters of Zionism, and to abandon the Jews already in the Holy Land, but even more unwilling in view of the world situation to coerce the Palestine Arabs contrary to democratic theories of self-determination and to strain relations with the Arab and Moslem peoples of the East, the British cabinet swung back to the old theory that some means of compromise must be found. Since the Moslems and Christians were the aggressive element in the Palestine disturbances and the friendship of the Arab states appeared more vital to the empire than that of the Zionists, it was natural that compromise should take the form of the largest concessions to Arab demands short of complete re-

nunciation of the Balfour Declaration and abandonment of the national home.

Rumors that the British delegation would soon formally present a plan for the gradual establishment of self-government leading to independence and for restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchases to keep the Jews in a permanent minority were current before the end of February.²¹ On March 8th, the cabinet approved the outlines of a scheme embodying these ideas and decided that, if it were not accepted as a basis for discussion, the conference would be brought to an end and a British plan of settlement enforced.²² On March 13th a cabinet committee approved the final details, and two days later the British proposals were laid before the various delegates. They provided for a Palestine state which was to receive independence after an indeterminate period the length of which would depend upon the ability displayed by Arabs and Jews in the joint operation of national institutions. At the beginning, Jewish and Arab representatives would be nominated to the Advisory and Executive councils, in the former of which they would outnumber the British members. Later, a legislature would be elected from the various communities in proportion to their population and the heads of departments would be replaced by Palestinians. Finally, a national assembly would be summoned to draft a constitution for the independent state which would then enter into an alliance with Great Britain similar to that existing between the United Kingdom and Iraq. The constitution would provide for minority guarantees and, it was suggested, might establish a federal system of Jewish and Arab cantons. Jewish immigration was to be limited to 75,000 persons for five years, subject always to the economic absorptive capacity of the country. Areas in which the purchase of land by Jews would be unrestricted, limited and prohibited, respectively, would be demarcated.²³

Most of the proposals in the British plan had already been discussed during the conference and were known to be unacceptable to both the Jews and the Palestine Arabs. Though there had been some possibility that they might be accepted by the delegates from the Arab states, whose approval of British policy the government was desirous of securing, Jamal al-Husaini on March 17th rejected the plan as unsatisfactory, and the Arab state representatives acquiesced in the decision of their Palestine brethren. In his speech of refusal, Jamal asked for a fixed period of apprenticeship leading to independence and the complete stoppage of immigration and land sales. The Jewish Agency also rejected the proposal, acting in harmony with previous declarations that no scheme envisaging minority status for the Jews could form the basis of a suitable settlement.²⁴ The London Conference thus came to an end, having had no result

other than to emphasize the irreconcilable opposition of Arab and Zionist objectives.

THE MACDONALD WHITE PAPER

The unsuccessful outcome of the London Conference forced the British government to prepare its own plan of settlement for Palestine. An announcement of policy was expected immediately, but German seizure of Bohemia and Moravia, followed shortly by Italian occupation of Albania, resulted in postponement of work on the new state paper. An opportunity was thus given for further negotiation and for the proponents of various schemes to come forward with suggestions. The advocates of communal autonomy and parity in national political life again became vocal, as did the supporters of cantonization. In elaboration of both plans, it was suggested that Britain and France might unite to foster the creation of a Syro-Palestinian federation in which either a binational Palestine composed of autonomous communities or a separate Jewish canton might find a place beside the Maronite Lebanon. It was hoped that, in return for the gift of a united Syria stretching from Turkey to Egypt, the Arabs, freed from their fear of being swamped in a Hebrew state, might agree to a growing Jewish national home as a partner in their predominantly Arab federation.²⁵ This ingenious scheme, despite its economic and geographic basis in the essential unity of Syria and Palestine, would hardly have disarmed the well-established hostility of the Palestine Arabs to seeing part of their land become the national home of the Jews. A more immediate and serious objection, however, was French disinclination to consider such a plan.²⁶ Despite the Anglo-French alliance in Europe, rivalry in the Levant was still keen.

These suggestions for communal autonomy and cantonization found little favor with the government. Further inconclusive efforts were made to secure acceptance by the Arab states and the Palestine nationalists of some scheme along the general lines of the plan presented to the London Conference,²⁷ and the White Paper issued on May 17th by Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald differed from the earlier plan only in its lack of detail and the greater latitude allowed the government in the future formulation of policy.

The MacDonald White Paper announced that the government would "regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which had been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will," and declared it desired to see the creation of an independent state "in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of

each are secured." It went on to warn, however, that the relinquishment of the mandate would be dependent upon the establishment of "such relations between the Arabs and the Jews as would make good government possible," and that the mandatory might find it necessary to postpone the grant of independence. In developing these ideas, the Paper announced a plan to establish within ten years an independent state in alliance with Great Britain. During the first five years, Palestinians would gradually replace British officials in charge of all departments in the government. If public opinion seemed favorable, a legislature might be created. At the end of this period an elected assembly would be convened to review progress toward self-government and to make recommendations regarding the constitution of the new state. The British government would require that in the constitution, or in the projected Anglo-Palestine treaty, provision be made for the protection of the different communities in Palestine and for recognition of the special position of the Jewish national home.

The White Paper announced that the government felt it inadvisable to adhere longer to the policy laid down in Ramsay MacDonald's 1931 letter which had recognized economic absorptive capacity as the sole criterion in limiting Jewish immigration. It pointed out that this policy had been based upon the unfulfilled expectation that the Arabs would ultimately recognize the advantages of such immigration and acquiesce in it and declared that, in the interest of Jews and Arabs alike whose welfare was bound up in the peaceful development of Palestine, the government could no longer enforce a continued expansion of the Hebrew community contrary to Arab desires. The Paper, however, went on to say that, in view of the fact that the economic life of the country was adjusted to the reception of large numbers of immigrants and out of consideration for the plight of Jewish refugees from Germany, Italy and eastern Europe, the government planned to admit 75,000 persons during the ensuing five years, subject to the economic absorptive capacity of the country. This addition to the Jewish community of 10,000 regular immigrants a year, and an extra 25,000 refugees admitted at the discretion of the High Commissioner, was calculated to raise it to approximately one-third of the total population by 1944, after which date the government would feel that "they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population." Finally, the Paper authorized the government to place such restrictions as appeared justifiable and necessary upon the purchase of land by Jews.²⁸

The MacDonald White Paper virtually announced that the ob-

ligation to foster the creation of a Hebrew national home, assumed by the British government under the Balfour Declaration and the mandatory instrument, had been fulfilled and that Palestine was henceforth to be treated like an ordinary A mandate and prepared for self-government. Further growth of the Jewish home was practically prohibited unless Arab consent could be secured and independence was promised to a Palestinian state having an Arab majority as soon as safeguards for the Hebrew community could be devised. Thus a sort of "double veto" was established. The Arabs could block the growth of the national home. The Jews might prevent the achievement of Arab independence. If the White Paper was to form the basis of a satisfactory settlement, both groups would have to cooperate. But they had little eagerness for common action. The ideologies of the Zionists and the Arab nationalists offered slight foundation for harmony.

The MacDonald Paper, though it went far to meet Moslem and Christian demands in an attempt to satisfy Arab opinion abroad as well as in Palestine, was still an effort at compromise which left both Jews and Palestine Arabs discontented. The Jews were embittered by what they termed the crystallization of their national home and because the British policy, if carried into effect without sincere Arab good will, would almost inevitably result in the strangulation of the existing community. Even if minority guarantees proved efficacious to protect the Jews from physical violence and their communal institutions from destruction, an unfriendly, Arab-controlled government, whether unitary or federal, would be dominated by agricultural interests, and the economic bases of Jewish commercial and industrial life would be swept away. It was, moreover, doubtful whether the safeguards offered by the British government would be sufficient to prevent Arab attacks upon the national home by more direct methods. The Jewish Agency issued a protest charging the government with the intention of setting up "a territorial ghetto for the Jews in their own homeland,"²⁹ and Hebrew demonstrations against the "Black Paper" in Palestine degenerated into serious riots. The Twenty-first Zionist Congress, which assembled in Geneva in August, declared that "the Jewish people will not acquiesce in the reduction of its status in Palestine to that of a minority, nor in the subjection of the Jewish National Home to Arab rule"³⁰ and made plans to oppose restrictions on immigration and land transfers by every means at its disposal.

On the other hand, the Arabs were dissatisfied because of the failure to put a complete halt to Jewish immigration and land purchases and because, without voluntary Jewish participation in the national government, independence might be indefinitely withheld. The Higher Committee, meeting in Beirut, decided that the

new declaration of policy, which fell short of the proposals rejected in London, was totally inadequate and ought to be repudiated.³¹ Jews and Arabs alike refused to regard the White Paper as a definitive settlement of the Palestine problem. In England the Paper was received without enthusiasm. *The Times* criticized it as a new effort to create a unitary state out of mutually antagonistic elements,³² and there was a general feeling that much might happen in ten or even five years to rescue the Jews from impending Arab domination.³³

Despite the unfavorable reception given its proposals, the government proceeded with plans to implement the White Paper. On May 22nd, Malcolm MacDonald asked the House of Commons to approve the new policy. In its defense he emphasized the effect which Palestine events had upon the Arab world and pointed to Britain's mandatory obligations to the non-Jewish Palestinians. He insisted at the same time that the Jews were not being surrendered to Arab control. The Labor Party sought to move an amendment declaring the statement of policy contrary to the mandate and leaving Parliament uncommitted, pending action by the League of Nations. In a division on the following day the Labor leaders secured for this resolution 181 votes, among them those of Winston Churchill, Leopold Amery, and some twenty other normal supporters of the government. For its resolution of approval, the ministry, although it viewed the matter as a vote of confidence, was able to muster only 268 votes out of a usual strength of 413. The number of abstentions made it evident that it was disinclination to embarrass the government during an international crisis rather than satisfaction with the policy which motivated the lower house in approving the White Paper. In the House of Lords the ministry also secured passage of a favorable resolution but only in the face of strong protests from Lord Snell and Viscount Samuel.³⁴

This grudging Parliamentary agreement to the White Paper policy was a prelude to its virtual rejection by the Permanent Mandates Commission. That body, which met in June for the consideration of Palestine affairs, heard Malcolm MacDonald explain and defend his government's policy as being in harmony with promises made to the Jews and to the Arabs and as offering the greatest hope of a settlement in the Holy Land.³⁵ He suggested that the obligation to foster the creation of the Jewish national home through immigration and acquisition of land might be regarded as fulfilled when a Hebrew community was established having all the characteristics described in the Churchill White Paper of 1922 and having sufficient strength to maintain itself in Palestine.³⁶ In its report to the League of Nations Council, however,

the Mandates Commission decided unanimously that the policy of curtailing Jewish immigration and land purchases was not in accordance with the interpretation which the Commission, the Council and the British government itself had always placed upon the Palestine mandate. The English, French and Portuguese members suggested that the mandatory instrument might be reinterpreted by action of the Council and that existing circumstances would justify the policy of the MacDonald Paper. The other four members felt that the very terms of the mandate and the fundamental intentions of its authors precluded any possibility of re-interpretation.³⁷

The report of the Mandates Commission offered encouragement to opponents of the MacDonald Paper.³⁸ It was, however, only an advisory opinion and the British government prepared to lay its case before the League Council early in September.³⁹ Agreement to the newly proposed policy would perhaps have been secured, but the outbreak of war between Germany and the Anglo-French alliance resulted in the postponement and the ultimate suspension of League of Nations activities. The legal status of the White Paper policy and, indeed, of the Palestine mandate itself was thus rendered uncertain.

WARTIME POLICY, 1939-1941

The outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the British Empire had repercussions in Palestine. As danger of Italian intervention grew, the country was placed upon a war footing⁴⁰ and measures were taken, in conjunction with the French authorities, to prepare for the defense of Syria, Palestine and Egypt as bastions of the Suez Canal. On September 5, 1939, Sir Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner, broadcast an appeal to all Palestinians to lay aside their differences in the interest of a common effort against German aggression.⁴¹ Soon terrorism which had been endemic since the commencement of the Arab strike in 1936 came to an end. It was again safe to move about the roads and rural districts of the Holy Land.

The end of violence resulted from a complex of causes. The Jews, suffering from German anti-Semitism and fearing Nazi domination of Europe, looked upon the British as allies. On the eve of the war Dr. Weizmann assured the Prime Minister that the Jewish Agency wished its differences with the mandatory to give way before "the greater and more pressing necessities of the time" and pledged Hebrew manpower, technical ability and economic resources to the cause of the world democracies.⁴² The Jewish community in Palestine adopted a similar attitude. Even the extremists of the New Zionist Organization gave up the campaign of violence with which they had greeted the MacDonald White

Paper. The Arab moderates were inclined to regard the Paper as a basis for peaceful negotiations.⁴³ The authority of the irreconcilable Mufti, who fled from the French-controlled Lebanon to non-belligerent Iraq in October, 1939, appeared to be waning. The Arab masses were weary of strife and had no particular love for the Germans or their Italian allies who had invaded Moslem Albania and aroused the hatred of their Arab subjects in Libya. The will to violent action was weakened considerably. Finally, the enforcement of wartime restrictions and the concentration of military forces made any continued terrorism or retaliation extremely dangerous to the perpetrators. Dissatisfaction with British policy remained, but it seldom revealed itself in acts of sabotage or murder.

The internal peace which came to Palestine was not accompanied by a return of prosperity. Economic conditions remained unfavorable. Importation of Zionist capital was curtailed at the same time that many markets were barred to Palestine exports. The entry of Italy into the conflict on the side of Germany in June, 1940, aggravated this situation by practically closing the Mediterranean to British merchant shipping, while the collapse of France in the same month resulted in closure of the Syrian frontier and a further strain upon the economic life of the Holy Land. The opportunity to assist in the maintenance of large military forces; government loans, subsidies and relief grants;⁴⁴ and the reopening of trade with Syria after the British and Free French occupied that territory in July, 1941—these factors saved Palestine from economic collapse but did not restore its former prosperity.

Zionist hopes that failure of the League of Nations to ratify the MacDonald White Paper and the outbreak of war would halt the enforcement of the new policy were largely disappointed. The exigencies of war made impossible the program of constitutional reform, but the land transfer and immigration provisions were gradually put into effect. Changes in the British cabinet in May, 1940, which placed Winston Churchill, long an opponent of the government's Palestine policy, in the Prime Minister's chair and removed Malcolm MacDonald from the Colonial Office,⁴⁵ resulted in no alteration of attitude. The movement of the war into the Mediterranean area which accompanied the belligerency of Italy emphasized the strategic importance of Palestine and the other lands of the Near East. Jewish loyalty in a struggle with Germany was assured, but Arab support was less certain and had to be wooed. No English government would risk supplying any material for German and Italian propaganda in the Moslem world by receding from the concessions of the White Paper.⁴⁶

The MacDonald Paper promised that, during the transition pe-

riod leading to Palestinian independence, land transfers to Jews would be regulated in the interest of the Arab agrarian population. As early as June 29, 1939, therefore, the High Commissioner was authorized by an order-in-council to forbid or restrict land transfers by Arabs to non-Arabs and by Jews to non-Jews.⁴⁷ This power, retroactive to May 18, 1939, was defined and made specific by the Palestine Land Transfers Regulations issued on February 28, 1940.⁴⁸ This enactment divided Palestine into three zones. In Zone A, consisting of rural areas within the hill country and certain parts of Gaza and Beersheba sub-districts, transfer of land by an Arab to a non-Arab was prohibited. In Zone B, including rural areas in the plains of Esdraelon and Jezreel, eastern Galilee, the maritime plain between Haifa and Tantura and between the southern boundary of Ramleh sub-district and Beer-Tuviya, and the Negeb, land transfers from Arabs to non-Arabs were severely restricted at the discretion of the High Commissioner. In the remainder of Palestine, including all municipal areas, the Haifa industrial zone and the maritime plain between Tantura and the southern boundary of Ramleh sub-district, land transfers were to remain unrestricted. The British government maintained, in defense of this action, that, if limitations were not placed upon the sale of farms, a large class of landless Arabs would be created. This, it stated, would contribute to renewed bitterness and further violent disorders in Palestine.⁴⁹

The Zionists protested bitterly that the land regulations violated the mandatory obligation to encourage close settlement by barring all but about one-twentieth of Palestine land to unhampered Hebrew acquisition and that they discriminated against Jews on grounds of race and religion by creating a pale of settlement in the country of the national home. They emphasized the fact that earlier fears of creating a class of landless Arabs had proved unfounded and demonstrated that the Arab population was most numerous and most prosperous in the vicinity of Jewish settlements.⁵⁰ Hebrew demonstrations against the regulations took place daily in Palestine between March 2nd and March 7th. Troops and police were stoned, barricades were erected and attempts were made to destroy government property. In the disturbances, five policemen and seventy-four Jews were seriously injured.⁵¹

On March 6th, the Labor Party moved a motion of censure against the government in the British House of Commons, asserting that the land transfer regulations discriminated unjustly against one section of the inhabitants of Palestine and were inconsistent with the terms of the mandate. In the face of the bitterest Labor opposition since the outbreak of the war, Malcolm MacDonald presented a strong defense of the government's policy in which he

argued that the White Paper offered fair treatment to both Jews and Arabs and intimated that its fulfillment was necessary to prevent new violence in Palestine and a weakening of the British position in Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Sa'udi Arabia, Egypt and India. This appeal to expediency in time of war proved successful, and the Labor motion was defeated 292 to 129.⁵² The land transfer provisions of the May statement of policy were thus carried into effect with Parliamentary approval.

In April, 1939, shortly before the MacDonald Paper was issued, the powers given earlier to the High Commissioner to place a limit upon total immigration into Palestine were made permanent on the plea that economic and political considerations alike made such action necessary.⁵³ The quota established for the period of April to September, 1939, followed the policy laid down in the White Paper by providing for the entry of only 5,000 regular immigrants and 5,350 refugees.⁵⁴ However, many Jews, fleeing from anti-Semitism in central and eastern Europe, and finding regular channels closed, sought entry into the Holy Land by surreptitious means. The trade in illegal immigrants grew to unprecedented proportions. To meet this threat to its policy, the British government continued the plan of reducing quotas by the number of apprehended and estimated illegal entrants. On July 12, 1939, the Colonial Secretary announced that there would be no immigration quota allowed for the period of October, 1939, to March, 1940, because of the heavy unlawful immigration during the preceding period.⁵⁵ He virtually accused the Jews of an organized attempt to defeat the White Paper policy through fostering illicit migration.⁵⁶

In 1940, between April and September, 9,400 immigration certificates were issued, but the government, calculating that 16,565 persons had entered the country illegally since April, 1939, noting that there were some 8,000 unused certificates outstanding because of travel difficulties in wartime, and fearing that unemployment would be aggravated by further immigration, decided against the issuance of any schedule for the period of October, 1940, to March, 1941.⁵⁷

The problem of illicit immigration became so serious that in 1940 drastic efforts were made to halt further unlawful entry. The policy of reducing the immigration quotas was augmented by a threat to deport to some British colony and to intern there for the duration of the war any persons entering Palestine without proper qualifications. Announcement was made on November 20th that 1,771 Jewish refugees, who had recently arrived from Austria, Slovakia, Bohemia, Hungary and Rumania without certificates, would be so treated and would not be allowed at the end of the

war either to remain in the colony or to proceed to Palestine.⁵⁸ These persons and 133 other illegal immigrants were placed on board the vessel *Patria* which lay in Haifa harbor awaiting a favorable opportunity for sailing. There, on November 25th, the ship was blown up by a time-bomb, placed on board possibly by Jewish extremists as a supreme protest against the British policy.⁵⁹ Nearly two hundred persons lost their lives in the disaster, and the government as "an exceptional act of mercy" decided to permit the survivors to remain in Palestine, deducting their number from the next legal immigration quota.⁶⁰

The *Patria* tragedy, though it awakened opposition to the government's attitude among Zionist sympathizers both in the British Empire and in the United States, resulted in no change of policy. The government's plan was so strictly enforced that 1,584 illegal immigrants, recently arrived, were deported on December 8, 1940.⁶¹ The authorities again refused to issue any quota for legal entries in the period of April to June, 1941, emphasizing the dangers of wartime travel and the unsatisfactory economic situation.⁶² In announcing that 32,862 Jews had entered the Holy Land since the issuance of the MacDonald Paper and that some 42,000 might still enter before 1944, the Palestine administration demonstrated how rigorously it was adhering to the terms of the White Paper.

The government's wartime policy may have strengthened the position of Britain in the Near East and maintained a truce in the struggle between Jews and Arabs in the Holy Land. It is certain that this policy outraged the Jews and did not completely satisfy the Arabs. The Zionists were determined that the end of the war should bring about the realization of their dreams of a Hebrew commonwealth. The Arabs expected to achieve independence and to block any further expansion of the Jewish community.

Retrospect

THE recent history of Palestine has been molded by the interplay of three distinct interests: British imperialism, Zionism and Arab nationalism. Imperial policy demanded that no great power other than England should acquire a dominant position upon the eastern flank of the Suez Canal or at the Haifa gateway of the overland route to the Persian Gulf and that the government controlling Palestine should be amenable to British influence. These objectives did not conflict with the purposes of Zionism, a movement which required a strong protector and willingly looked to Great Britain for aid, nor were they necessarily in direct opposition to the aims of Arab nationalism, as the history of Iraq demonstrated. The desires of the Jews and the Arabs, however, proved irreconcilable within the narrow confines of the Holy Land. The Zionists strove to create in Palestine, the ancient homeland of Israel, a completely autonomous community having sufficient size to permit the development of a healthy economic, political and cultural life upon a distinctly Hebrew pattern. Under existent political theories such a purpose could be best, if not solely, achieved by the establishment of a sovereign state. The Arab nationalists, on the other hand, desired political independence for those areas of the Near East which had been for centuries inhabited by Arabic-speaking peoples, so that a virile and well-integrated society might fall heir to the glories of their medieval culture. As long as the Moslem and Christian peoples of Palestine insisted that the Arabic nature of the country remain unaltered and, basing their demand upon the democratic principle of self-determination, asked for independence, there could be no compromise between Arabs and Jews.

During the First World War, Great Britain, motivated alike by the wish to procure a strategically located ally in the struggle against Turkey, to provide for the future a friendly buffer state, and to assure to the Moslems the independence of their holy cities under a sovereignty well-disposed to England, offered support to the nationalists of Arabia, Syria and Iraq. The pledges given by Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Husain of the Hejaz were not intended to commit England to recognition of Arab independence

in the coastal area of Palestine, but their wording was so lacking in precision that such an interpretation was not completely precluded. Later, semi-official and official statements caused the Arabs to think their aspirations might be achieved in the Holy Land and contained definite assurances that the wishes of its Moslem and Christian inhabitants would not be disregarded.

The prospective dissolution of the Ottoman Empire impelled the Allied Great Powers to define their interests in the Near East. In the ensuing negotiations, Great Britain sought to consolidate its position at the head of the Persian Gulf, to obtain control of the port of Haifa and to prevent the occupation of the rest of Palestine by any foreign state. Religio-political antagonisms, which made Britain's principal allies unwilling to see France, Italy or Russia control Palestine, assisted the English government in attaining its third objective, and the Sykes-Picot agreement provided for the establishment of an international regime in the area west of the Jordan.

In 1917, the British government, long abstractly sympathetic with the aims of Zionism, became convinced that a declaration pledging support to the establishment of a Jewish colony in Palestine would be advantageous in the successful prosecution of the war. Such a statement of policy, it was thought, would rally the opinion, wealth and influence of world Jewry to the Allied cause during the darkest period of the struggle with the Central Powers. In November, 1917, therefore, the government issued the Balfour Declaration, which contained a carefully drafted promise to facilitate "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." It was then unknown to what extent the Zionists would avail themselves of their opportunity, but it was confidently expected in both official and unofficial circles that, if the Jews proved capable colonizers and came to the Holy Land in sufficient numbers, there would ultimately be created a Jewish state. The rights of the existing population were acknowledged, but it was not realized that the racially mixed, religiously heterogeneous population of Palestine regarded itself as Arab, that it was possessed of a rapidly developing nationalism which rejected any suggestion for submergence in a Hebrew culture, and that it was destined to grow by natural increase at a rate which, if long maintained, would ultimately overpopulate the waste spaces of the land.

The collapse of Tsarist Russia and the introduction of the mandates principle necessitated a revision of the Sykes-Picot agreement. Imperial interests still impelled the government to prevent control of Palestine by any other European power and the Zionists strongly advocated a British protectorate. In the course of the prolonged negotiations which followed the war, it was therefore

decided that Great Britain should receive a mandate for Palestine. Opposition of Arab leaders was ignored and a mandatory instrument was drafted, under the terms of which the creation of a Jewish national home became the primary duty of the mandatory. The independence of the existing population was not given provisional recognition as in the other A mandates nor were rights of self-government immediately conferred upon it. The way was thus left open for the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state.

Before the technicalities which hindered formal approval of the mandate were overcome, the impossibility of both fulfilling the wishes of the Arab political leaders and observing the mandate became evident. Considerations of expediency had already resulted in the withdrawal of Trans-Jordan from the terms of the Balfour Declaration, but the objections of the Moslems and Christians of Palestine to the creation of the Jewish home and to the withholding of independence were in no way weakened. The government therefore launched upon a policy of attempted compromise. The first step in this plan of modifying the Jewish national home in an endeavor to make it acceptable to the Arabs was taken in the Churchill White Paper of 1922 which repudiated any intention to create a Jewish state in Palestine and interpreted the national home on lines of cultural autonomy. The purpose of this policy seemed to be the creation of a binational but unitary state in the Holy Land.

The Arabs, who rejected the modified national home of the 1922 White Paper as totally unacceptable, made clear their opposition in the riots of 1929, and the Labor government followed the precedent of the Churchill Paper in formally enunciating the theory that the mandate imposed upon Great Britain equal obligations to the Arabs and the Jews. The Passfield White Paper of 1930 not only reiterated the cultural nature of the national home but provided for its curtailment in size, through the imposition of more stringent immigration restrictions and limitations upon the right of land purchase. Though Jewish protest, public displeasure and pro-Zionist political pressure induced Ramsay MacDonald to explain away these latter provisions, the basic policy of the government remained one of compromise. The effort to induce the Arabs to accept some form of the national home continued.

The general strike of 1936 again brought the Palestine problem sharply to the attention of the government. In the light of the lucid and convincing account presented by a Royal Commission, it was induced to accept the fact that Arab and Jewish desires were incompatible within a single state and that nothing but complete renunciation of the Balfour Declaration would satisfy the Moslems and Christians. This admission, however, did not in-

volve a basic change of policy, for the government sought, in the partition of Palestine into two states, a means of fulfilling the desires alike of Jews and of Arabs. When the impracticability of partition was revealed, it repudiated this concession to reality and declared in November, 1938, that some compromise of Arab-Jewish disagreements must be reached.

The failure of the London Conference to offer any basis for an understanding between the rival communities in the Holy Land made necessary the formulation of a new policy. Fundamentally, however, the MacDonald White Paper of May, 1939, followed the lines of earlier attempts at compromise. In the face of a growing threat of war in Europe which emphasized British need of Arab support, it provided for virtual crystallization of the national home within five years. At the same time, it postponed Palestine independence until the Hebrew and Arab communities demonstrated a capacity for cooperation. It thus failed to satisfy either group of the population. The outbreak of the Second World War in September, 1939, and the subsequent spread into the Near East of hostilities between the Allies and the Axis was accompanied by an effort to implement the White Paper. Domestic peace came to Palestine, but it was peace based upon a truce rather than upon a settlement of Arab-Jewish differences.

The compromising policy adopted alike by Coalition, Conservative, Labor and National governments, though hard to justify from the viewpoint of Arab, Jewish or imperial interests, is not difficult to explain. First, a solemn pledge to foster the creation of a national home in Palestine was given to the Jews, while certain less definite promises implying a grant of self-government were made with regard to the Palestine Arabs. These pledges could not be reconciled unless the Arabs agreed to the establishment of the Jewish home. Second, there was acceptance by certain members of every British government of the theory that civilization is obligated to provide a home for the Jews and that world culture would benefit from the contributions of a well-balanced Hebrew society. The growth of anti-Semitism after the First World War strengthened this belief by constantly emphasizing the plight of the homeless and unwanted Jew and the value to him and to mankind of a Hebrew land in which he might find refuge and become a contributing member of the world community. On the other hand there was acknowledgment of the strength of the Arab case for self-determination. It is impossible to harmonize with democratic ideals the enforcement upon a protesting people of an abhorrent policy which might result in its political subjugation to an alien culture. These views, again, could be reconciled only by Arab acceptance of the national home. Third, every government disliked

to antagonize the influential Jewish and Gentile Zionists at home and feared to lose for Britain the friendship of world Jewry and its sympathizers. On the other hand, no government was able to ignore the small but articulate body of pro-Arabs and pro-Moslems in England, or to frame a policy without consideration of its probable effect upon the Moslem and Arab worlds. Only Palestine Arab consent to the establishment of the national home, however, could permit the formulation of a program acceptable alike to Zionist and Moslem-Arab sentiment. Government after government therefore sought to arrange a compromise by which the Arabs would agree to the creation of a Jewish home.

Unfortunately, no amount of modification in the national home program made it acceptable to the Arabs. As a result, the British government's insistence upon an attempted compromise encouraged nearly 500,000 Jews to establish themselves in Palestine, but did not permit them to escape from the dangers of minority status in a hostile country, and it saddled the Arabs with an immense and unassimilable minority. Moreover, it weakened the friendship of both the peoples of Palestine for the British Empire and strained Anglo-Arab relations throughout the Near East. British policy, indeed, aggravated the Palestine situation and worked to the disadvantage alike of Jewish, Arab and imperial interests.

If the British government had been able, in the years immediately following the First World War, to overcome the pressure impelling it to compromise, two alternatives would have presented themselves: firm action in the original spirit of the Balfour Declaration, or repudiation of the pledge to the Jews as impracticable. Either of these policies would have offered greater chances of success than the program of compromise which the government adopted. Imperial interests would have been better served, and one of the Palestinian communities might have been satisfied. It is conceivable that a firm and consistent fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration might have put down Arab opposition in Palestine while the movement was still not fully organized and the fellahin were apathetic. It might then have been possible to create a predominantly Jewish nation having a relatively contented minority of Arab peasants whose politically inclined brethren would have sought an outlet for their activities in the surrounding countries. Such a state would have been bound alike by ties of gratitude and self-interest to Great Britain, and would have provided the empire with a bulwark in the Near East. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that repudiation of the Balfour Declaration would have permitted the creation of an Arab state linked to Great Britain by a military alliance and fairly amenable to British influence. The cooperative imperialism, operating today with a degree of success

in Iraq and Egypt, might have proved at least equally efficacious in Palestine. A vigorous and positive policy would, under either alternative, have necessitated the breaking of pledges or the violation of ideals. It would, however, have offered a possible solution of the Palestine imbroglio.

At the moment, neither the creation of a Hebrew majority nor the recognition of Arab independence unfettered by requirements for the security of the national home is possible. An attempt to establish a Jewish state could not now be undertaken by any British government, for Arab national sentiment in Palestine has sharpened, British prestige in the Levant has declined, and a far-flung war involving the interests of the empire in the Near East has made vital to Great Britain the friendship of the independent Arab states whose people sympathize with their Palestine brethren. On the other hand, no government could permit the establishment, even as a war measure, of an independent Arab state as long as such action would require the surrender of authority over the national home to an administration unreconciled to the very existence of the vigorous and autonomous Hebrew community which has grown up under British protection. Thus no completely satisfactory solution of the Palestine problem appears possible. Certainly it is clearly evident that the MacDonald White Paper offers no real hope for the success of a program of conciliation between Jews and Arabs, because the former reject the crystallization of the national home and will struggle against it, and the latter protest the indefinite postponement of independence and the exceptional status accorded the Jewish minority.

Mandate for Palestine¹

THE Council of the League of Nations:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:

¹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1923*, Cmd. 1785.

ARTICLE 1

The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

ARTICLE 2

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

ARTICLE 3

The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

ARTICLE 4

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

ARTICLE 5

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power.

ARTICLE 6

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

ARTICLE 7

The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

ARTICLE 8

The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

ARTICLE 9

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall ensure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the disposition of the founders.

ARTICLE 10

Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

ARTICLE 11

The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard,

among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilized by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

ARTICLE 12

The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

ARTICLE 13

All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

ARTICLE 14

A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council.

ARTICLE 15

The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

ARTICLE 16

The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

ARTICLE 17

The Administration of Palestine may organize on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defense of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

ARTICLE 18

The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of

industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country, and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State, the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

ARTICLE 19

The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.

ARTICLE 20

The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combatting disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

ARTICLE 21

The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nations of all States Members of the League of Nations.

(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year A. D. 1700.

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, re-

ports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export license from the said Department.

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorized by the competent Department.

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

ARTICLE 22

English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

ARTICLE 23

The Administration of Palestine shall recognize the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

ARTICLE 24

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

ARTICLE 25

In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

ARTICLE 26

The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 27

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

ARTICLE 28

In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honor the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Members of the League.

Done at London the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

Notes

CHAPTER ONE

¹Still indispensable in a study of Palestine geography is Sir George Adam Smith's *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land* (25th rev. ed., New York, 1931). Useful also are Ellsworth Huntington's *Palestine and Its Transformation* (Boston, 1911) and D. G. Hogarth's *The Nearer East* (New York, 1902). A brief survey of the geography of the mandated area of Palestine and Trans-Jordan is contained in Norman Bentwich's *Palestine* (London, 1934).

²Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479 (London, 1937), p. 19.

³Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1932*, Colonial No. 82 (London, 1933), p. 1. Hereafter the annual reports to the League of Nations will be cited simply as Great Britain, C. O., *Palestine Report*, followed by the year and the "Colonial" series number when one exists. The titles of the reports have varied from time to time.

⁴Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, *Syria and Palestine*, Peace Handbook No. 60 (London, 1920), p. 15, note 1.

⁵Bentwich, *Palestine*, p. 55.

⁶See, for example, Sir George Adam Smith, *Syria and the Holy Land* (New York, 1918), p. 56.

⁷The Palestine government estimated that between 1922 and 1938 the Moslem population alone grew through natural increase by 292,798 persons, while the Jewish population grew through immigration by 259,371. Great Britain, C. O., *Palestine Report, 1938*, Colonial No. 166 (London, 1939), p. 226.

⁸*The New Judaea*, vol. XVI (1940), p. 166.

⁹The most comprehensive work on Arab nationalism is George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement* (Philadelphia, 1939). An unpublished doctoral dissertation by John George Hazam, "Arab Nationalism and Anglo-French Imperialism on the Eve of the World War" (University of California, 1932), contains some interesting material on the subject, as do Hans Kohn's *A History of Nationalism in the East* (New York, 1929) and *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (London, 1932).

¹⁰Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 153.

¹¹Many books and pamphlets have been written on Zionism. Worthy of particular mention are Nahum Sokolow's *History of Zionism, 1600-1918* (2 vols., London, 1919); Leonard J. Stein's *Zionism* (London, 1925); and Richard J. H. Gottheil's *Zionism* (Philadelphia, 1914). A brief survey of Zionist activity, placing emphasis on the period since the First World War and containing a valuable exposition of the various branches and organs of the World Zionist Organization, is Israel Cohen's pamphlet, *The Progress of Zionism* (4th rev. ed., London, 1938).

¹²Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, vol. I, pp. 268-69.

¹³A good account of the Sinai and Uganda schemes is given in the second volume of Jacob de Haas, *Theodor Herzl: A Biographical Study* (2 vols., Chicago, 1927).

¹⁴See Shlomo Bardin, *Pioneer Youth in Palestine* (New York, 1932), pp. 50-90.

¹⁵The outlines of British policy may be followed in *The Cambridge His-*

tory of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919, edited by Sir A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch (3 vols., Cambridge, 1922-1923). Harold W. V. Temperley's *England and the Near East: The Crimea* (London, 1936) provides a more detailed account for the period from the death of Canning to the Crimean War. Halford Lancaster Hoskins' *British Routes to India* (New York, 1928) offers a survey of nineteenth-century activity in connection with the commercial and strategic routes to the East. British interest in a Jewish restoration in Palestine is well summarized by Albert M. Hyamson in *British Projects for the Restoration of the Jews* (Leeds, 1917).

¹⁶Hoskins, *British Routes to India*, pp. 5-25.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 154-82, 321-42.

¹⁸See Vernon John Puryear, *International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant, 1834-1853* (Stanford University, 1935).

¹⁹Documents concerning the international negotiations over the Baghdad railway and Turkey-in-Asia, 1910-1914, are given in Great Britain, Foreign Office, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold W. V. Temperley (12 vols., London, 1926-), vol. X, Part II, pp. 1-420.

²⁰Interesting in this connection is a memorandum advocating such action, dated September 25, 1840, and presented by Lord Ashley (later the Earl of Shaftesbury) to Lord Palmerston. Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, vol. II, pp. 229-31.

²¹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. LIX, cols. 2169-70, 2187-88.

²²An extensive program of harbor development was initiated in 1922. In October, 1933, the improved port was officially opened, but work continued until the end of 1938.

²³The mandate for Palestine did not prohibit the establishment of naval bases in the mandated territory and the prohibition against their creation in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant applied specifically only to B and C mandates. It was, therefore, claimed that there was no legal objection to the creation of such bases in A mandates. C. A. Boutant, *Les mandats internationaux* (Paris, 1936), p. 174. Haifa was not fully equipped or designated as a naval base, but during the Italo-Ethiopian War, the subsequent Palestine disturbances, and the conflict which commenced in 1939, naval vessels were frequently stationed there for considerable periods.

CHAPTER TWO

¹Details of the Palestine campaign are given in Great Britain, Committee of Imperial Defence, *History of the Great War Based on Official Documents. . . Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine*, compiled by Sir George F. MacMunn and Cyril Falls (2 vols., London, 1928-1930), hereafter referred to as Great Britain, Com. Imp. Def., *Official History*, and in Henry Somer Gullett, *The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 1914-1918* (Sydney, 1923).

²Great Britain, Com. Imp. Def., *Official History*, vol. I, pp. 19-21; B. H. Liddell Hart, *Colonel Lawrence, the Man Behind the Legend* (New York, 1934), p. 31.

³Great Britain, Com. Imp. Def., *Official History*, vol. I, pp. 79-85.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 250-51.

⁵*Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 15.

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 293-97. The military advisers' note is given in David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George* (6 vols., Boston, 1933-1937), vol. V, pp. 251-60.

⁷Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1919*, Cmd. 53 (London, 1919), pp. 25-27.

⁸Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. LIX, cols. 2169-70, 2187-88.

⁹Sir George Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener* (3 vols., New York, 1920), vol. III, p. 153.

¹⁰Kitchener to Grey, Feb. 6, 1914; Great Britain, F. O., *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, vol. X, Part II, p. 827.

¹¹Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 127-28.

¹²See a dispatch from the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Sir L. Mallet, to Grey, March 18, 1914; Great Britain, F. O., *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, vol. X, Part II, pp. 827-28.

¹³The accounts of these meetings in Antonius' *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 127-28, and in Sir Ronald Storrs' *The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs* (New York, 1937), p. 135, do not exactly agree. Storrs refers only to the April meeting. He was writing largely from memory.

¹⁴Kitchener to Sir W. Tyrrell, April 26, 1914; Great Britain, F. O., *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, vol. X, Part II, p. 831.

¹⁵From the verbal report of the messenger, Oct. 30, 1914. Storrs, *Memoirs*, pp. 164-66.

¹⁶Kitchener to British representative in Cairo, Oct. 31, 1914; *ibid.*, p. 166.

¹⁷Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 133-34.

¹⁸*The Times* (London), Nov. 16, 1914.

¹⁹Storrs, *Memoirs*, p. 166.

²⁰Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 160.

²¹*Ibid.*, pp. 157-58. The text is a translation from an Arabic version lent to Antonius by Faisal.

²²The official English translation of this and subsequent letters which were exchanged between Husain and McMahon in Arabic is given in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39*, Cmd. 5957 (London, 1939). An unofficial translation is given in *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 413-27.

²³Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39*, Cmd. 5957, p. 4.

²⁴Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 169.

²⁵Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39*, Cmd. 5974 (London, 1939), pp. 23-24.

²⁶*Ibid.*, Cmd. 5957, pp. 8-9.

²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 14.

³⁰Sir Henry McMahon declared in a letter to the British government, dated March 12, 1922, that he had intended to exclude Palestine from the area of Arab independence as fully as the coastal regions to the north. Philip P. Graves, *Palestine, the Land of Three Faiths* (London, 1923), pp. 53-54. In a public letter addressed to the editor of *The Times*, he wrote:

"I feel it my duty to state, and I do so definitely and emphatically, that is was not intended by me in giving this pledge [of independence] to King Hussein to include Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was promised.

"I also had every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not included in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein." *The Times*, July 23, 1937.

Sir Ronald Storrs, who as Oriental Secretary to the High Commissioner handled the correspondence, has written: "Palestine was excluded from the promises made to the Arabs before those British [military] operations which gave freedom to so large a proportion of the Arab peoples." *Memoirs*, p. 398.

William Ormsby-Gore (later Lord Harlech), who was attached to McMahon's staff in 1916, stated in the House of Commons on July 21, 1937, "that it never was in the mind of anyone on that staff that Palestine west of the Jordan was in the area within which the British Government then undertook to further the cause of Arab independence." *Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Fifth Series*, vol. CCCXXVI, col. 2237.

T. E. Lawrence, who was closely in touch with the entire Arab movement, wrote in a letter to *The Times*, concerning the Husain-McMahon letters, the Sykes-Picot agreement, and other undertakings, "I can see no inconsistencies or incompatibilities in these . . . documents, and I know nobody who does." *The Times*, Sept. 11, 1919. This indicates that he, also, held that Palestine had been excluded from the area of Arab independence.

³¹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39*, Cmd. 5957, p. 8.

³²Sazonov to Izvolsky, March 3/16, 1915, and Paléologue to Sazonov,

March 26, 1916; E. Adamow, ed., *Die Europäischen Mächte und die Türkei während des Weltkrieges: Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei nach den Geheimdokumenten des ehem. Ministeriums für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten* (Dresden, 1932), pp. 28, 71. Hereafter cited as Adamow, *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*.

³³Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39*, Cmd. 5974, p. 27.

³⁴For an account of the military operations of the Arabs, see T. E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph* (Garden City, New York, 1935) and Great Britain, Com. Imp. Def., *Official History*.

³⁵Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 225-29. Charles R. Ashbee, the Civic Adviser to Jerusalem, wrote in a letter of July 5, 1918, regarding the British officials in Palestine, "We are preaching Nationality in Palestine. . . . We are for the Arabs. . . . We make great capital out of the Arabic tradition that Jerusalem comes back to the Arabs when a new prophet [al-Nebi, i.e., Allenby] shall enter it as a conqueror." Charles R. Ashbee, *A Palestine Notebook, 1918-1923* (London, 1923), pp. 7-8.

³⁶British Agent at Jidda to King Husain, Feb. 8, 1918; Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 431-32.

³⁷Hogarth's message is given in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39*, Cmd. 5964 (London, 1939), p. 3.

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁹The official English text of this so-called "Declaration to the Seven" is given in *ibid.*, pp. 5-6. An unofficial translation from the Arab text appears in Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 433-34.

⁴⁰Two memoranda from the British Embassy in Petrograd, March 12, 1915; Adamow, *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*, pp. 23-26.

⁴¹French Ambassador to Sazonov, March 8, 1915; *ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴²Basili to Kudashov, March 1/14, 1915, and Neratov to Sazonov, March 2/15, 1915; *ibid.*, pp. 26, 28.

⁴³Maurice Paléologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs* (3 vols., New York, 1925), vol. I, p. 303.

⁴⁴Sazonov to Benckendorff, March 7/20, 1915; Adamow, *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*, pp. 30-31.

⁴⁵Verbal note of the French Embassy, April 10, 1915; *ibid.*, p. 34.

⁴⁶Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1920*, Cmd. 671 (London, 1920).

⁴⁷See a note from the British Ambassador to Sazonov, March 20, 1915; Adamow, *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*, p. 30.

⁴⁸There is little evidence available concerning this committee. See, however, Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, p. 17; 1938-39, Cmd. 5974, pp. 13, 51; Shane Leslie, *Mark Sykes: His Life and Letters* (London, 1923), pp. 20, 238, 249.

⁴⁹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39*, Cmd. 5974, p. 51.

⁵⁰In 1915 Asquith was loath to contemplate any increase in British obligations in Palestine. Earl of Oxford and Asquith, *Memoirs and Reflections, 1852-1927* (2 vols., Boston, 1928), vol. II, p. 71. Sir Edward Grey feared that the Liberal Party would not approve any increased commitments and suggested international control for Palestine. Blanche E. C. Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Balfour, K. G., O. M., F. R. S., Etc.* (2 vols., London, 1936), vol. II, p. 225. As late as April, 1917, Balfour was advocating an American protectorate for Palestine. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

⁵¹A partial account of these negotiations was published in *Le Temps* (Paris) of September 17, 1919. A fuller account is given in a letter dated October 18, 1919, which Lloyd George sent to Clemenceau to refute a charge that Great Britain was not treating France fairly in regard to the post-war settlement in Syria. David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (2 vols., London, 1938), vol. II, pp. 1082-1100.

⁵²Leslie, *Mark Sykes*, pp. 249, 256.

⁵³Izvol'sky to Sazonov, Jan. 27/Feb. 9, 1916; Adamow, *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*, p. 53.

⁵⁴Izvol'sky to Sazonov, Feb. 5/18, 1916, and Benckendorff to Sazonov, Feb. 8/21, 1916; *ibid.*, pp. 53-54; Leslie, *Mark Sykes*, p. 258.

⁵⁵Memorandum from the British and French Embassies to Sazonov,

March 9, 1916; Adamow, *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*, pp. 55-58.

⁵⁶Sazonov to Paléologue and Paléologue to Sazonov, April 13/26, 1916; *ibid.*, pp. 90-93. Following the Soviet government's partial publication of the secret treaties in 1917, this agreement became known by the somewhat misleading title of the Paléologue-Sazonov treaty.

⁵⁷See Benckendorff to Sazonov, May 17/30, 1916, and Benckendorff to Stürmer, Sept. 3/16, 1916; *ibid.*, pp. 106-7, 147.

⁵⁸Paléologue to Sazonov, March 26, 1916; *ibid.*, p. 71.

⁵⁹The texts of these letters are given by Henri Froidevaux in "La France, l'Angleterre et la Syrie" in *L'Asie française*, 1918-19, pp. 244-46. See also *Le Temps* (Paris) May 22, 1919; *The Manchester Guardian*, Jan. 8, 1920; *Current History: A Monthly Magazine* of "The New York Times," vol. XI (1920), pp. 499-500.

⁶⁰Nabokov to Pokrovsky, Jan. 16/29, 1917; Adamow, *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*, pp. 205-6.

⁶¹An account of the St. Jean de Maurienne Conference is given in Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, pp. 773-78. See also Adamow, *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*, pp. 242-46, 249, 256.

⁶²The text of this understanding is given in a note from the British Foreign Secretary to the French Chargé d'Affaires in London, dated August 18, 1917. *Current History*, vol. XI (1920), pp. 504-5. The Italo-French exchange of notes is given in Adamow, *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*, pp. 277-80.

⁶³Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, pp. 782-83.

⁶⁴Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, vol. II, pp. 46, 48, 50.

⁶⁵The Board of Deputies represented the Jewish community of Great Britain as organized in its synagogues. The Anglo-Jewish Association was the principal Jewish philanthropic organization of Great Britain. These organizations cooperated in matters of common interest through the Conjoint Foreign Committee.

⁶⁶Paul Goodman, *Zionism in England: English Zionist Federation, 1899-1929* (London, 1929), pp. 31-32.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 34-37.

⁶⁸Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, vol. II, pp. 47-48. See also Oxford and Asquith, *Memoirs and Reflections*, vol. II, pp. 70-71.

⁶⁹Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour*, vol. II, pp. 223, 225.

⁷⁰See Balfour's statement in his introduction to Sokolow's *History of Zionism*, vol. I, pp. xxix-xxx, and Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour*, vol. I, pp. 433-34; vol. II, p. 224.

⁷¹Lloyd George, *War Memoirs*, vol. II, pp. 46-50; Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour*, vol. II, p. 226.

⁷²Great Britain, F. O., *Zionism*, Peace Handbook No. 162 (London, 1920), p. 39; Herbert Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine* (London, 1937), pp. 56-57.

⁷³Memorandum of the British Embassy in Petrograd to Sazonov, March 13, 1916; Adamow, *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*, pp. 64-65.

⁷⁴Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, vol. II, p. 51.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*; Goodman, *Zionism in England*, p. 36. An excerpt from this program is given in Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine*, pp. 57-58.

⁷⁶Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour*, vol. II, p. 228.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 228-29; Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, vol. II, p. 52; Leslie, *Mark Sykes*, pp. 270-71.

⁷⁸Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, vol. II, p. 52.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

⁸⁰Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour*, vol. II, p. 230.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, pp. 231-32. Jacob de Haas states that in the spring of 1916 Wilson had given American Zionists assurance of his support for their plans. Louis D. Brandeis: *A Biographical Sketch with Special Reference to His Contributions to Jewish and Zionist History* (New York, 1929), p. 88.

⁸²De Haas claims that in March or April, 1917, the British War Office issued a "War Aims Book" setting forth a five-point program "for the re-settlement of Palestine in accordance with Jewish National Aspirations."

Louis D. Brandeis, pp. 89-90; *History of Palestine: The Last Two Thousand Years* (New York, 1934), p. 484; Stephen S. Wise and Jacob de Haas, *The Great Betrayal* (New York, 1930), pp. 30-32. The plan allegedly presented was apparently a résumé of the program submitted to the government by British Zionists in October, 1916. This document, if it ever existed, cannot have been intended for general circulation, since the War Office declares that "it has not been possible to trace the 'War Aims Book'" to which de Haas refers. British War Office to the author, July 4, 1939. By May, 1917, however, reliable reports were current that the government was contemplating support for a Jewish home in Palestine.

⁸³The text of Weizmann's address is given in Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, vol. II, pp. 54-58.

⁸⁴*The Times*, May 24, 1917.

⁸⁵Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour*, vol. II, pp. 232-33.

⁸⁶Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine*, pp. 58-59. As a member of the British Palestine Committee, Sidebotham was closely in touch with Zionist activity during the war.

⁸⁷Accounts of the final drafting of the Balfour Declaration, somewhat contradictory in minor detail, but essentially in agreement, are given in Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, pp. 1122-38; Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour*, vol. II, pp. 215-16, 232-33; Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine*, pp. 58-62; de Haas, *History of Palestine*, pp. 485-86.

⁸⁸*The Times*, Nov. 9, 1917.

⁸⁹Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, vol. II, pp. 127-28.

⁹⁰De Haas, *History of Palestine*, p. 486. A Joint Resolution of Congress signed by the President on September 21, 1922, finally gave formal American sanction to the ideal of the national home.

⁹¹Such an announcement was finally issued on January 5, 1918. The text is given in Georg Schwarzenberger, *Das Völkerbunds-Mandat für Palästina* (Stuttgart, 1929), p. 23, note 25.

⁹²Lloyd George, in giving evidence before the Palestine Royal Commission, said that the Balfour Declaration was a propaganda measure. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, p. 23. See, also, his statements in *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, pp. 1118-22.

⁹³On November 22, 1915, *The Manchester Guardian* published an editorial by Herbert Sidebotham pointing out the value to Great Britain of a Jewish buffer state in Palestine. At the request of several Manchester Zionists, Sidebotham expanded this into a memorandum for the Foreign Office. In January, 1917, he and several Jewish colleagues, banded together as the British Palestine Committee, began publication of the periodical *Palestine* to link British and Zionist interests and to foster the cause of a Jewish dominion of the British Commonwealth of Nations in Palestine. See Sidebotham's *Great Britain and Palestine*, pp. 17-50, and the files of *Palestine: The Organ of the British Palestine Committee, 1917-1924*.

⁹⁴See the statement of Ahad Ha'am (Asher Ginsberg) on this subject in the preface to his collected essays, quoted in his *Ten Essays on Zionism and Judaism* (London, 1922), p. xvi.

In October, 1917, the British Zionists circulated a resolution for adoption by Jewish bodies which favored "the reconstitution of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish People" and requested the government to use its best endeavors for the achievement of that object. *The Times*, Oct. 23, 1917.

⁹⁵Zionist Organization, *Great Britain, Palestine and the Jews: Jewry's Celebration of Its National Charter* (New York, 1918), p. 45.

⁹⁶Convenient collections of statements and press opinion on the Balfour Declaration and Zionism appear in the Zionist Organization's publications, *Great Britain, Palestine and the Jews: Jewry's Celebration of Its National Charter* and *Great Britain, Palestine and the Jews: A Survey of Christian Opinion* (London, 1918), and in Louis J. Gribetz, *The Case for the Jews: An Interpretation of Their Rights under the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine* (New York, 1930), pp. 33-40, 99-113. Reference to the press of the period shows that these Zionist collections are representative of the vast majority of opinion.

⁹⁷Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, p. 24.

CHAPTER THREE

¹See Alexander Aaronsohn, *With the Turks in Palestine* (Boston, 1916).

²Georges-Picot's instructions are given in Adamow, *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*, pp. 232-36, and in *Current History*, vol. XI (1920), pp. 502-3.

³See Storrs, *Memoirs*, pp. 291, 293; Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, p. 455.

⁴Great Britain, Com. Imp. Def., *Official History*, vol. II, pp. 607-8; Harold W. V. Temperley, ed., *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (6 vols., London, 1920-1924), vol. VI, p. 140. In December, 1918, after the Allied occupation of Cilicia, O.E.T. (North) became O.E.T. (West) and the new territory, which became O.E.T. (North), was placed under the control of an officer who had during the war commanded the French military mission to the Hejaz.

⁵Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CXLV, col. 36.

⁶See Storrs, *Memoirs*, pp. 311-12, 380-82.

⁷Dr. H. Ami of the British Embassy in Washington, speaking before a Zionist convention in Pittsburgh in June, 1918. *The New York Times*, June 27, 1918.

⁸"Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, June 25th, 1919, at 4:00 P. M.," David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris, with Documents* (21 vols., New York, 1924), vol. XVI, p. 461.

⁹See Storrs, *Memoirs*, pp. 311-12, 380-85; Horace B. Samuel, *Unholy Memories of the Holy Land* (London, 1930), pp. 25-55; Graves, *Palestine, the Land of Three Faiths*, pp. 56-59; Ashbee, *Palestine Notebook*, pp. 7-9, 105-15, 221, 267; Redcliffe N. Salaman, *Palestine Reclaimed: Letters from a Jewish Officer in Palestine* (London, 1920), pp. 118, 153-54, 169-75, 196-97.

¹⁰*The Times*, Feb. 12, 1918.

¹¹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, p. 157.

¹²Not until autumn, 1920, was Palestine opened to immigrants. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1499 (London, 1921), p. 18. Proclamations issued on November 1 and 18, 1918, forbade all transfers of immovable property pending reorganization of the land registers. Palestine, *Legislation of Palestine, 1918-1925*, compiled by Norman Bentwich (2 vols., Alexandria, 1926), vol. I, pp. 613-15, 617-18. The ban was not lifted until after the institution of the civil administration in 1920.

¹³See a Beirut dispatch, dated May 11, 1914, commenting on Arab unrest over the growth of Jewish colonization; *The Near East*, May 22, 1914, p. 71.

¹⁴George Napier Whittingham, *The Home of Fadeless Splendour; or, Palestine of To-Day* (London, 1921), pp. 138-39.

¹⁵This Damascus program as presented to the King-Crane Commission is given in Paris Peace Conference, Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey, "Report of the American Section of the Inter-allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey," *Editor and Publisher*, Dec. 2, 1922, Section Two, pp. vii-viii. A somewhat different translation from the original Arabic is given in Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 440-42.

¹⁶See Samuel, *Unholy Memories of the Holy Land*, p. 27.

¹⁷Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, p. 50; Samuel, *Unholy Memories of the Holy Land*, pp. 55-58. The report of a military court of inquiry (the Palin Commission) which investigated the riots has never been released to the public. The Palestine Royal Commission, however, is supposed to have summarized the military court's findings when it wrote:

"It appeared on investigation that the causes of the [1920] trouble had been (1) the Arabs' disappointment at the non-fulfilment of the promises of independence which they believed to have been given them in the War: (2) the Arabs' belief that the Balfour Declaration implied a denial of the right of self-determination, and their fear that the establishment of the National Home would mean a great increase of Jewish immigration and would lead to

their economic and political subjugation to the Jews: (3) the aggravation of those sentiments on the one hand by propaganda from outside Palestine associated with the proclamation of Emir Feisal as King of a reunited Syria and with the growth of Pan-Arab and Pan-Moslem ideas and on the other hand by the activities of the Zionist Commission, supported by the resources and influence of Jews in the world at large."

¹⁸See, for example, Enzo Sereni and R. E. Ashery, eds., *Jews and Arabs in Palestine: Studies in a National and Colonial Problem* (New York, 1936), pp. 49a-53a; William B. Ziff, *The Rape of Palestine* (New York, 1938), p. 85.

¹⁹At the end of February, 1920, Arab raiders had attacked Jewish colonies in the extreme north of Palestine. On March 1, in the defense of Tel Hai and Kefar Gil'adi, Captain Joseph Trumpeldor, who has become Palestinian Jewry's national hero, was mortally wounded.

²⁰*The Times*, April 22, 23, 1920. These sentences caused a scandal which hastened the end of the Military Administration. Allenby reduced Jabotinsky's sentence to one year when the verdict of the military court came before him for approval and Sir Herbert Samuel subsequently granted an amnesty to persons sentenced in connection with the riots.

²¹*Ibid.*, April 17, 1920.

²²See, for example, an editorial in *ibid.*, April 27, 1920.

²³Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, p. 1038.

²⁴André Tardieu, "Mossoul et le pétrole," *L'Illustration*, June 19, 1920, p. 381.

²⁵This information came apparently from a report dated November 4, 1918, submitted to the War Cabinet by T. E. Lawrence. The text is given in *The Letters of T. E. Lawrence*, edited by David Garnett (London, 1938), pp. 265-69.

²⁶Lloyd George reproduces excerpts from the minutes of this Eastern Committee meeting (undated) in *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, pp. 1142-51.

²⁷The text is given in Lloyd George, *ibid.*, pp. 1151-55.

²⁸The First American Jewish Congress, meeting in Philadelphia, adopted on December 17, 1918, a resolution instructing its peace conference delegation to cooperate with the Zionists in securing the establishment of conditions in Palestine which would "assure under the trusteeship of Great Britain . . . the development of Palestine into a Jewish commonwealth." *The New York Times*, Dec. 18, 1918.

²⁹Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. I, pp. 121-22. The project for American supervision of Palestine was soon abandoned in view of the position taken by the American peace delegation. On January 21, 1919, its Intelligence Section recommended the establishment of a separate state under a League of Nations mandate entrusted to Great Britain and that "it will be the policy of the League of Nations to recognize Palestine as a Jewish state as soon as it is a Jewish state in fact." Miller, *My Diary*, vol. IV, p. 263.

³⁰The text is given in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1917-18*, Cd. 8468 (London, 1917).

³¹The text is given in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1918*, Cd. 9005 (London, 1918), pp. 230-35.

³²Woodrow Wilson, *President Wilson's State Papers and Addresses* (New York, 1917), p. 470.

³³The directing body of the conference was at this time the Council of Ten, representing Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States and Japan. The term, "Supreme Council," however, has been adopted throughout this chapter in referring to the paramount Allied body regardless of its composition at the moment.

³⁴The text is given in Miller, *My Diary*, vol. XIV, pp. 130-31.

³⁵Paris Peace Conference, "Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held at M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, January 30, 1919, at 11:00 A. M." and "Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M.

Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, January 30, 1919, at 3:30 P. M.," *B. C. Records* (Hoover Library Peace Conference Documents, Stanford University), vol. II, BC-17, BC-18.

³⁶The minutes of the committee meeting on February 8 at which Smuts presented the draft of the mandates article are given in David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant* (2 vols., New York, 1928), vol. II, pp. 271-77.

³⁷Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1919*, Cmd. 153 (London, 1919), pp. 16-17.

³⁸On May 7, 1919, the Supreme Council assigned the B and C mandates. Consideration of the A mandates, then regarded as dependent on the conclusion of a Turkish treaty, was postponed.

³⁹The memorandum is reproduced in Miller, *My Diary*, vol. IV, pp. 297-99.

⁴⁰"Territorial Claims of the Government of the Hedjaz," *ibid.*, p. 300.

⁴¹Paris Peace Conference, "Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 6th February, 1919, at 3:00 P. M.," *B. C. Records* (Hoover Library Peace Conference Documents), vol. III, BC-24, pp. 2-8.

⁴²Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 280-86. The author had access to Faisal's diary and may be assumed to give a faithful report of the Amir's ideas.

⁴³The text of the agreement is given in Miller, *My Diary*, vol. III, pp. 188-89, and in Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 437-39. It is dated London, January 3, 1919, but was apparently signed later because in the proviso which he attached, Faisal spoke of a memorandum dated January 4th.

A facsimile of Lawrence's paraphrase of the proviso was published in *The Times*, June 10, 1936. A translation from the Arabic is given in *The Arab Awakening*, p. 439. The content of the memorandum referred to is not known.

⁴⁴Harold Nicolson said that Ganem was "a Syriac poet of Paris, who, although he had not set foot in Syria for twenty years, had been produced by M. Pichon as the spokesman of the Syrian Arabs." *Peacemaking, 1919* (Boston, 1933), p. 143.

⁴⁵Paris Peace Conference, "Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, February 13, 1919, at 3-0 p.m.," *B. C. Records* (Hoover Library Peace Conference Documents), vol. IV, BC-31, pp. 2-9L.

⁴⁶Paris Peace Conference, "Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, February 15, 1919, at 3:00 P. M.," *B. C. Records* (Hoover Library Peace Conference Documents), vol. IV, BC-33, pp. 1-4.

⁴⁷*The Times*, Nov. 29, 1918.

⁴⁸De Haas, *Louis D. Brandeis*, pp. 102-9.

⁴⁹Zionist Organization, *Statement of the Zionist Organization regarding Palestine. February 3, 1919* (Paris, 1919).

⁵⁰Paris Peace Conference, "Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 27th February, 1919, at 3:00 P. M.," *B. C. Records* (Hoover Library Peace Conference Documents), vol. VI, BC-41, pp. 3-16.

⁵¹This is the French version of the negotiations as presented by Pichon in "Notes of a Conference held in the Prime Minister's Flat at 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, on Thursday, March 20, 1919, at 3 P. M.," Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (3 vols., Garden City, New York, 1922), vol. III, pp. 2-7.

⁵²Milner to Lloyd George, March 8, 1919; Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, pp. 1046-50.

⁵³See Tardieu, "Mossoul et le pétrole," *L'Illustration*, June 19, 1920, p. 381. He says that on February 9th and again on March 17th, France protested that the terms of the December agreement were not being observed by Great Britain.

⁵⁴"Notes of a Conference held in the Prime Minister's Flat at 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, on Thursday, March 20, 1919, at 3 P. M.," Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, vol. III, pp. 1-19.

⁵⁵The terms of reference are given in Miller, *My Diary*, vol. XV, pp. 505-8.

⁵⁶See the memorandum of a meeting of English and French experts on March 25, 1919, *ibid.*, vol. VII, pp. 169-70.

⁵⁷Paris Peace Conference, Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey, "Report," *Editor and Publisher*, Dec. 2, 1922, Section Two, pp. iv-xxvi.

⁵⁸"Italian Policy in Asia Minor, January-October, 1919," Miller, *My Diary*, vol. XIX, pp. 558, 565-66; Tardieu, "Mossoul et le pétrole," *L'Illustration*, June 19, 1920, p. 381.

⁵⁹Vicomte Robert de Caix, "L'état présent des questions orientales et l'intérêt français," *L'Asie française*, 1918-19, pp. 169-79.

⁶⁰The text is given in Miller, *My Diary*, vol. XVI, pp. 511-13.

⁶¹Cabled report to the United States Department of State of a meeting on September 15, 1919, in M. Clemenceau's room at the War Office, Paris, *ibid.*, pp. 513-14.

⁶²Lloyd George to Clemenceau, Oct. 18, 1919; Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, pp. 1082-1100.

⁶³Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 301.

⁶⁴Paris Peace Conference, "Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, held in the Salle de l'Horloge, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, June 17, 1919, at 11:00 a.m.," *B. C. Records* (Hoover Library Peace Conference Documents), vol. VII, BC-62.

⁶⁵Miller, *My Diary*, vol. XVI, pp. 479-84.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 475-79.

⁶⁷Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, pp. 1104-9.

⁶⁸Earl of Zetland (Lord Ronaldshay), *The Life of Lord Curzon: Being the Authorized Biography of George Nathaniel, Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*, K.G. (3 vols., London, 1928), vol. III, p. 271.

⁶⁹Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 302-5; Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. VI, p. 157.

⁷⁰Official communiqués, April 18 and 19, 1920, *The Manchester Guardian*, April 19 and 20, 1920.

⁷¹Anis Saghir, *Le Sionisme et le mandat anglais en Palestine* (Paris, 1932), p. 103.

⁷²The text of the agreement signed by Philippe Berthelot and Sir John Cadman at San Remo on April 24, 1920, is given in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1920*, Cmd. 675 (London, 1920). Regarding the agreement of April, 1919, signed by Henry Bérenger and Walter F. D. Long and that signed in December, 1919, by Berthelot and Sir Hamar Greenwood, see Tardieu, "Mossoul et le pétrole," *L'Illustration*, June 19, 1920, pp. 381-82; Pierre L'Espagnol de la Tramereye, *The World-Struggle for Oil* (London, 1923), pp. 170-71; Henry H. Cumming, *Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East: The Decline of French Influence* (London, 1938), p. 96.

⁷³Two excerpts from the secretary's notes of this conversation are given by Lloyd George in *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, pp. 1163-75, 1182-90. They are separated by extraneous material and are undated. Reference to Paris Peace Conference, *Index to the Interallied Conference Documents, March 16-May 1, 1920* (Hoover Library Peace Conference Documents), p. 40, however, indicates that a conversation on these topics and apparently in the same terms took place at San Remo on April 24, 1920.

⁷⁴*The Manchester Guardian*, April 26, 1920.

⁷⁵See Paris Peace Conference, *Index to the Interallied Conference Documents, March 16-May 1, 1920* (Hoover Library Peace Conference Documents), p. 35.

⁷⁶*The Manchester Guardian*, April 20, 1920.

⁷⁷*The Times*, April 28, 1920.

⁷⁸Article 95 read: "The High Contracting Parties agree to entrust, by application of the provisions of Article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as may be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a Mandatory to be selected by the said Powers. The Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on Novem-

ber 2, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

"The Mandatory undertakes to appoint as soon as possible a special Commission to study and regulate all questions and claims relating to the different religious communities. In the composition of this Commission the religious interests concerned will be taken into account. The Chairman of the Commission will be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations." Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1920*, Cmd. 964 (London, 1920).

⁷⁹W. F. Boustany, *The Palestine Mandate, Invalid and Impracticable: A Contribution of Arguments and Documents towards the Solution of the Palestine Problem* (Beirut, 1936), pp. 20-22.

⁸⁰See a memorandum by Sir William Finlay, K.C., dated April 8, 1921, presented to the League of Nations by the Committee of Jewish Delegations. *League of Nations Official Journal*, vol. II (1921), pp. 443-44.

⁸¹The text is reproduced in Eliot G. Mears, *Modern Turkey: A Politico-Economic Interpretation, 1908-1923* (New York, 1924), p. 658.

⁸²The minutes of the Lausanne Conference have been published as Lausanne Conference, *Conférence de Lausanne sur les affaires du Proche-Orient (1922-1923)*. *Recueil des actes de la conférence* (6 vols., Paris, 1923). A partial publication of the minutes of the first part of the conference was made in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1923*, Cmd. 1814 (London, 1923).

⁸³Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1923*, Cmd. 1929 (London, 1923), Articles 16, 27.

⁸⁴Bentwich, *Palestine*, p. 101. The words describe the author's opinion of what the mandatory instrument actually accomplished but are noteworthy in revealing what the Zionists hoped to secure.

⁸⁵The text of this draft was communicated to David Hunter Miller in a letter from Felix Frankfurter, dated March 28, 1919. *My Diary*, vol. VII, pp. 369-75.

⁸⁶House to Wilson, Aug. 9, 1919; *ibid.*, vol. XX, pp. 383-89.

⁸⁷House to Wilson, Sept. 19, 1919; *ibid.*, pp. 420-21.

⁸⁸League of Nations, Council, *Procès-Verbal of the Seventh Session* (London, 1920), p. 27.

⁸⁹League of Nations, Council, *Procès-Verbal of the Eighth Session* (London, 1920), pp. 39-43, 49-51, 63, 177-89, 191. See also *League of Nations Official Journal*, vol. I (1920), pp. 334-41.

⁹⁰League of Nations, Council, *Procès-Verbal of the Tenth Session* (London, 1920), pp. 23, 25-27, 59, 185-87, 189-93, 195-97. See also *League of Nations Official Journal*, vol. I (1920), No. 8, pp. 30-33.

⁹¹Franz Friedmann, *Das Palästina-mandat* (Prague, 1936), pp. 17-18.

⁹²Cohen, *The Progress of Zionism*, pp. 45, 49; Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine*, p. 69. See also *The Times*, Dec. 14, 1920.

⁹³The text is given in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1176 (London, 1921), pp. 5-9.

⁹⁴See *Palestine*, Feb. 21, 1920, pp. 9-12; Sept. 25, 1920, pp. 28-30; *The Times*, Oct. 25, Nov. 27, Dec. 14, 1920. See also a telegram sent on February 16, 1920, by Justice Brandeis to Dr. Weizmann for communication to Lloyd George in which the Zionist Organization of America declared that the Balfour Declaration could not be fulfilled unless the requested frontiers were secured. Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, pp. 1179-80.

⁹⁵Lloyd George gives excerpts from the minutes of conversations with Berthelot on this topic, undated, and in the midst of minutes of the San Remo Conference. *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, pp. 1176-81. It is not impossible, however, that they took place during the London Conference, February 12-23, 1920, at which the question of Palestine frontiers was reported to have been discussed. *Palestine*, Feb. 21, 1920, pp. 9-12.

⁹⁶The text of this convention, sometimes referred to as the Leygues-Har-

dinge treaty, is given in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1921, Cmd. 1195 (London, 1921). The Haifa-Persian Gulf Railway has not been built and the British oil pipeline is located considerably to the south of the frontier, passing through Mafrug on the Hejaz Railway in Trans-Jordan.

⁹⁷The texts of the Frontier Commission's report and of the exchange of notes are given in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1923, Cmd. 1910 (London, 1923). The frontier to the east of Al-Hamma was not settled until October 31, 1931, when an Anglo-French convention placing all the Druze settlements south of Jebel ed Druz in the French mandate was signed in Paris. Great Britain, C. O., *Palestine Report*, 1931, Colonial No. 75 (London, 1932), pp. 207-10.

⁹⁸League of Nations, Council, *Procès-Verbal of the Eleventh Session* (Geneva, 1920), *passim*. See also *League of Nations Official Journal*, vol. II (1921), p. 84.

⁹⁹League of Nations, Council, *Minutes of the Twelfth Session* (Geneva, 1921), pp. 10-12, 28, 70-76. See also *League of Nations Official Journal*, vol. II (1921), pp. 137-43.

¹⁰⁰League of Nations, Council, *Minutes of the Fourteenth Session* (Geneva, 1921), pp. 119, 168-71.

¹⁰¹For the significant documents in the early negotiations, see Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1921, Cmd. 1226 (London, 1921) and United States, Department of State, *Mandate for Palestine* (Washington, 1931). The correspondence exchanged after February, 1921, is given only in the latter publication. The text of the treaty is given in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1924-25, Cmd. 2559 (London, 1925), pp. 107-15.

¹⁰²*League of Nations Official Journal*, vol. III (1922), pp. 112, 188-89 (Minutes of the Sixteenth Session of the Council).

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, pp. 518-19, 546-49 (Minutes of the Eighteenth Session of the Council).

¹⁰⁴See Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1922, Cmd. 1708 (London, 1922); *The New York Times*, May 28, 1922.

¹⁰⁵Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1922, Cmd. 1708, pp. 7-8.

¹⁰⁶At the Twentieth Session of the Council, Lord Balfour sought to secure approval for a commission composed of Christian, Moslem and Jewish sub-commissions and presided over by an American Protestant. The Catholic powers rejected this scheme, but found it impossible to present any agreed alternative. *League of Nations Official Journal*, vol. III (1922), pp. 1149-54 (Minutes of the Twentieth Session of the Council). As a result the Holy Places Commission has not been constituted.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 791-93, 798-802, 817-25 (Minutes of the Nineteenth Session of the Council).

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, vol. IV (1923), pp. 1349, 1355 (Minutes of the Twenty-sixth Session of the Council).

¹⁰⁹For the text of the mandate, see Appendix.

CHAPTER FOUR

¹Vivian Gabriel, "The Troubles of the Holy Land," *The Edinburgh Review*, vol. CCXXXV (1922), pp. 13-14.

²*The Times*, April 5, 1920.

³*Ibid.*, April 20, 1920.

⁴A few extremists suspected that Samuel's appointment was intended to cover a repudiation of the Balfour Declaration, since in a desire to prove his fairness he would favor the Arabs. See, for example, a letter from Israel Zangwill in *The Spectator*, July 3, 1920, p. 12.

⁵On April 28, 1920, the Chief Administrator read the Balfour Declaration to an assembly of Arab notables at Acre.

⁶See *The Spectator*, June 19, 1920, pp. 814-15; June 26, 1920, p. 855.

⁷Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Lords*, Fifth Series, vol. XL, cols. 1010-11.

⁸*The Times*, April 5, June 14, July 12, 1920; *Palestine*, July 17, 1920, pp. 180-83.

⁹Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1920-1921* (London, 1922), pp. 47-48.

¹⁰See, for example, his "Before the Paris Conference" in *Asia*, vol. XIX (1919), pp. 105-6.

¹¹Elizabeth Titzel, "The Too Much Promised Land," *ibid.*, vol. XXIII (1923), p. 256.

¹²Samuel, *Unholy Memories of the Holy Land*, pp. 67-68. Richmond resigned in 1924 but was reappointed to the non-political position of Director of Antiquities in which he served from 1927 to 1937.

¹³Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, p. 180. The appointment of Haj Amin was engineered as part of a scheme to obtain support from both of the important Arab family parties. The military governor of Jerusalem had dismissed Musa Kazem al-Husaini from the position of mayor following the Nebi Musa riots and had replaced him by Ragheb Nashashibi, the leader of the opposing faction. Upon the death of Kamel al-Husaini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, in March, 1921, the Moslem leaders, in accordance with Turkish law, presented a panel of names from which Samuel was to select as Mufti one of the three persons receiving the highest number of votes. The first three names were those of Nashashibi candidates; the fourth, that of Amin al-Husaini. Wishing to keep a balance between the parties in the civic and religious honors of Jerusalem, Samuel induced one of the Nashashibi candidates to retire and selected Haj Amin.

¹⁴The text of the Mudawara Lands Agreement, November 19, 1921, is given in *Palestine, Legislation of Palestine, 1918-1925*, vol. II, pp. 500-505. The Zionists claimed that the Arabs received more land than they could cultivate and sold it at profiteering prices to Jews and that this concession to what was technically little more than squatter rights encouraged Arabs to lay fraudulent claims to government lands sold or leased to Jews.

¹⁵Immigration Ordinance, 1920 (Aug. 26), *Palestine, Legislation of Palestine, 1918-1925*, vol. I, pp. 637-40.

¹⁶*Palestine*, July 17, 1920, p. 182.

¹⁷Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1920-1921*, pp. 126-27.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 127; Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1499, p. 18.

¹⁹The report of the Haycraft Commission gives the official version of the 1921 disturbances. *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1540 (London, 1921). A good account from the Jewish side is given in Samuel, *Unholy Memories of the Holy Land*, pp. 70-73.

²⁰The conclusions of the commission appear in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1540, pp. 43-60.

²¹*Ibid.*, Cmd. 1499, p. 18; Cmd. 1540, p. 35.

²²*Ibid.*, Cmd. 1499, pp. 8-9; *The Times*, June 4, 1921.

²³Beginning in 1924 the quotas were calculated semi-annually.

²⁴Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1499, pp. 18-19; C.O., *Palestine Report, 1920-1921*, p. 127; 1922 (London, 1923), p. 521.

²⁵Samuel stated on August 21, 1920, that France had recently renounced any desire to extend its influence into Trans-Jordan. *The Times*, Aug. 25, 1920.

²⁶Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1499, pp. 20-21. The text of Samuel's address, delivered on August 21, is given in *The Times*, Aug. 25, 1920.

²⁷The Arabs claimed that this so-called Treaty of Umm Qais provided for an Arab Amir, a representative legislative assembly, a national army, the prohibition of Zionist immigration, and the right of ultimate reunion with Syria. League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Fifteenth Session* (Geneva, 1929), pp. 263, 267. See, also, Josef Schechtmann, *Trans-jordanien im Bereiche des Palästina Mandates* (Vienna, 1937), p. 67.

²⁸L. B. Namier, "Lawrence of Arabia," *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 24, 1935, p. 416. The quotation is from the author's résumé of a statement made to him in 1930 by T. E. Lawrence, who in 1921 served in the Middle Eastern Department of the Colonial Office.

- ²⁹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1499, p. 21.
- ³⁰Lawrence's account as given in Namier, "Lawrence of Arabia," *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 24, 1935, p. 416.
- ³¹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1499, p. 21.
- ³²This statement was finally made categorically in the first draft of the Churchill White Paper and by implication in the final statement of policy published on July 1, 1922. *Parliamentary Papers, 1922*, Cmd. 1700 (London, 1922), pp. 20, 25-26.
- ³³Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1500 (London, 1921), p. 12 (Article 25).
- ³⁴*League of Nations Official Journal*, vol. III (1922), pp. 1188-89 (Minutes of the Twenty-first Session of the Council). The text of the British memorandum is given in *ibid.*, pp. 1390-91, and in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1923*, Cmd. 1785 (London, 1922), pp. 10-11.
- ³⁵Great Britain, C. O., *Palestine Report, 1920-1925*, Colonial No. 15 (London, 1925), pp. 53-54.
- ³⁶British aid to Trans-Jordan in 1936-37, for example, consisted of direct grants of 55,000 pounds for administration, 31,534 pounds for the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, and 31,072 pounds toward payment of the Ottoman Public Debt, and an indirect grant of 12,904 pounds from the Colonial Development Fund. Great Britain, C. O., *Palestine Report, 1937*, Colonial No. 146 (London, 1938), p. 366.
- ³⁷Great Britain, C. O., *Palestine Report, 1925*, Colonial No. 20 (London, 1926), p. 8; *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CLXXXVI, cols. 44-45.
- ³⁸Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1928*, Cmd. 3069 (London, 1928). Ratifications were exchanged on October 31, 1929.
- ³⁹Great Britain, C. O., *Palestine Report, 1928*, Colonial No. 40 (London, 1929), p. 99; 1929, Colonial No. 47 (London, 1930), pp. 139-40. The text of the Organic Law is given in Trans-Jordan, *Legislation of Transjordan, 1918-1930*, compiled by C. R. W. Seton (London, 1931), pp. 397-408.
- ⁴⁰See, for example, *The New Statesman*, Feb. 12, 1921, pp. 551-52; *The Spectator*, June 5, 1920, p. 746; Sept. 3, 1921, p. 287.
- ⁴¹See *The Spectator*, June 19, 1920, pp. 814-15; Jan. 15, 1921, pp. 68-69; June 25, 1921, pp. 803-4; April 22, 1922, pp. 484-85. Following a visit of Lord Northcliffe to Palestine early in 1922, during which he became convinced that the Arabs were being unfairly treated, the influence of *The Times* also was in general exerted against the national home policy until death removed Northcliffe from control of the paper. *The Times*, Feb.-Aug., 1922.
- ⁴²See *The New Statesman*, June 24, 1922, p. 310; July 8, 1922, pp. 376-77. The policy of this journal with regard to Palestine showed startling and sudden gyrations.
- ⁴³*The Times* took this position before Northcliffe's visit to the Holy Land. See editorials on May 14 and June 16, 1921.
- ⁴⁴Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CXXXVIII, cols. 539-42.
- ⁴⁵See Churchill's statement in Parliament on June 14, 1921, in which he said: "The difficulty about this promise of a national home for the Jew in Palestine is that it conflicts with our regular policy of consulting the wishes of the people in the mandated territories and of giving them representative institutions as soon as they are fit for them, which institution in this case they would use to veto any further Jewish immigration." *Ibid.*, vol. CXLIII, cols. 265-90.
- ⁴⁶Palestine delegates attended the General Syrian Congresses in Damascus in 1919 and 1920 which were, therefore, regarded as the first two Arab Congresses.
- ⁴⁷A translation of the resolutions adopted by this congress is given in Matiel E. T. Mogannam, *The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem* (London, 1937), pp. 125-27.
- ⁴⁸Palestine Arab Congress, *Report on the State of Palestine, presented to the Right Honourable Mr. Winston Churchill, P. C., M. P., by the Executive*

Committee of the Third Arab Palestine Congress. Jerusalem, March 28, 1921 (Jerusalem, 1921).

⁴⁹*The Times*, April 2, 1921.

⁵⁰League of Nations, *Draft Mandate for Palestine. Letters Dated September 2nd and 10th, 1921, from the Palestine Arab Delegation* (Geneva, 1921).

⁵¹London, 1921. See, also, a refutation by Leonard J. Stein, *The Truth About Palestine: A Reply to the Palestine Arab Delegation* (London, 1922).

⁵²Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1499, p. 10.

⁵³A résumé of the draft order-in-council appeared in *The Times*, Feb. 10, 1922.

⁵⁴Palestine Arab Delegation to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Feb. 21, 1922; Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1922*, Cmd. 1700, pp. 2-4.

⁵⁵Shuckburgh to Palestine Arab Delegation, March 1, 1922; *ibid.*, pp. 5-11.

⁵⁶Palestine Arab Delegation to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, March 16, 1922; *ibid.*, pp. 11-15.

⁵⁷Great Britain, C. O., *Palestine Report, 1920-1925*, Colonial No. 15, p. 27.

⁵⁸A considerable body of Jewish opinion regarded this as an enforced assent. Sereni wrote: "Under enormous political pressure and the threat that the Mandate would not otherwise be ratified, the Zionist Organization accepted the White Paper of Churchill-Samuel." Sereni and Ashery, *Jews and Arabs in Palestine*, p. 61a.

⁵⁹Palestine Arab Delegation to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, June 17, 1922; Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1922*, Cmd. 1700, pp. 21-28.

⁶⁰This body was created by the Twelfth Zionist Congress in September, 1921, to take over the duties of the Zionist Commission and to serve as the Palestine organ of Zionism.

⁶¹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1922*, Cmd. 1700, pp. 17-21.

⁶²Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Lords, Fifth Series, vol. L, cols. 994-1034*.

⁶³Concessions for the generation of hydro-electric power from the waters of the Auja and Jordan rivers were granted by the Palestine administration to Pinhas Rutenberg, a Russian Jew of revolutionary antecedents. Although these grants, which conveyed a practical monopoly for the supply of electricity throughout the country, raised a storm of protest from Arabs and British capitalists alike, they were ultimately validated.

⁶⁴Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Fifth Series, vol. CLVI, cols. 221-344*.

⁶⁵Great Britain, Privy Council, *The Palestine Order in Council, 1922* (London, 1922).

⁶⁶Great Britain, Privy Council, *The Palestine Legislative Council Election Order, 1922* (London, 1922).

⁶⁷Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1923*, Cmd. 1889 (London, 1923), pp. 3-4.

⁶⁸See an editorial in *The Times*, Jan. 15, 1923.

⁶⁹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Fifth Series, vol. CLXI, col. 2097*.

⁷⁰Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1923*, Cmd. 1889, pp. 3-9.

⁷¹The Palestine (Amendment) Order in Council, 1923 (May 4), *ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

⁷²*Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

⁷³*The Times*, July 16, Aug. 11, 1923.

⁷⁴*The New York Times*, July 12, 1923.

⁷⁵Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1923*, Cmd. 1889 (London, 1923), pp. 3-7.

⁷⁶Samuel to Devonshire, Oct. 12, 1923; *ibid.*, pp. 7-11.

⁷⁷Devonshire to Samuel, Nov. 9, 1923; *ibid.*, p. 12.

⁷⁸Great Britain, C. O., *Palestine Report, 1923*, Colonial No. 5 (London, 1924), p. 3.

riod leading to Palestinian independence, land transfers to Jews would be regulated in the interest of the Arab agrarian population. As early as June 29, 1939, therefore, the High Commissioner was authorized by an order-in-council to forbid or restrict land transfers by Arabs to non-Arabs and by Jews to non-Jews.⁴⁷ This power, retroactive to May 18, 1939, was defined and made specific by the Palestine Land Transfers Regulations issued on February 28, 1940.⁴⁸ This enactment divided Palestine into three zones. In Zone A, consisting of rural areas within the hill country and certain parts of Gaza and Beersheba sub-districts, transfer of land by an Arab to a non-Arab was prohibited. In Zone B, including rural areas in the plains of Esdraelon and Jezreel, eastern Galilee, the maritime plain between Haifa and Tantura and between the southern boundary of Ramleh sub-district and Beer-Tuviya, and the Negeb, land transfers from Arabs to non-Arabs were severely restricted at the discretion of the High Commissioner. In the remainder of Palestine, including all municipal areas, the Haifa industrial zone and the maritime plain between Tantura and the southern boundary of Ramleh sub-district, land transfers were to remain unrestricted. The British government maintained, in defense of this action, that, if limitations were not placed upon the sale of farms, a large class of landless Arabs would be created. This, it stated, would contribute to renewed bitterness and further violent disorders in Palestine.⁴⁹

The Zionists protested bitterly that the land regulations violated the mandatory obligation to encourage close settlement by barring all but about one-twentieth of Palestine land to unhampered Hebrew acquisition and that they discriminated against Jews on grounds of race and religion by creating a pale of settlement in the country of the national home. They emphasized the fact that earlier fears of creating a class of landless Arabs had proved unfounded and demonstrated that the Arab population was most numerous and most prosperous in the vicinity of Jewish settlements.⁵⁰ Hebrew demonstrations against the regulations took place daily in Palestine between March 2nd and March 7th. Troops and police were stoned, barricades were erected and attempts were made to destroy government property. In the disturbances, five policemen and seventy-four Jews were seriously injured.⁵¹

On March 6th, the Labor Party moved a motion of censure against the government in the British House of Commons, asserting that the land transfer regulations discriminated unjustly against one section of the inhabitants of Palestine and were inconsistent with the terms of the mandate. In the face of the bitterest Labor opposition since the outbreak of the war, Malcolm MacDonald presented a strong defense of the government's policy in which he

argued that the White Paper offered fair treatment to both Jews and Arabs and intimated that its fulfillment was necessary to prevent new violence in Palestine and a weakening of the British position in Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Sa'udi Arabia, Egypt and India. This appeal to expediency in time of war proved successful, and the Labor motion was defeated 292 to 129.⁵² The land transfer provisions of the May statement of policy were thus carried into effect with Parliamentary approval.

In April, 1939, shortly before the MacDonald Paper was issued, the powers given earlier to the High Commissioner to place a limit upon total immigration into Palestine were made permanent on the plea that economic and political considerations alike made such action necessary.⁵³ The quota established for the period of April to September, 1939, followed the policy laid down in the White Paper by providing for the entry of only 5,000 regular immigrants and 5,350 refugees.⁵⁴ However, many Jews, fleeing from anti-Semitism in central and eastern Europe, and finding regular channels closed, sought entry into the Holy Land by surreptitious means. The trade in illegal immigrants grew to unprecedented proportions. To meet this threat to its policy, the British government continued the plan of reducing quotas by the number of apprehended and estimated illegal entrants. On July 12, 1939, the Colonial Secretary announced that there would be no immigration quota allowed for the period of October, 1939, to March, 1940, because of the heavy unlawful immigration during the preceding period.⁵⁵ He virtually accused the Jews of an organized attempt to defeat the White Paper policy through fostering illicit migration.⁵⁶

In 1940, between April and September, 9,400 immigration certificates were issued, but the government, calculating that 16,565 persons had entered the country illegally since April, 1939, noting that there were some 8,000 unused certificates outstanding because of travel difficulties in wartime, and fearing that unemployment would be aggravated by further immigration, decided against the issuance of any schedule for the period of October, 1940, to March, 1941.⁵⁷

The problem of illicit immigration became so serious that in 1940 drastic efforts were made to halt further unlawful entry. The policy of reducing the immigration quotas was augmented by a threat to deport to some British colony and to intern there for the duration of the war any persons entering Palestine without proper qualifications. Announcement was made on November 20th that 1,771 Jewish refugees, who had recently arrived from Austria, Slovakia, Bohemia, Hungary and Rumania without certificates, would be so treated and would not be allowed at the end of the

CHAPTER FIVE

¹On July 1, 1929, the Palestinians employed in the actual civil service numbered 1,176 Christians, 1,111 Moslems and 714 Jews. Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Commission on the Disturbances of August, 1929: Evidence*, Colonial No. 48 (3 vols., London, 1930), vol. II, p. 1063.

²The Local Councils Ordinance, 1921 (April 8). As amended by an ordinance of November 2, 1921, it is given in Palestine, *Legislation of Palestine, 1918-1925*, vol. I, pp. 153-54.

³See, for example, *The Spectator*, April 11, 1925, pp. 580-81.

⁴For a survey of Jewish education see Noach Nardi, *Zionism and Education in Palestine* (New York, 1934).

⁵Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1921*, Cmd. 1499, p. 11.

⁶Great Britain, C. O., *Palestine Report, 1920-1925*, Colonial No. 15, p. 5.

⁷Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1926*, Colonial No. 26 (London, 1927), p. 8.

⁸See Moshé Burstein, *Self-Government of the Jews in Palestine Since 1900* (Tel Aviv, 1934).

⁹The Religious Communities Organization Ordinance, No. 19 of 1926 (April 16), Palestine, *Ordinances, 1926* (Jerusalem, 1927), p. 113.

¹⁰Regulations for the Organization of the Jewish Community (Dec. 30, 1927), Palestine, *Proclamations, Regulations, Rules, Orders and Notices, 1927* (Jerusalem, 1928), pp. 527-39; Great Britain, *Palestine Report, 1927*, Colonial No. 31 (London, 1928), pp. 81-93.

¹¹See the protests of the *Agudath Israel* and the *Va'ad Ha'ir Ashkenasi* of Jerusalem to the Permanent Mandates Commission. League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Eleventh Session* (Geneva, 1927), p. 213; *Minutes of the Thirteenth Session* (Geneva, 1928), p. 54.

¹²An elective Supreme Moslem Sharia Council and a subsidiary General Waqf (Pious Bequest) Committee were established by regulations of December 20, 1921. Palestine, *Legislation of Palestine, 1918-1925*, vol. II, pp. 398-402. The chairmanship of the Waqf Committee went *ex officio* to the Mufti of Jerusalem and Haj Amin al-Husaini was also chosen President of the Supreme Moslem Council.

¹³Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1927*, Colonial No. 31, p. 13.

¹⁴For the immigration figures see Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1920-1921*, p. 127; *1922*, pp. 5, 55; *1923*, Colonial No. 5, pp. 47-49; *1924*, Colonial No. 12 (London, 1925), pp. 4, 58-60; *1925*, Colonial No. 20, pp. 7, 51, 55-57.

¹⁵Immigration Ordinance, No. 32 of 1925 (Sept. 1), Palestine, *Legislation of Palestine, 1918-1925*, vol. I, pp. 579-85; Immigration Regulations, *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 334-50. See, also, Great Britain, *Palestine Report, 1925*, Colonial No. 20, pp. 130-43.

¹⁶See the table in Liesel Strauss, *Die Einwanderung nach Palästina seit dem Weltkrieg* (Geneva, 1938), p. 126.

¹⁷For the figures of immigration and emigration, see Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1926*, Colonial No. 26, pp. 59, 64; *1927*, Colonial No. 31, pp. 67-68; *1928*, Colonial No. 40, p. 91; *1929*, Colonial No. 47, p. 125.

¹⁸Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1929-30*, Cmd. 3530 (London, 1930), p. 22.

¹⁹Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1920-1921*, p. 110.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 112. The Transfer of Land Ordinance, 1920, as altered by the Transfer of Land (Amendment) Ordinance, 1921, is given in Palestine, *Legislation of Palestine, 1918-1925*, vol. I, pp. 62-65.

²¹These figures are from the census of October, 1922. Palestine, *Census of Palestine, 1931* (2 vols., Alexandria, 1933), vol. II, p. 594; Great Britain, *Palestine Report, 1922*, pp. 5, 58.

²²*The Statesman's Year-Book, 1930*, p. 187.

²³Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1920-1925*, Colonial No. 15, pp. 42-44.

²⁴*The Times*, Nov. 13, 22, 1923; Dec. 24, 1924; Mogannam, *The Arab Woman*, p. 234.

²⁵*The Times*, Nov. 21, 1927.

²⁶*Ibid.*, May 25, June 21, 1928; Mogannam, *The Arab Woman*, pp. 234-35.

²⁷League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Fourteenth Session* (Geneva, 1928), p. 246.

²⁸*The Times*, July 26, 1928. The political rights enjoyed by the Palestinians under the Turkish constitution were more theoretical than actual, but they formed one of the chief arguments in Arab propaganda.

²⁹Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1929*, Colonial No. 47, pp. 9-10; *The Times*, June 21, 1929.

³⁰See Storrs, *Memoirs*, pp. 365-67. Though Moslem Waqf cannot be sold, it can be exchanged for other land of equivalent worth.

³¹See Chapter III, note 106 *supra*.

³²A general strike of protest was held on the afternoon of September 27, and appeals to the League of Nations to assure their rights of worship at the Wall were dispatched by various Jewish bodies. *The Times*, Sept. 29, 1928; Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1929-30*, Cmd. 3530, pp. 29-30.

³³Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1928-29*, Cmd. 3229 (London, 1928).

³⁴The official version of these events is given in the report of the British commission of inquiry. *Parliamentary Papers, 1929-30*, Cmd. 3530, pp. 30, 36-50.

³⁵Frederick H. Kisch, *Palestine Diary* (London, 1938), pp. 248-49.

³⁶On July 5, Sir John Chancellor said before a meeting of the Permanent Mandates Commission: "There has been no serious breach of the peace since I became High Commissioner, and I consider that the resources at the disposal of the Government are sufficient to deal with any situation that is likely to arise." League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Fifteenth Session*, p. 80.

³⁷The Shaw Commission of Inquiry reported: "We . . . consider that the outbreak in Jerusalem on the 23rd of August was from the beginning an attack by Arabs on Jews for which no excuse in the form of earlier murders by Jews has been established." Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1929-30*, Cmd. 3530, p. 63.

³⁸The official account of the disturbances is given in *ibid.*, pp. 50-66. A Jewish statement appears in Maurice Samuel's *What Happened in Palestine: The Events of August, 1929; Their Background and Their Significance* (Boston, 1929).

³⁹See, for example, editorials in *Palestine and Near East Economic Magazine*, Sept. 7, 1929, p. 401; Sept. 30, 1929, pp. 421-22.

⁴⁰League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Seventeenth (Extraordinary) Session* (Geneva, 1930), p. 139.

⁴¹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1929-30*, Cmd. 3530, p. 68.

⁴²The text of the document is given in Samuel, *What Happened in Palestine*, pp. 143-45.

⁴³See editorials in *The Times*, Sept. 4, 1929, and *The Nation* (London), Sept. 7, 1929, pp. 724-25.

⁴⁴Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1929-30*, Cmd. 3530, pp. 68-69.

⁴⁵League of Nations Official Journal, vol. XI (1930), pp. 72, 92-93, 172-74 (Minutes of the Fifty-eighth Session of the Council).

⁴⁶International Commission on the Wailing Wall, *Report of the Commission Appointed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, with the Approval of the Council of the League of Nations, to Determine the Rights and Claims of Moslems and Jews in connection with the Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem. December, 1930* (London, 1931).

⁴⁷The Palestine (Western or Wailing Wall) Order in Council, 1931 (May 19), Great Britain, *Palestine Report, 1931*, Colonial No. 75, pp. 196-200.

⁴⁸On December 28, 1917, a Conference of the British Labor Movement accepted a war-aims program which provided for a Jewish home in the Holy Land, and on February 23, 1918, the Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Confer-

ence in London adopted a resolution incorporating the principles of the British program and favoring the creation of a free state in Palestine to which all Jews who wished might return. *The Times*, Feb. 25, 1918.

⁴⁹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CCXXVII, cols. 1462-71, 1474-86. This attack was directed not so much against Leopold Amery, the Colonial Secretary, who was himself pro-Zionist, as against the general policy of the government and the anti-Zionist or apathetic members of the Palestine administration.

⁵⁰*The Times*, March 13, 1928.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1929.

⁵²*Ibid.*, Sept. 4, 1929.

⁵³Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1929-30*, Cmd. 3530, p. 3.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 150.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁵⁷The findings of the commission appear in *ibid.*, pp. 70-171. Harry Snell, the Labor member, entered a note of reservation in which he held that the administration, the Mufti, and the Arab Executive were all more blameworthy than his colleagues admitted and insisted that too much credence had been given to Arab claims of economic injuries from Jewish immigration. Arab hostility to the Jews was, in his opinion, largely the result of a campaign of anti-Zionist propaganda (pp. 172-83).

⁵⁸*The Times*, Sept. 24, 1929.

⁵⁹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1929-30*, Cmd. 3530, p. 140.

⁶⁰Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CCXXVII, cols. 1466-67.

⁶¹This suspension was carried out in a peculiarly maladroitness fashion. On May 12th the Palestine administration informed the local Executive of the Jewish Agency that it had approved a grant of 3,300 labor certificates for the current semi-annual period. Two days later it announced that orders from the Colonial Office necessitated the suspension of all labor immigration. The Jews naturally argued that if the local administration judged that over 3,000 persons might be satisfactorily absorbed, the suspension was a purely political measure, contrary to the mandatory provision for the facilitation of Jewish immigration. Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, pp. 292-93.

⁶²Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1929-30*, Cmd. 3582 (London, 1930).

⁶³*The Times*, May 14, 1930. See, also, Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, p. 76; Mogannam, *The Arab Woman*, p. 180; *The Times*, May 19, 23, 1930.

⁶⁴League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Seventeenth Session*, pp. 137-48.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 51-59.

⁶⁶The Protection of Cultivators Ordinance, No. 27 of 1929 (July 31), required notice of termination of tenancy and compensation for improvements and disturbance. *Official Gazette of the Government of Palestine*, No. 237, June 16, 1929, pp. 710-14; No. 240, Aug. 1, 1929, p. 860.

⁶⁷Founded in 1901 by the Zionist Organization "for the purchase of land in Palestine as the inalienable possession of the Jewish people." Cohen, *The Progress of Zionism*, p. 45.

⁶⁸The Hope Simpson report was published in *Parliamentary Papers, 1930-31*, Cmd. 3686, 3687 (London, 1930). A vigorous refutation of many of its conclusions appeared in Abraham Granovsky's "Land Settlement and Development in Palestine: Some Critical Comments on the Report of Sir John Hope Simpson, C.I.E.," *Palestine and Near East Economic Magazine*, vol. V (1930), Nos. 21-22; vol. VI (1931), Nos. 2-3.

⁶⁹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1930-31*, Cmd. 3692 (London, 1930). For the official Zionist rebuttal, see Leonard J. Stein, *The Palestine White Paper of October, 1930: Memorandum of the Jewish Agency for Palestine* (London, 1930).

⁷⁰Weizmann to Passfield, undated; *The Times*, Oct. 31, 1930. Felix M. Warburg, Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the Jewish Agency,

definitely charged that at a meeting late in August, 1930, Passfield misled him as to the policy to be adopted by the British government. Wise and de Haas, *The Great Betrayal*, pp. 11-12.

⁷¹Weizmann to Passfield, Oct. 20, 1930; *The Times*, Oct. 21, 1930.

⁷²Melchett to Weizmann, Oct. 21, 1930; *ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1930.

⁷³The New York correspondent of the London *Times* quoted an unnamed Jewish leader as saying: "We can and will create in this country an anti-British movement among the Jews of America which will be more widespread, more powerful, and more dangerous to Great Britain than Sinn Fein ever was at the height of its political power." *Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1930.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1930.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1930.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1930.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, Nov. 4, 1930.

⁷⁸Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CCXLIV, cols. 18, 24, 46-47.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, vol. CCXLV, cols. 77-210.

⁸⁰See *The Times*, Oct. 24, 28, 30, 1930.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, Nov. 4, 1930.

⁸²MacDonald to Smuts, Oct. 23, 1930; *ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1930.

⁸³Passfield to Weizmann, Oct. 25, 1930; *ibid.*, Oct. 31, 1930.

⁸⁴Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CCXLIV, col. 24.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, vol. CCXLV, cols. 88, 104, 115-20, 206-10.

⁸⁶Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, p. 358.

⁸⁷Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CCXLVIII, cols. 388-90.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, cols. 751-57.

⁸⁹The Palestine Arab Executive accused MacDonald of breaking the Passfield promises as Balfour had violated the McMahon pledges and called upon Arabs everywhere to support their Palestine brethren against the Jewish peril. *The Times*, Feb. 21, 1931.

⁹⁰See *The New Statesman*, Nov. 1, 1930, p. 101; Nov. 22, 1930, pp. 196-97; *The Nation* (London), Oct. 25, 1930, pp. 127-28; Nov. 1, 1930, pp. 151-52; Nov. 8, 1930, p. 180; Nov. 15, 1930, p. 225; Nov. 22, 1930, p. 252; Feb. 21, 1931, p. 652. For a favorable reception of the White Paper, however, see *The Spectator*, Oct. 25, 1930, pp. 568-69; Nov. 1, 1930, pp. 617-18; Nov. 8, 1930, pp. 657-58.

CHAPTER SIX

¹Regulations under the Immigration Ordinance, No. 32 of 1925 (April 1, 1930), *The Official Gazette of the Government of Palestine*, No. 257, April 16, 1930, pp. 280-81, and the interpretation of category A in Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1930*, Colonial No. 59 (London, 1931), p. 45.

²Regulations under the Immigration Ordinance, No. 32 of 1925 (Sept. 14, 1932), *The Palestine Gazette*, No. 317, Sept. 15, 1932, pp. 804-7.

³Immigration Ordinance, No. 38 of 1933 (Aug. 31), *ibid.*, Extraordinary, No. 385, Aug. 31, 1933, pp. 1181-1205.

⁴For the immigration figures, see Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1930*, Colonial No. 59, p. 36; 1931, Colonial No. 75, pp. 14, 21-22; 1932, Colonial No. 82, p. 26; 1933, Colonial No. 94 (London, 1934), pp. 34, 40; 1934, Colonial No. 104 (London, 1935), pp. 34-37; 1935, Colonial No. 112 (London, 1936), pp. 43-47.

⁵These are the figures for April-September, 1933; October, 1933-March, 1934; and April-September, 1934. Strauss, *Die Einwanderung nach Palästina seit dem Weltkriege*, p. 126.

⁶Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1933*, Colonial No. 94, p. 15.

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 16, 36-37.

⁸Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1934*, Colonial No. 104, p. 9.

⁹Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1936*, Colonial No. 129 (London, 1937), pp. 236-37. The Jewish community was estimated at 29 per cent of the settled (i.e. non-Bedawin) population. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹⁰H. Beeley in Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1936* (London, 1937), p. 707.

¹¹Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Royal Commission: Memoranda*, Colonial No. 133 (London, 1937), p. 168.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 182.

¹³Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1938*, Colonial No. 166, p. 182; *The Times*, May 25, 1937.

¹⁴Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Royal Commission: Memoranda*, Colonial No. 133, p. 182.

¹⁵Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1936*, Colonial No. 129, pp. 85-86.

¹⁶*The Times*, April 16, 24, 1931.

¹⁷Passfield to Chancellor, June 26, 1931; Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1931*, Colonial No. 75, pp. 3-6.

¹⁸By the end of 1936 there had been received 3,280 applications for registration as landless Arabs, but only 664 heads of families had been accepted for resettlement. Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1936*, Colonial No. 129, p. 90. One reason for the small number was the strict definition given to the term "landless Arab," but it became evident that the Arab leaders had exaggerated the amount of displacement.

¹⁹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CCLXXX, cols. 1439-43.

²⁰The Protection of Cultivators Ordinance, No. 37 of 1933 (Aug. 31), *The Palestine Gazette*, Extraordinary, No. 385, Aug. 31, 1933, pp. 1170-80.

²¹Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1935*, Colonial No. 112, p. 55.

²²Formerly General Officer commanding in Northern Ireland.

²³League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Twenty-second Session* (Geneva, 1932), pp. 79-82.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 82.

²⁵Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1933*, Colonial No. 94, pp. 8, 30.

²⁶For accounts of the 1933 disturbances, see the report of the Murison Commission in *The Palestine Gazette*, Extraordinary, No. 420, Feb. 7, 1934, pp. 89-105; Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, pp. 82-84; Mogannam, *The Arab Woman*, pp. 225-29.

²⁷Ordinance No. 1 of 1934, *The Palestine Gazette*, Extraordinary, No. 414, Jan. 12, 1934, Supplement No. 1, pp. 1-12.

²⁸An example of the criticism leveled against the Municipal Corporations Ordinance, 1934, is contained in the evidence given before the Royal Commission by Dov Hos on behalf of the General Federation of Jewish Labor. Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Royal Commission: Minutes of Evidence Heard at Public Sessions*, Colonial No. 134 (London, 1937), pp. 230-33.

²⁹Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1934*, Colonial No. 104, p. 8.

³⁰For accounts of the congress, see H.A.R. Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931" in Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1934* (London, 1935), pp. 99-109; *The Times*, Oct. 19, Nov. 6, 20, 30, Dec. 7, 9, 12, 18, 1931.

³¹*The Times*, Oct. 31, 1932.

³²*Ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1932; Mogannam, *The Arab Woman*, pp. 235-36.

³³Mogannam, *The Arab Woman*, p. 236.

³⁴An account of the Arab political organizations by a partisan of the National Defense Party is given in *ibid.*, pp. 235-46.

³⁵See Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1935*, Colonial No. 112, pp. 4, 8; *Palestine Royal Commission: Memoranda*, Colonial No. 133, p. 85.

³⁶J. M. Machover, *Governing Palestine: The Case against a Parliament* (London, 1936), pp. 216-17. This action was in harmony with Jewish opinion which as early as 1932 had felt that the institution of a legislative council, having an Arab majority which rejected the mandate and the national home, would provide a barrier to Zionist plans and a sounding board for anti-Jewish agitators.

³⁷Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1935*, Colonial No. 112, p. 15.

³⁸*The Times*, Dec. 18, 1935.

³⁹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1935-36*, Cmd. 5119 (London, 1936).

⁴⁰Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Royal Commission: Memoranda*, Colonial No. 133, p. 85.

⁴¹Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1936*, Colonial No. 129, pp. 20-21.

⁴²Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Lords*, Fifth Series, vol. XCIX, cols. 750-95 (Feb. 26, 1936).

⁴³Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CCCX, cols. 1079-1150, 1166-73 (March 24, 1936).

⁴⁴Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1936*, Colonial No. 129, p. 22.

⁴⁵See Mogannam, *The Arab Woman*, pp. 287-91.

⁴⁶Robert Gessner, *Some of My Best Friends Are Jews* (New York, 1936), pp. 258-59. The Arabization of the party reportedly took place as early as 1930. *The Times*, Jan. 10, 1931.

⁴⁷For the official comment on foreign propaganda, see Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, pp. 94-95.

⁴⁸Official accounts of the 1936 disturbances are given in the report of the Royal Commission which investigated the troubles involved (*ibid.*, pp. 96-103) and in Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1936*, Colonial No. 129, pp. 5-20. A Jewish view is presented in Horace B. Samuel, *Revolt by Leave: Being Certain Criticisms of the Anti-Zionist Policy of the Palestine Government* (London, 1936) and an Arab view in Mogannam, *The Arab Woman*, pp. 292-306.

⁴⁹This organ was known at first as the Supreme Arab Committee.

⁵⁰Manifesto of the Supreme Arab Committee, April 28, 1936, quoted in Mogannam, *The Arab Woman*, p. 296.

⁵¹Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1936*, Colonial No. 129, p. 24; Mogannam, *The Arab Woman*, pp. 297-99.

⁵²On May 6th the Colonial Secretary told Parliament there would be no stoppage of Jewish immigration. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CCCXI, cols. 1685-86.

⁵³Mogannam, *The Arab Woman*, pp. 300-301.

⁵⁴Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CCCXII, cols. 837-38.

⁵⁵Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1936*, Colonial No. 129, p. 25. Preliminary announcement of the grant had been made to the Jewish Agency on May 12th. *The Times*, May 13, 1936.

⁵⁶Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, p. 98.

⁵⁷Proclamation in *The Palestine Gazette*, Extraordinary, No. 584, April 19, 1936, p. 468. The Palestine (Defense) Order-in-Council was enacted in 1931 as a result of the 1929 disturbances but was allowed to lie dormant. The powers it conferred, though extensive, did not include the right to declare martial law nor to suspend the powers of the civil courts.

⁵⁸Regulations issued under the Palestine (Defense) Order in Council, 1931, *The Palestine Gazette*, Extraordinary, No. 584, April 19, 1936, Supplement No. 2, pp. 259-68.

⁵⁹Emergency (Amendment) Regulations (No. 4), *ibid.*, Extraordinary, No. 603, June 12, 1936, Supplement No. 2, pp. 609-13. The principle of the collective fine upon a village, some unidentified inhabitant of which had committed a crime, was well known in the East and existed in the ordinary legislation of Palestine. Its application, however, was extended and made more severe.

⁶⁰Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, pp. 100-101.

⁶¹*The Times*, June 8, Aug. 5, 7, 1936.

⁶²When the British press and the Jews protested against foreign intervention, the Colonial Office issued a letter to Weizmann formally denying that the home government had made any pledges regarding immigration or had authorized Nuri es-Said to act as intermediary. See Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1936*, Colonial No. 129, pp. 30-31; *The Times*, Aug. 22, 24, 25, 27-29, Sept. 1, 3, 4, 1936.

⁶³The text is given in Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1936*, Colonial No. 129, p. 30.

⁶⁴Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CCCXIII, cols. 1313-24.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, vol. CCCXV, cols. 1509-15. Beside Lord Peel, who had twice been Secretary of State for India in Conservative cabinets, the commission consisted of Sir Horace Rumbold, a retired diplomat who had between 1920 and 1924 served as ambassador at Constantinople; Sir Laurie Hammond, an Indian civil servant; Sir Morris Carter, formerly Chief Justice of Tanganyika; Sir Harold Morris, for many years president of the Industrial Court in England; and Reginald Coupland, the Oxford scholar and historian.

⁶⁶*The Times*, Sept. 3, 4, 1936.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1936.

⁶⁸The Palestine Martial Law (Defense) Order in Council, 1936 (Sept. 26), *The Palestine Gazette*, Extraordinary, No. 634, Sept. 30, 1936, pp. 1070-72.

⁶⁹Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1936*, Colonial No. 129, p. 33.

⁷⁰Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, p. 101.

⁷¹See *The Times*, Sept. 22, 28, 1936.

⁷²Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1936*, Colonial No. 129, p. 34.

⁷³Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, p. 101.

⁷⁴*The Times*, Oct. 27, 1936.

⁷⁵Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CCCXVII, cols. 250-52.

⁷⁶Strauss, *Die Einwanderung nach Palästina seit dem Weltkriege*, p. 126.

⁷⁷*The Times*, Jan. 7, 1937.

⁷⁸Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, p. xi.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 368.

⁸²The commission suggested that elected members might be added to the Advisory Council but doubted that the Arabs would accept this offer. *Ibid.*, pp. 361-62.

⁸³This idea of parity proved particularly appealing to persons who wished to see the national home grow without subjecting the Arabs to its political domination. It was advocated by Norman Bentwich, the Jewish former Attorney-General of Palestine, in *The Times* of August 22, 1935, and by Leopold Amery, the former Colonial Secretary, in the same journal on August 8, 1936.

⁸⁴The origin of this plan is obscure. Beatrice Erskine presented a variant of it in *Palestine of the Arabs* (London, 1935), pp. 226-34. Archer Cust gave his version in "A New Plan for Palestine," *The Spectator*, Feb. 21, 1936, pp. 294-95; and Douglas V. Duff offered a similar proposal in *Palestine Picture* (London, 1936), pp. 265-73.

⁸⁵Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1936-37*, Cmd. 5479, p. 360.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, Cmd. 5513 (London, 1937).

⁸⁷British Foreign Office to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, July 6, 1937; *League of Nations Official Journal*, vol. XVIII (1937), p. 660.

⁸⁸See *The Times*, July 8, 1937; *The Spectator*, July 9, 1937, p. 45; July 16, 1937, pp. 92-93; *The New Statesman and Nation*, July 17, 1937, pp. 100-101; excerpts of other editorial opinion reproduced in *The Times*, July 9, 1937.

⁸⁹*The Times*, April 27, 1937.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, July 8, 1937. For a Zionist view of the partition scheme see Herman L. Weisman, *The Future of Palestine: An Examination of the Partition Plan* (New York, 1937).

⁹¹*The Times*, July 12, 1937.

⁹²*Ibid.*, July 12, 14, 1937.

⁹³*Ibid.*, July 26, 1937; Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1937*, Colonial No. 146, p. 20.

⁹⁴Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Lords*, Fifth Series, vol. CVI, cols. 599-674, 797-824.

⁹⁵Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, vol. CCCXXVI, cols. 2235-2367.

⁹⁶League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Thirty-second (Extraordinary) Session* (Geneva, 1937), pp. 13-25.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 225-30.

⁹⁸*League of Nations Official Journal*, vol. XVIII (1937), pp. 885, 887, 899-907 (Minutes of the Ninety-eighth Session of the Council).

⁹⁹The text is given in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1937-38*, Cmd. 5854 (London, 1938), pp. 18-19. See, also, *The Times*, Aug. 3, 5-7, 11, 12, 17, 1937.

¹⁰⁰Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1937* (2 vols., London, 1938), vol. I, pp. 547-48; *The Times*, Aug. 19-21, 23, 1937. The suggestion for a conference was rejected by the British government on the ground that further discussions on the basis of the mandate were useless.

¹⁰¹*The Times*, July 12, 16, 1937.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, Aug. 31, Sept. 8, 10, 1937; Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1937*, vol. I, pp. 552-53.

¹⁰³*The Times*, Sept. 23, 1937.

¹⁰⁴Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1937*, Colonial No. 146, pp. 5-8.

¹⁰⁵The Palestine (Defense) Order in Council, 1937 (March 18), which consolidated the Orders of 1931 and 1936 and legalized the emergency regulations issued under the former in the face of a court decision that the enactment of 1936 had rendered them void. *The Palestine Gazette*, Extraordinary, No. 675, March 24, 1937, Supplement No. 2, pp. 267-73.

¹⁰⁶Defense Regulations (Nos. 6 and 7), 1937, *ibid.*, Extraordinary, No. 723, Sept. 30, 1937, Supplement No. 2, pp. 911-12.

¹⁰⁷The Defense (Supreme Moslem Sharia Council) Regulations, 1937, and a Notice under the Defense Regulations (No. 7), 1937, *ibid.*, Extraordinary, No. 723, Sept. 30, 1937, Supplement No. 2, p. 913. Though the General Waqf Committee was not abolished, a commission of control composed of two British officials and one Moslem member was established to supervise the management of Awqaf. Defense (Moslem Awqaf) Regulations, 1937, *ibid.*, Extraordinary, No. 730, Oct. 16, 1937, Supplement No. 2, pp. 973-74.

¹⁰⁸See an official communiqué issued on October 1, 1937. Great Britain, C. O., *Palestine Report, 1937*, Colonial No. 146, pp. 20-21.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 8-18.

¹¹⁰*The Palestine Gazette*, No. 732, Oct. 21, 1937, pp. 1017-19.

¹¹¹Immigration (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 33 of 1937, *ibid.*, No. 736, Nov. 11, 1937, Supplement No. 1, pp. 285-88.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, Supplement No. 2, pp. 1107-8. The addition of 1,600 to the 8,000 limit upon Jewish immigration set by the July White Paper was to allow for an average number of non-Jewish entries.

Labor immigration for the period of April-September, 1937, had already been drastically reduced. On May 10th, the Jewish Agency was informed that, in view of the impending publication of the Royal Commission report, the current labor schedule would be limited to a four-month period and to 770 certificates. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *The Establishment in Palestine of the Jewish National Home: Memorandum on the Development of the Jewish National Home, 1937*, submitted by the Jewish Agency for Palestine to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for the Information of the Permanent Mandates Commission. June, 1938 (London, 1938), p. 5 and paragraph 6 of the covering letter.

¹¹³Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope, Dec. 23, 1937; Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1937-38*, Cmd. 5634 (London, 1938).

¹¹⁴Sir John Woodhead, formerly financial expert in the legislature of Bengal; Sir Alison Russell, formerly Chief Justice of Tanganyika; A. P. Waterfield, Principal Assistant Secretary to the Treasury. Thomas Reid, once Labor Controller in Ceylon and more recently Chairman of the League of Nations Commission to Alexandretta, was later added as a fourth member.

¹¹⁵Defense (Military Commanders) Regulations, 1938, *The Palestine Gazette*, Extraordinary, No. 827, Oct. 18, 1938, Supplement No. 2, p. 1361.

¹¹⁶A brief account of the disturbances is given in Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1938*, Colonial No. 166, pp. 11-17, 23. Full reports appeared in *The Times*, July-Oct., 1938.

- ¹¹⁷*The Times*, Oct. 6, 7, 1938.
¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, Oct. 8, 10, 12, 1938.
¹¹⁹R. A. Butler, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking on September 17, 1938. *League of Nations Official Journal*, vol. XIX (1938), pp. 849-50 (Minutes of the 122nd Session of the Council).
¹²⁰Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1937-38*, Cmd. 5854, pp. 48-51. These figures were calculated on the assumption that Haifa, Tiberias, Safad and Acre were to be included at once in the Jewish area. A dunum equals about a quarter of an acre.
¹²¹Notes of reservation by Sir Alison Russell and Thomas Reid, *ibid.*, pp. 249-81.
¹²²The commission calculated the annual deficit of the Arab state (including Trans-Jordan) under Plan C at 610,000 pounds and that of the mandated territories at 460,000. *Ibid.*, pp. 236-37.
¹²³The Woodhead Commission rejected as impracticable the suggestion for a Jewish subvention to the Arab state.
¹²⁴The conclusions of the commission are summarized in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1937-38*, Cmd. 5854, pp. 232-48.
¹²⁵Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39*, Cmd. 5893 (London, 1938).

CHAPTER SEVEN

- ¹See Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1938*, Colonial No. 166, pp. 17-19; *The Times*, Nov., 1938-May, 1939.
²It then stood at 2,400,839 pounds. Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1938*, Colonial No. 166, p. 182.
³League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Thirty-fourth Session* (Geneva, 1938), p. 62.
⁴Financial returns for the year ended March 31, 1939, showed revenues of 5,937,280 pounds, including grants-in-aid from the British government of 1,702,141 pounds. Expenditures totaled 5,692,671 pounds, of which about 1,597,000 were spent for defense and security. *The Statesman's Year Book, 1940*, p. 200.
⁵Ormsby-Gore to MacMichael, March 10, 1938; *The Palestine Gazette*, Extraordinary, No. 767, March 15, 1938, pp. 256-58, and Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1938*, Colonial No. 166, pp. 56-58.
⁶*The Palestine Gazette*, No. 779, May 5, 1938, Supplement No. 2, pp. 519-20; No. 832, Oct. 27, 1938, Supplement No. 2, p. 1395.
⁷Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1938*, Colonial No. 166, p. 68.
⁸*Ibid.*, p. 226. These figures did not allow for unrecorded illegal immigration or unrecorded emigration. It is probable that the number of Jews in Palestine was greater than 411,000.
⁹*The Times*, Nov. 10, 1938.
¹⁰*Ibid.* The White Paper had reserved to the British government "the right to refuse to receive those leaders whom they regard as responsible for the campaign of assassination and violence." Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1937-38*, Cmd. 5893, p. 3.
¹¹*The Times*, Nov. 11, 1938.
¹²*Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1938.
¹³See Great Britain, C.O., *Palestine Report, 1938*, Colonial No. 166, p. 30; *The Times*, Nov., 1938-Feb., 1939.
¹⁴*The Palestine Gazette*, No. 849, Dec. 22, 1938, Supplement No. 2, pp. 1581-82; *The Times*, Jan. 7, 1939.
¹⁵*The Times*, Jan. 24, 1939.
¹⁶*Ibid.*, Feb. 2, 4, 1939.
¹⁷*Ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1939.
¹⁸*Ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1939.
¹⁹Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39*, Cmd. 5957.
²⁰*Ibid.*, Cmd. 5974, p. 10.

²¹*The Times*, Feb. 27, 1939.

²²*Ibid.*, March 9, 1939.

²³*Ibid.*, March 16, 17, 1939.

²⁴*Ibid.*, March 18, 1939.

²⁵Viscount Samuel advocated one version of this plan in the House of Lords as early as July 20, 1937. *Parliamentary Debates, Lords*, Fifth Series, vol. CVI, cols. 641-42. More than a year later another version, presented by Sir Arnold Wilson, was approved by *The Times* (Oct. 12, 1938). It later received editorial support from both *The Spectator* (Feb. 24, 1939, pp. 289-90) and *The New Statesman and Nation* (March 4, 1939, p. 310).

²⁶*The Times*, Oct. 21, 1938.

²⁷The Arab delegates to London went to Cairo following the end of the conference and there held further conversations with English agents and Dr. Weizmann. See *ibid.*, April 12, 13, 24, May 1, 2, 1939; *The New York Times*, April 27, 29, May 1, 2, 15, 1939.

²⁸Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39*, Cmd. 6019 (London, 1939).

²⁹*The Times*, May 18, 1939.

³⁰Political Resolutions of the Twenty-first Zionist Congress, 1939, *The New Judaea*, vol. XV (1939), p. 347.

³¹*The Times*, May 20, 1939. The official statement of the Committee's views was published at the end of May. *The New York Times*, June 1, 1939.

³²*The Times*, May 18, 1939.

³³See *The New Statesman and Nation*, May 20, 1939, pp. 768-69; *The Spectator*, May 26, 1939, p. 885.

³⁴*The Times*, May 23 and 24, 1939.

³⁵*The New York Times*, June 16, 17, 18, 21, 1939.

³⁶Extracts from the Minutes of the Thirty-sixth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, June 16, 1939, *The New Judaea*, vol. XV (1939), p. 324.

³⁷The text of the report of the Mandates Commission on Palestine is given in *ibid.*, vol. XV (1939), pp. 319-20, and *The New York Times*, Aug. 18, 1939. The members opposed to any reinterpretation represented Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Norway. Seats held by delegates of Spain, Germany, Italy and Japan were vacant.

³⁸On July 20, 1939, when rumors of its contents were abroad, but before the report was published, the Labor Party again attacked the government's Palestine policy during a debate on the Colonial Office estimates in the House of Commons. The debate was sparsely attended, and the Labor motion was defeated by 188 to 119.

³⁹*The New York Times*, Aug. 18, 1939.

⁴⁰The mandate did not require neutrality and, while Palestine was not officially declared to be at war, war measures were made applicable to that territory. Norman Bentwich, "The War Comes to Syria and Palestine," *The Nineteenth Century and After*, vol. CXXVIII (1940), p. 262.

⁴¹*The New York Times*, Sept. 6, 1939.

⁴²Weizmann to Chamberlain, August 29, 1939; *The New Judaea*, vol. XV (1939), p. 318.

⁴³The leaders of the National Defense Party made a public announcement to this effect soon after the Paper was issued. *The New York Times*, May 30, 31, 1939.

⁴⁴On January 3, 1940, MacMichael announced that the British government would continue to bear the expenses of the garrison and to contribute to the cost of local security and defense forces and that about 750,000 pounds would be expended by the Palestine administration for relief and public works during the period January, 1940-March, 1941. *The New Judaea*, vol. XVI (1940), pp. 42-44. Bank loans to citrus growers, particularly in need of assistance, were provided under government guarantee in 1940-41 and 1941-42. In the latter year the government prepared to lend an additional 100,000 pounds to encourage diversified farming. *Ibid.*, vol. XVII (1941), pp. 94-95.

⁴⁵Lord Lloyd, a man familiar with Eastern affairs and sympathetic with Arab aspirations, was appointed Colonial Secretary. He had served as British High Commissioner in Egypt from 1925 to 1929.

⁴⁶An Iraqi rebellion in April and May, 1941, caused by internal political strife, pan-Arab and anti-foreign sentiment and German incitement, and aimed at the establishment of an anti-British regime, demonstrated the danger of Arab opposition to the English war effort.

⁴⁷*The New York Times*, June 29, 1939.

⁴⁸Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, 1939-40*, Cmd. 6180 (London, 1940), pp. 4-6.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 8-10.

⁵⁰*The New Judaea*, vol. XVI (1940), pp. 53-55, 69-71, 74-77.

⁵¹Reply of Malcolm MacDonald to a question in the House of Commons, March 13, 1940. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁵²*Ibid.*, pp. 86-118.

⁵³Immigration (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 17 of 1939, *The Palestine Gazette*, No. 877, April 6, 1939, Supplement No. 1, p. 26.

⁵⁴*The New York Times*, June 15, 1939.

⁵⁵Reply of Malcolm MacDonald to a question in the House of Commons, July 12, 1939, *ibid.*, July 13, 1939.

⁵⁶Many Zionists insisted that entry into Palestine without proper credentials was only technically illegal, since the Jews had a natural right to return to their homeland. They maintained also that the immigration ordinances were themselves illegal in that they violated the mandatory provision for facilitating Jewish immigration.

⁵⁷*The New Judaea*, vol. XVII (1941), pp. 41, 47; *The New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1940.

⁵⁸*The New Judaea*, vol. XVII (1940), p. 28.

⁵⁹Accounts of the report of the Special Commission of Inquiry are given in *ibid.*, vol. XVII (1941), p. 77, and *The New York Times*, March 18, 1941.

⁶⁰*The New York Times*, Dec. 6, 1940.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1940.

⁶²*The New Judaea*, vol. XVII (1941), p. 124.

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¹This bibliography is intended, not to provide a comprehensive survey of works on Palestine or a complete record of the materials used in the preparation of this volume, but merely to offer a convenient check-list of the works cited in the text and of a few other books of outstanding significance in the field of recent Palestinian history.

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